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Costa Rica embodies many of the characteristics which the
United States would like to foster in Central America and elsewhere.
In recent years, however, misunderstandings have often been

present in the development of relations between both nations, and
leaders.
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These differences have been particularly visible between

Presidents Reagan and Arias when carrying out their foreign policies
towards Central America.
Recent developments in warfare, social and political unrest and
economic crises in the region added to the emergence of a Central
American political leadership--independent of U.S. decision making-have increased international misunderstandings between both
political speakers.

These misunderstandings are shown by Reagan

and Arias' through their public discourses which have revealed
deterioration in communication and cooperation between them.
Since Reagan and Arias come from different cultures, their
values are different, making it difficult for the two men to
communicate effectively.

Towards discovering the differences m

cultural values underlying arguments between them, this study uses
the Toulmin model to provide a critical and interpretative analysis
of the exchange of political arguments from both leaders concerning
Central America.

Data were collected from public discourses by

Reagan and Arias.

An intercultural communication perspective is

then used to assess the effects of the arguments on international
understanding.
This research was successful in isolating a number of political
arguments concerning Reagan and Arias' respective policies toward
Central America, it revealed consistently different underlying
cultural values.

These differences in cultural values may affect the

mutual understanding between the two political leaders, since their

discourses did not acknowledge each other's cultural values or
patterns of thinking.
At the core of Reagan and Arias' disagreements is the
ethnocentric assumption that each is similar to the other.

This

assumption is not a recommended strategy for intercultural
interaction.
Because of the novelty of this type of interdisciplinary
interpretative research, the results can not be compared adequately
with previous research on values in public discourse.
Further investigation in this area should support the worth of
studying political argumentation from the combines approaches of
rhetorical analysis and intercultural communication.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to discover the different cultural
values that may underlie public arguments between President
Reagan of the United States and President Arias of Costa Rica, and to
explore the effect of those possible differences on intercultural
understanding. The arguments upon which this thesis focuses took
place in a political and historical context that is briefly summarized
below.
Costa Rica and the United States are democracies and
traditional allies in the American hemisphere. Although the former
is considered underdeveloped, both countries share similar social,
political and economic standards according to the World Bank annual
report (1986). In addition, politicians from both countries have said
that Costa Rica is the only country in Latin America without "antiYankee" political sentiments.
In a broadcasted interview (Flores, 1984) former Costa Rica
President Luis A. Monge explained that this positive attitude toward
the United States and its government is based on two main factors:
First, Costa Rica, unlike most Central American countries, has never
been successfully invaded by U.S. military forces; second, Costa Rica's
democratic system affords to all its citizens obligations and rights
similar to those granted to citizens of United States. In fact, in their
book Confronting revolution: Security through diplomacy in Central
America (1986), Morris J. Blachman, William M. Leogrande and
Kenneth Sharpe wrote that "Costa Rica embodies all the
virtues the United States would like to promote elsewhere in the
[Central American] region" (p. 17).
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As with any country, Costa Rica has its differences with the
United States. But, until recently, these differences rarely led to
open arguments in political exchanges or in economic relations.
Historians list five main events that have shaped relations between
the United States and Costa Rica. The historian Carlos Monge Alfaro
(1982) wrote about two of these events, and Morris J. Blachman and
Ronald G. Hellman (1986) about the other three. These include: (1)
the military invasion of Costa Rica by U.S. mercenaries in 1856; (2)
the U.S. political intervention in the selection of the president of
Costa Rica in 1919; (3) the military invasions of Costa Rica in 1949
and 1955 carried out by Nicaragua which, at the time, was U.S.'s
closest Central American ally; (4) the Costa Rican political, medical
and economic support to the Sandinistas during the civil war against
Somoza's dictatorship; and, (5) despite U.S. pressures, the unilateral
neutrality declared by the Costa Rican government in 1983.
Tension between the two countries began in 1856 when, after
the U.S. takeover of the Nicaraguan government, an American
adventurer named William Walker invaded Costa Rica. Both U.S.
politicians and members of the private sector supported Walker
financially and politically. He was defeated by Costa Rican civilian
resistance (Monge, pp. 208-14 ).
In 1919, after the fall of the autocratic regime of the Tinoco
family, the U.S. government intervened in the selection of the
president of Costa Rica. Monge claimed that the intervention had
been carried out "in a way which damaged Costa Rican sovereignty"
(pp. 286-7).
Tension rose in 1949 and again in 1955 when socialist policies
adopted by the Costa Rican government of Jose Figueres --supported
by the U.S. on the onset of the revolution of 1948-- provoked a
Nicaraguan military intervention backing the former president of
Costa Rica, Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia.
During the sixties, the reelected president Figueres supported
the Sandinistas guerrillas against the heirs of Somoza, and again a
decade ago Costa Rica supported the Sandinista guerrillas and helped
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them to organize a democratic government for Nicaragua. As a
result, relations between the U.S. and Costa Rica were strained as
were relations between Costa Rica and the U.S.-backed dictatorship m
Nicaragua (Blachman & Hellman, p. 172).
The fifth historic event key to Costa Rican -United States relations
is the decision made by the administration of Costa Rican President
Luis A. Monge to declare the unilateral neutrality of Costa Rica on
November 17,1983. This announcement reflected a posture of nonparticipation in any U.S. policy based on military attempts to overthrow
the Nicaraguan regime. As Blachman and Hellman conclude, "U.S. policy
thus ends up exacerbating the kinds of pressures that are antithetical to
the very kind of democracy Washington praises and the Costa Rican
cherish" (p. 181). U.S. interference in Costa Rica has been estimated as a
problem by the general Costa Rican population. In 1984 a public
opinion survey polled respondents who were asked to name a country
that interferes too much in Costa Rica's internal affairs. "Some 43 % of
those with a high school education named the United States" (Dillon,
1984, June 17). In what has often been called the "most pro-North
American country in Latin America," there has been an
"uncharacteristic irritation about U.S. meddling in their financial and
political affairs" (Blachman, et al., p. 170).
In 1987, the new president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, started a
peace initiative for Central America. He invoked peaceful rather
than the traditional military solutions to the region's problems and
opposed the U.S. backed "Freedom Fighters" in Nicaragua (Contras).
Arias' initiative clearly differed from President Reagan's policies
toward Central America. In a 1988 interview with reporters of CBS's
"60 minutes," Arias discussed the different plans and what they
meant.
After almost ten years of peace negotiations by different
groups and increasing pressures from the Reagan Administration,
Arias' plan initiated a Central American president's summit in
Guatemala. From this summit the first peace accord for the region
emerged (Central America presidents' summit, 1987). On August 5,
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1987, the day before the agreement was reached in Guatemala,
President Reagan announced his own proposal for peace in Central
America. A month later, Time magazine described Reagan's attitude
toward the Arias' peace plan as one of disdain. Reagan, the magazine
said, charged that the plan " [fell] short of the safeguards" contained
in an earlier proposal put forward by himself and the Democratic
Congressional leader, Jim Wright. In response to Reagan's contempt,
Arias said: "Reagan believes that our plan has loopholes, and I accept
that it might. No human work is perfect. But now the ball is in the
court of the Central Americans" (Smolowe, 1987, p.34).
As the Arias peace plan gained international support, the
Reagan administration adapted its position. When Reagan addressed
the Organization of American States (OAS) on October 7, 1987,
Reagan said that he did not plan to make any demands on any
Central American president who signed the Guatemala accord.
However, later in his address Reagan pointed out that "without the
freedom fighters [Contras], the Sandinistas never would have signed
the Guatemala accord, and there would be no pressure on the
Sandinistas to reform" (Reagan., 1987, p. 3). Within the U.S. Congress,
military support for the Contras decreased. As a result, the Reagan
administration kept a close eye on the second summit of Central
American presidents, which took place in Costa Rica in January, 1988.
Two weeks before the summit, Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, Reagan's
National Security Adviser, irritated Nicaragua's neighbors by
suggesting they might suffer U.S. aid cutbacks if they abandoned the
Contras. Powell also urged them to condemn the Sandinista's
intransigence as a major obstacle to peace (Greenwald, 1988, p. 39).
President Arias replied by saying "War is easy. Peace requires
goodwill from many people" (Greenwald, 1988, p. 39).
During the 1988 summit the Nicaraguan regime conceded more
openness in dealing with its domestic civil and military political
opposition. In the following weeks, the Reagan administration
shifted its traditionally friendly position towards Costa Rica. The U.S
State Department managed to expel Guido Fernandez, Costa Rican
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ambassador to the U.S., for intervening successfully against the aid
for the Contras and fostering the Arias' peace plan. As a result,
Fernandez quit his post. In Costa Rica several months later,
Fernandez stated his impressions to a reporter of CBS's "60
Minutes"(l988). Citing U.S. government sources, Fernandez said that
"Oscar Arias has been the spoiler of the U.S. administration policy
toward Central America." In the same program, Sen. Christopher
Dodd, D-Conn., chairman of the Committee in Hemisphere Affairs,
confirmed a drastic change in U.S policy towards Costa Rica. He
mentioned three examples of this attitude change. First, in
September, 1986, even though Congress had approved $80 million m
urgently needed economic support to Costa Rica, the United States
waited almost one year to release the funds. Second, although Costa
Rica is of vital strategic value for the United States, the U.S.
administration delayed almost a year before sending a new
ambassador to Costa Rica. Third, before the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) the U.S. position had been flexible in helping Costa Rica
negotiate its payments of its external debt. However, during the last
two years; it had been extremely difficult for the Arias
administration to get the U.S. to vote in favor of critical payment
arrangements of Costa Rica's debt. These changes led President Arias
in June, 1988, to tell an American journalist that since Reagan
strongly supported the Contras--who represent the military solution
rejected by Arias peace initiative--"Costa Rica and the peace plan will
get much more support either from Mr. Dukakis or Mr. Bush" (CBS,
60 Minutes, 1988).

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To fully understand the disagreements between Reagan and
Arias, it is necessary to look beyond the political and historical
context to possible differences in basic cultural values. This thesis
identifies what cultural values support each of the respective claims
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made by Reagan and Arias in speeches and public addresses
concerning Central American problems. Since Reagan and Arias come
from different cultures, their values may be different -- making it
difficult for the two men to communicate effectively. Their mutual
misinterpretations can be understood better by following a two-step
process: (1) analysis of arguments; and (2) interpretation of this
analysis in terms of an intercultural communication perspective.

RATIONALE AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Few of the writings on values in public discourse and argument
are concerned with the intercultural approach to the study of
cultural values. According to Henry Scheele (1984 ), few scholars
have endeavored to examine closely the values of the speaker either
in general or interculturally.
Among the few scholarly works found are the value analysis
by Henry McGuckin's about Nixon's 1972 Checkers' speech, Wayne
Thompson's study of values in Barbara Jordan's keynote address
delivered at the 1976 Democratic Convention, and Scheele's value
study of Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential acceptance address. Each
author focused chiefly on the use of value appeals as rhetorical
strategies that persuade audiences to respond favorably to the
purpose of winning an issue or goal within an intracultural context.
All of them (Scheele, 1984; Thompson, 1979; McGuckin, 1968) rely
on the identification of a set of values which emerges from the
speech itself. Several additional considerations need to be made to
support the identification of values within arguments from the
intercultural perspective.
First, according to Stanley Paulson ( 1962), students of
communication recognize that cultural values are often present m
public discourse. In order to identify values within arguments
between two different speakers from two different cultures, this
research will move from the study of arguments in public discourse
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within the frame of U.S. culture, which is considered here
"intracultural rhetoric," to the study of arguments in public discourse
between speakers from different cultures, which is considered in this
thesis "intercultural rhetoric."
Second, Paschal Viglionese (1982) suggests that certain areas of
study which are traditionally kept separate, overlap somehow. The
separation is mainly in response to a need felt among academicians
to define as neatly as possible the concerns and parameters of their
disciplines. Viglionese explained that although interdisciplinary
collaboration may widen a perspective, for some scholars it often
seems to cloud neat definitions of research. Condon and Yousef
(1975) respond to this assertion by stating that the universe of
communication studies is expanding, and that new metaphorical
models for the description of communicative acts are continually
being developed. They conclude that this kind of study, which
Condon and Yousef specifically call intercultural communication,
demands a more interdisciplinary approach.
Third, Lorand B. Szalay (1974), has pointed out that the thrust
of communication studies is not toward fixed, repeatable messages of
the literary type, but rather toward categories of situation, processes
and value systems. Szalay goes on to state that by doing the same
type of communication research abroad as we have done at home, as
in many cross-cultural values studies, the necessary information for
more effective international relations and communications cannot be
obtained. The rationale for using the same techniques in domestic
and in intercultural situations is supported by such factors as
professional interests, institutional inertia, and cultural egocentrism.
It is bound to reinforce cultural myopia, concludes Szalay. Other
social sciences are displaying an increased interest in the impact of
values upon argument in international political exchanges. An
example of this trend is the emerging Global Humanism School. Mel
Gurtov, a representative of the school, explains in his book, Global
Politics in the Human Interest (1988), that the line which once so
neatly divided domestic from foreign affairs and foreign from global
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affairs is now much harder to find. Conflicts which involve countries
like the United States, such as the intervention in Central America,
affect people and nations well beyond the participants. He suggests a
need for additional tools to analyze them. Gurtov states that
"international affairs are still politics, but political science is no
longer sufficient for the study of international affairs" (p.6).
Fourth, if communication researchers try to apply a single set of
values to both Reagan and Arias' arguments, they will bias the
analysis. As Condon and Yousef pointed out, when values are stated
only from the perspective of one society, it is difficult to make
comparisons which are needed for international understanding.
Therefore, the culturally different contexts of the arguments demand
an intercultural approach.
According to Condon and Yousef, any intercultural study of
values seeks underlying principles as categories both for
distinguishing cultures and for finding commonplaces among
cultures. But since each culture is a system with its own assumptions
and consistent within itself, different cultures will express different
types of reasoning. Condon and Yousef make an important warning
regarding analyzing arguments from the intercultural perspective.
They said that what appears to be non sequitur in another society
may actually be quite logical [consistent] given the assumptions of
that culture.
A unique reason for studying Costa Rica and United States
presidential discourse in terms of cultural values is provided by
Barbara Stanford (1987). She says in the United States there is an
overemphasis on the problems and failures of other countries. This
tends to give people a very distorted picture of the world, a sense of
despair, and a feeling that there is not much reason to become
acquainted with other countries. Stanford also points out that,
worldwide, there are few studies about Costa Rica and less
curriculum materials about Costa Rica than about any other Central
America country. This lack of information is due to a research bias
which allows more attention to cultures whose international
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situations can be considered bad news. She suggests more research
on Costa Rica, particularly about its value system not only to fight the
scholarly bias, but to enhance U.S. understanding of other countries'
cultures. Consequently, this thesis poses the following research
questions in order to explore interculturally political arguments from
public discourses concerning Central American issues between
Presidents Ronald Reagan and Oscar Arias.

Research Questions
1. What arguments are present in Reagan's and Arias' public
discourses concerning their respective policies toward Central
America political, economic and military problems?
2. How do Reagan's and Arias' particular arguments reveal their
respective underlying cultural values?
3. How might the difference in underlying cultural values affect the
mutual understanding evident in their discourse?
Before pursuing these research questions, it is essential that
the reader have a clear understanding of the key concepts used
throughout this thesis.

Definitions
Argument: Toulmin (1958) and Condon and Yousef (1975)
define argument as the process of determining and providing
"proofs" going from evidence (data) to conclusions (claims),
making inferences and deductions, and in one way or another
going from what is known or assumed to an appropriate
conclusion.
Persuasion: Brembeck and Howell (1976) define persuas10n as
communication intended to influence choice. The word
communication denotes that this phenomenon is symbolic and
attempt has a predetermined goal, the word influence
suggests that behavioral change of some sort is sought and the
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word choice reflects the view that the receiver has options
available to him.
Propaganda: Brembeck and Howell consider propaganda a
form of persuasive campaign designed to influence large
numbers of people, usually in non-face-to-face situations. Its
purpose may be concealed or revealed.
Cultural Value: Anthropologists Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn
(1951), have written extensively on value theory. They say
the only defining point of values generally agreed upon by
scholars deal with normative as opposed to existential
propositions. Values deal with what is judged to be good, bad,
right or wrong. Statements based on values describe the ideal
or the standards by which behavior is evaluated. They do not
necessarily describe actual behavior.
Intercultural communication: Richard E. Porter and Larry A.
Samovar ( 1975) say that intercultural communication occurs
whenever a message producer is a member of one culture and
a message receiver is a member of another. In this
circumstance, we are faced with problems inherent in a
situation where a message encoded in one culture must be
decoded in another. The process of coding allows us to move
from the traditional analysis of values based on listing values
in accordance with intracultural research.

DESIGN OF Tiffi STUDY

This study will employ a critical and interpretative case study
methodology.

The Data
The data for this study are public addresses given by Ronald
Reagan and Oscar Arias. The documents examined deal with the U.S.
foreign policy towards Costa Rica and Central America, and involve
the concepts of peace, war, freedom, communism and democracy.
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This thesis selected as data persuasive discourses identified as
argumentation rather than propaganda. Winston L. Brembeck and
William S. Howell (1976) point out that "argumentation is a form of
persuasion that employs essentially reasoned discourse while using
non-logical appeals as supplementary means of influence"(p. 19).
Propaganda is a type of persuasive campaign designed to influence
large numbers of people, usually in non-face-to-face situations. Its
purpose is either revealed or concealed, and employs such vehicles
as organization, mass media, the stage, books, and billboards to carry
its messages. Despite the fact that both argumentation and
propaganda may be based on persuasive messages, they differ in
their means and ends. The former as derived from these definitions
offers a reasoned choice among options, the latter not. The former
yields evidence to support its conclusions, the latter not.

The Methodology
Most critical and interpretative research identifies value
expressions and notes their frequency to determine their importance
within discourse. The interest in this thesis, however, is to identify
the actual cultural values which may support the arguments in
Reagan and Arias' discourses. Another concern is to learn how the
sets of underlying cultural values may affect mutual understanding
interculturally. To do this, this research looks at Reagan and Arias'
discourse in relation to their cultures. In both cases this study
travels from the particular to the general and from the speech to the
culture.
To identify accurately the structure of each discourse, this
thesis relies on the Toulmin (1958) model for the study of
argumentation. According to Toulmin, an individual who makes an
assertion puts forth a claim - "a claim on our [the listener's] attention
and to our beliefs" (Toulmin, p. 11). He explains that the claim
implicit in an assertion is like a claim to a right or a title. Its merits
depend on the merits of the argument which can be produced in its
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support. Whatever the particular nature of the assertion may be
eg., President Reagan praising the "Contras" or Oscar Arias blaming
the "Contras" - the assertion can be challenged and attention can be

drawn to the grounds (backing, data, facts, evidence, considerations,
features) on which the merits of the assertion are dependent (p. 11).
Hence, the scheme for this thesis' methodological purposes uses three
key terms: (1.) The data (D), which yield evidence, lead to (2.) the
conclusion, which is a claim (C ), by way of (3.) the warrant (W).
Terms of evidence leading to conclusions by way of warrants can
usually be phrased in this form: given evidence, therefore
conclusions, because of warrant(s). Sometimes all three are explicitly
stated in an argument, but more often the data and the warrant (and
occasionally the claim) are omitted. The relationship between data
and the claim can be symbolized as a continuum that is intersected
by a warrant which lends authority for taking the step from one to
the other.
The model to analyze arguments looks like Figure 1:

D

------------------ } (So) C
I

(Since) W
Figure 1. Diagram illustrating three main components of
most arguments according to Stephen Toulmin's model.

Or, to give an example see Figure 2:

Contras---------------------------} (So) Contras are
are anti-communist
I
freedom fighters
I

Anti-communism favors freedom
Figure 2. An Example of a Simple Argument
Diagrammed with the Toulmin Model.
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Toulmin makes it clear that the explicit appeal in the argument
goes directly from the claim to the data, which is relied on as a
foundation. The warrant is, in a sense, incidental and explanatory, its
task being simply to explicitly register the legitimacy of the step
involved and to refer it back to the larger class of steps whose
legitimacy is being presupposed. Data and warrants differ in their
appeal: data appeal to the explicit grounds of a claim and warrants to
the implicit principles which the claim conveys. In addition, one may
remark that warrants generally, certify the soundness of all
arguments of the appropriate type, and accordingly must be
established in quite a different way from the facts we produce as
data which is argument specific. (See Toulmin, 1958, pp. 99-100.)
The three elements of an argument take different forms. Evidence or
data (D) may be observed as sense data, they may be hypothetical,
or they may be an assertion of something assumed to be true or
known to be valid. Conclusions also take many forms: judgments of
better or worse, explanations of causes or predictions of future
events, and directive statements for policies or actions. Even though
the model of arguments presented implies a certainty of conclusions
arising from evidence of one or another, several scholars (Rieke &
Sillars, 1975; Condon & Yousef, 1975; Toulmin, 1958) say that
conclusions are not certain. Thus it is the function of argument to
state what is most likely. Aristotle pointed out that people do not
argue about what is certain nor what cannot be known - so rhetoric
and argumentation fills the vast middle ground of more or less,
better or worse, and so on.
In a second part of Chapter IV, a second model of intercultural
analysis of arguments developed by Condon and Yousef (1975) will
be used in combination with a summary of cultural assumptions and
values designed by Edward C. Stewart, Jack Danielian and Robert J.
Foster (196~). Both tools have in common that they focus on the
range of possible solutions to common human problems which shape
the value systems of most societies, whether Western or non
Western. It is not too much to say that a complete argument is
bound by assumptions based on experience and values. The choice
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of "evidence" is as likely to be derived from expected conclusions as
the reverse, and the warrants that link them are not significantly
different from value orientations (Stewart, et al.). The three main
elements of an argument are the same across cultures, according to
Condon and Yousef. But they do say that how one classifies
something, and what one chooses to notice or ignore, depends a great
deal on the language and values of the culture. For this reason, it is
helpful to attempt to distinguish data from evidence whenever
possible. At the point of evidence we have already symbolically
transformed the data through the language and value system of the
society in which it arises. With conclusions and warrants structurally
tied together, the relationship between language and culture is even
closer. What must be stressed is that the relationship of the
evidence, warrant and conclusion in conventional argumentative
analyses is one of consistency. Thus, in different cultures, the"same
evidence" can lead to quite different conclusions which are each
logically consistent. This is possible because of different warrants
directed toward different goals and based on different values and
assumptions of different cultures.
Condon and Yousef provide a chart of the value orientations
and Stewart, Danielian and Foster provide a summary of contrasting
cultural assumptions and values which this thesis uses in Chapter IV
in identifying the cultural values implicit in the warrants of Reagan
and Arias' arguments. (See Chart XVI.) For instance, in the
hypothetical argument used in this chapter, the warrant (Anticommunism favors freedom) would be analyzed using the Condon
and Yousef chart of value orientations and the Stewart, Danielian and
Foster's summary of cultural assumptions and values to draw the
cultural value(s) that may underlies the argument. Assumptions
about human nature, the natural world, and the supernatural appear
most frequently in arguments. To these Condon and Yousef added
related categories. These are the concept of a moral order in society,
the influence of 'outsiders' in their thoughts as well as actions, and
assumptions about natural laws or basic truths (p. 219). These
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categories are especially relevant to evidence because they involve
culturally related predispositions toward witnesses and physical
evidence.
Chapters I and II of this thesis describe the arguments found,
using Toulmin's model, from each speaker's discourses. Next, Chapter
IV cross-examines the data collected, by looking at the warrants of
each speaker's arguments, interpreting similarities and differences
which, in terms of cultural values, affect intercultural understanding
through arguments. Any interpretation of the data relied upon the
lists value orientations used by Condon and Yousef in linking
argumentation and cultural values and the summary of cultural
assumptions and values used by Stewart, Danielian and Foster in
contrasting American cultural patterns and those of other nations.
The last chapter is concerned with the conclusions and their potential
significance for future research. Basically, Chapters II, III and IV
must be described as parts of a three-phase process which takes into
account the warning Rieke & Sillars (1984) have included in their
analysis of arguments. They stated the following:
A process of analysis which permits you to examine all
relevant evidence before you search for a claim would
seem ideal. Unfortunately, argumentation and the decision
making associated with it spring up in the midst of a
problem area, there is no beginning place for it. In general
argumentation we do not have the luxury of an ideal
method (p. 52).
Both authors cite Morris Cohen's view concerning with this
methodological issue. Cohen states:
Starting with the problem which initiates mqmry,
coupled with skepticism with respect to traditional
beliefs, ones pursues hypotheses, testing them by
the method of trial and error (p. 52).
As we can observe from both remarks, the study of
argumentation is difficult. However, Rieke and Sillars point out that
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although the potential for chaos in creating or analyzing argument 1s
great, it need not to occur because
every problem has a storehouse of knowledge and
standards by which selection takes place. There is a
simple control on the mechanism; the human mind is
unable to tolerate chaos, moving inevitably to
decrease the number of options and focus on something
about which it can be reasonable (p. 52).

POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE

This study attempts to continue the interdisciplinary direction
called for by several authors cited earlier in this chapter. Combining
the humanities (Rhetoric) and social science (Communication)
approaches of Speech Communication, this study takes a wider
approach to the topic of argument and culture, generating at least the
following benefits:
A. The results of this study may indicate that the method is
generally useful, and intercultural researchers will then have a
tool with which to analyze other international arguments from the
intercultural perspective.
B. This work will be heuristically valuable.

By analyzing a
contemporary political event, we can explain the causes of
misunderstanding by looking at public arguments interculturally.
We can also reconcile two different approaches to the study of
values; the cross-cultural approach and the intercultural
approach.

C Studying discourse from the intercultural viewpoint will increase
the accuracy of assessment needed to overcome misunderstanding
between cultures. By considering potential cultural assumptions
implicit in a public discourse, we can increase understanding
between different cultures by clarifying differences.

I'

CHAPTER II

REAGAN'S USE OFNARRATNE FORMS
AND ARGUMENT ON CENTRAL
AMERICAN ISSUES

Between 1980 and 1988, the United States government
engaged in what President Ronald Reagan called "our moral
responsibility" (Reagan, 1983, p. 454) towards democracy, freedom
and free enterprise in Central America. Reagan's rhetoric and actions
during those eight years focused on Nicaragua, and what he
considered the "region's threatened nations" (p. 453) the democratic
countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. During
this period, Reagan defined through public discourse a policy towards
Central America to three main audiences, the U.S. Congress, the U.S.
general public, and the Latin American governments.
Reactions from the diplomatic arena to Reagan's Central
American policy differed from the less successful response of
American audiences. The emergence of Latin American and
European efforts to bring peace to Central America without isolating
Nicaragua, such as the Contadora group, the Cartagena Group, Arias'
peace initiative and economic aid from the European Economic
Community, illustrated the reaction in the diplomatic arena. The
approval of humanitarian and military aid to the so called "freedom
fighters" until the emergence of regional peace initiatives -independent of U.S. decision-making-- and the explicit demand from
U.S. citizens (43.7% of a 1987 public opinion poll) for less
involvement in Central American affairs (Janda & Schrodt, 1987,
p.85) illustrated the reaction within the United States.
Other factors should be taken into account to fully explain the
failure of U.S. policy in Central America. This chapter focuses on the
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role Reagan's rhetoric played in persuading the aforementioned
audiences to support his policy. Reagan was referred to as "the
Western world's most gifted communicator" (Lewis, 1987, p. 106).
As pointed out by Lewis (p. 106) he manipulated his language, his
strategy, or his style to make himself and his policies appear to be
attractive. The form ·which prevails in most of his speeches has been
identified by Lewis as recurring to narrative forms which embody
American values. Says Lewis,
story telling is fundamental to the relationship between
Reagan and his audience. Stories are not just a rhetorical
device that Reagan uses to embellish his ideas; Reagan's
message is a story. Reagan uses story-telling to direct his
policies, ground his explanations, and inspire his audiences,
and the dominance of narrative forms helps to account for
the variety of reactions to his rhetoric (p. 107).
Using Lewis' ideas on narrative form, I plan to identify two
kinds of stories used by Reagan in his discourses concerning Central
American issues: anecdotes and myths. The former defines the
character of an issue, and is illustrated and reinforced in quick
stories, jokes or incidents that are "the verbal counterpart of the
visual image." The latter structures Reagan's message. Myths are
the pedagogic images of the nature and destiny of man (p. 108).
Lewis also suggests that Reagan's narratives are based on three
elements: story, moral and common sense. The story is the primary
basis for defining the situation, morality is the primary basis for
justifying public policy, and common sense is the primary basis for
analyzing political issues.
Reagan, as pointed out by Lewis, uses the narrative form to
carry a clear message to those whose experience leads them to accept
the story as either true or as true-to-life and whose values lead them
to accept the moral. By identifying the audience members (as
Americans), the narrative "makes those who accept this identity
accountable to a system of values" (p. 109). The success of Reagan's

19

public discourse depends on the audience's value identification with
Reagan, the speaker.
A complementary approach is provided by Stephen E.
Toulmin's The uses of argument (1958). As Reagan expresses his
viewpoints about a situation using narrative forms, he makes
assertions and puts forth claims.
As pointed out in the first chapter, the scheme used here
consists of three key terms: 1) The data (D), which yield evidence,
lead to 2) the conclusion, which is a claim (C), by way of 3) the
warrant (W). The warrant becomes vital for the purposes of this
study because within warrants are the underlying values which
sustain the claims. The warrant must be examine in order to find the
moral or values in Reagan's narrative arguments.
In order to describe and analyze Reagan's discourses, in the
light of Lewis' narrative forms and Toulmin's approaches, twentyseven arguments from seven discourses have been selected. The
following criteria has been used to select and analyzed both Reagan's
discourses: explicitness of the claims made, disregard of redundant
arguments, and focus on Central American issues. Similar criteria are
used in the next chapter with Arias' discourses. All twenty-seven
arguments were studied, and twenty-three were chosen for this
chapter to represent sufficiently the different common themes or
lines of argument used by Reagan. Each of the chosen discourses are
described; their arguments are made explicit; the themes which they
support are introduced; and the type of reasoning as well as the
warrants supporting the claims are described and analyzed.

DESCRIPTION OF ARGUMENTS

This chapter is based on data from seven discourses made
public by Ronald Reagan between 1982 and 1988, concerning specific
U.S. foreign policy toward Central America in general and Nicaragua
in particular. These discourses were chosen as representative of the
policies articulated by the Reagan administration during its eight
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years in power. Three of them were presented before the U.S.
Congress, two during the "State of the Union" address (1987 and
1988), and one as requested by the President (1983). Two other
discourses were delivered to the American people via television and
radio in 1984, 1986, and the last two before specifically Latin
American audiences in 1982 and 1987. The main topic of these
discourses are described below.
"The problems in Central America" (1983), a speech delivered
to a joint session of Congress, had three main objectives: (1) to
explain the strategic value of Central America to the U.S. and the
threat of a Nicaragua Soviet-Cuban backed government; to U.S.
security, (2) to describe the road to democracy, freedom, and peace
that most Central American countries, except Nicaragua, have
followed; and (3) to advise that the U.S should act now instead of
regretting inaction later.
The 1987 and 1988 "State of the Union" addresses, delivered to
Congress, had two common objectives: (1) to address the cause of
freedom as well as the willingness of the U .S to support its allies in
Central America, and (2) to remind Congress that the U.S. does not
need to intervene directly in Central America if the Nicaragua
freedom fighters are helped by the Congress.
"Central American Policy: No communist colonies in America"
(1984) and "Nicaragua: Aiding the Contras" (1986) were speeches
delivered to the American people. They shared three basic concerns:
(1) Soviet and Cuban dominance in Central America through
Nicaragua; (2) new requests for aid to the Nicaragua freedom fighters
to finish-off a"terrorist" state, and (3) threats to flourishing
democracies in Central America and U.S interests, represented by
Nicaraguan expansionist intent.
"Aid to the Caribbean Basin: Freedom is our common destiny"
and "Central America at a critical juncture" were addresses delivered
before the Organization of American States on February 24, 1982 and
on October 7, 1987, respectively. Both seem to have had four main
purposes: (1) to stress the consubstantiality of US interests and
those of Latin American and Caribbean countries by looking at the
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similarity between US values and Latin American and Caribbean
values; (2) to encourage counteraction of the peace rhetoric from the
Sandinistas by exploiting some aspects of the new peace initiatives
led by democratic nations in the region and downplaying others; (3)
to describe the expansionist and threatening role of Nicaragua as a
terrorist state backed by Cuba and Soviet Union; and (4) to stress
moral commitment of the U.S. to allies in the region and to the
freedom fighters against Nicaragua.
Seven recurrent themes can be found in these seven
discourses:
(1) Central America is of great strategic value for the U.S. both
because of the past history of the region and because of a "common
destiny" for both US and the Caribbean basin countries.
(2) Nicaragua is a threat because of the military build-up and
communist ideology encouraged by Soviet and Cuban presence.
Therefore, the Sandinistas can't be trusted.
(3) Democracy, economic freedom, human rights are flourishing m
Central America despite Nicaragua danger.
(4) Freedom fighters must be funded because they are fighting
communism thus protecting America's doorstep.
(5) The U.S. has a moral commitment to defend freedom,
democracy and economic freedom everywhere, but particularly it
must do so in its zones of influence.
(6) The U.S favors diplomatic efforts, dialogue, and peace, but the
Sandinistas are only interested in aggression and terrorism.
(7) Unwillingness from the U.S to aid its allies in Central America
and restrain Soviet expansion may weaken the trust of other allies
who depend on the U.S. to protect them. The U.S. has a stake in
preserving stability.
These seven themes are illustrated in Reagan's rhetoric by a
selection of arguments which are representative of the whole set of
arguments by each speaker's discourse. (See appendix of arguments.)
Each argument, is part of the twenty-seven studied, and each is
assigned a Roman numeral in the arguments chart on the next pages.
There is a continuous reference to these numerals in describing and
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analyzing each speech's narrative structure after the following
descriptive section of this chapter.
Arguments offered by Reagan in supporting of the first
common theme, Central America' strategic value, are shown in
Chart I.
Regarding the second common theme, that the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua cannot be trusted because they are communist, backed by
the Soviets and the Cubans, Reagan offers several arguments as
shown in Chart II.
In considering his third theme, that Central America is a region
of flourishing democracies where economic freedom and human
rights are improving, Reagan puts forth the arguments shown in
Chart Ill.
The fourth common theme repeated in Reagan's discourse 1s
that Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters are striving for freedom and
democracy against the Sandinistas communists, and thus the
Freedom Fighters defend American interests and principles. These
claims are supported by the arguments in Chart IV.
The fifth common theme is represented by claims made by
Reagan concerning a moral commitment toward freedom and
democracy in Central America and support for those who fight for
freedom and independence as shown in Chart V.
The sixth common theme claims U.S. commitment to the use of
negotiation and diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Central America
as opposed to the violent tactics of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas.
Reagan's supportive arguments are in Chart VI.
The last topic is grounded in the Reagan Administration's
concern that weaken the U.S. alliance with Central American nations
remain strong. As Reagan put it, if Central America fell into
communist hands, the security of the U.S. and its allies would be
compromised. This is shown in Chart VII.
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CHART I
FOUREXAMPLESOFREAGAN'SARGUMENTSON
THE FIRST COMMON THEME, CEN1RAL

AMERICA' STRATEGIC VALUE
Discourse
.llaa
No
P. #
1
322
[There are several
(I)
reasons why the US
and Latin America
share a common
destiny]
Argument by generalization

Warrant
(Since) Nations who seek
and share common destiny
are consubstantial.

John F. Kennedy said People who share some
that "all people in
aspirations are the same
America have the
mission to demonstrate
that man's unsatisfied
aspiration for economic
progress and social
justice can best be
achieved by free
men working within
the framework of
democratic institutions."
Argument by classification
1

322

(II)

"[CA] problems
directly affect the
the securit)' and
well-being of [US]
people."
Argument by parallel case
2

450

(VII)

4

386

(XVI)

.c.l.a.im
"We are the new world
We [Latin America and
the US] are all
America"

(So)"In the
commitment to
freedom and
independence, the
people of the
hemisphere [are] one."

Region which affects the
(So)"Central America
and security and well-being is the U.S.lifeline to
of the U.S.are as important
outside world."
as the U.S.proper.

Nicaragua is a Soviet- The Soviet Union and Cuba
Cuban backed
back regimes because of
communist regime.
a desire to dominate.

(So) "[The] Soviets and
[the] Cubans can
become the dominant
power in the regional
corridor."

Argument by sign

------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CHART II
THREEEXAMPLESOFREAGANSARGUMENTSON
THE SECOND COMMON THEME, COMMUNISTS
CANNOT BE TRUS1ED
Discourse
Dill
No
p #
7
261
The Sandinistas broke
(XXVI)
their promises for
democratic reforms
by failing to comply
with international
accords.
Argument by sign

wfil.Llill1

Qfilm.

(Since) Past violations
of trust can only be
overcome by large
acts of good faith.

(So) "[Sandinistas')
challenge is to take
irreversible steps
towards democracy."

"Nicaragua does
not grant freedom
to all its citizens."
Argument by classification

(Since) Democracy
guarantees freedom
for all.

(So) "The Sandinistas
in Nicaragua are not
democratic."

5

The only thing that can
stop democratization is
violent communist
expansion

(So)"[U.S] diplomatic
efforts for democracy
in Central America
will fail if communism
prevails and expands
from Nicaragua.

6

2

(XXIII)

259

Backed by U.S.
diplomatic effort in
the region,
democracy in C.A.
is moving forward
despite aggression
from Nicaragua."
Argument by classification
(XXI)
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CHART III
TWOEXAMPLESOFREAGAN'SARGUMENTSON
THE TIIlRD COMMON TIIEME, DEMOCRATIC
SUCCESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Discourse
N

7
261
(XXVII)

Data
P. #
There are signs of
democratization in
Central America.

Ari:ument by sj~n
"People in CA want
3
485
(XIV)
hope and better
lives."

Warrant

.cJ..aim

(Since) Moves toward
democracy reflect
a general trend.

(So) "Political freedom
is winning a battle ]
against totalitarism.
[... ] Freedom is finding
its way in Central
America."

(Since) Only democracy
and freedom guarantees
people's hope for a better
future.

(So)"Central American
people want freedom
and democracy."

Argument by generalization

CHART IV
THREEEXAMPLESOFREAGANSARGUMENTSONTHE
FOURTH COMMON THEME, DEFENSE OF THE
"FREEDOM FIGHTERS" IN NICARAGUA
Discourse
Dill
No
P #
4
388
Freedom Fighters are
(XVIII)
fighting communism m
hopes of democracy.
Argument by cause
259 The Freedom Fighters
(XXII)
are struggling against
the Soviets and
communism.
Argument by cause
6
3 "Nicaraguans are against
(XXIV)
tyranny and they fight
for this ideal.

5

will:lllli1

.Q..a.im

(Since) Those who support
and fight for democracy
help the U.S.

(So) "The resistance
has contributed
directly to the
security of the U.S."

(Since) Noble struggles
prevail.

(So)"Freedom fighters
won't allow the Soviets
to have a beachhead
[in Central America]."

(Since) Those who fight
communism in Nicaragua
today and those who fought
for independence in 1776
are alike.

(So) "They [Freedom
fighters] are fighting
for independence
Nicaragua."

Argument by parallel case

------------------------------------------------------------------------
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CHARTV
TWOEXAMPLESOFREAGANSARGUMENTSONTHEFIFTH
COMMON THEME, U.S. MORAL COMMITMENT

TOWARD FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY
Discourse

D.a..tll

P. #
The U.S. is committed to
(XXV)
preserve freedom and
democracy anywhere,
particularly, on its
doorstep.
Argument by cause

w fil.I.fill1

Q..aim

N

6

2
(XII)

4

452 President Truman said
in 1947 that the "US
must support free
peoples who are
res1stmg attempted
subjugation by armed
minorities or by
outside pressures."
Argument by parallel case

(Since) The commander-inchief (President) is the
protector of that moral
commitment.

(So) Reagan "won't
walk from the fight for
freedom in Central
America."

(Since) Today
is the same as
political and
stakes are the
[ in C.A.j"

(So)"President
Truman's words are as
apt today as they were
in 1947."

the situation
then. "The
strategic
same
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CHART VI
FIVE EXAMPLES OF REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS ON THE
SIXTII COMMON THEME, U.S. GOOD INTENTIONS
ANTAGONIZED BY NICARAGUA'S ACTIONS
Discourse
No
P

Nicaraguan

Dru.a

Warrant

intentions:

(Since) Nations that harbor
The "Sandinistas are
and support terrorists are
transforming their
nation into a safe house, outlaws.
a command post for the
international terrorism."
Argument by sign

4
387
(XVII)

388 There are signs that
Nicaragua isn't
preparing for peace.
Argument by sign

4

(XX)

U.S.

Qa.im

#

(So) "Nicaragua is an
outlaw regime."

(Since) To stand for peace,
a nation cannot harbor
aggressive intentions.

(So) "Nicaragua
doesn't stand for
peace."

(Since) U.S. defense policy
stresses military strength
to preserve peace and
freedom.

(So) The "U.S. will be
never be the
aggressor."

Since) The US acts in good
faith to those who also
act in good faith.

(So) "Our actions were
hardly the actions of a
nation implacably
hostile to Nicaragua."

intentions:

3
482-83 The "U.S. doesn't start
wars."
(XIII)

Argument by sign
The U.S. works in good
faith towards
Nicaragua and other
regional countries.
Argument by sign
2
451
(VIII)

2
(X)

452 The "U.S. has
What is true of these
attempted to have a
cases is true of all.
dialogue w/Nicaragua.
These are signs of war.
But, [Nicaragua] persists
in spreading violence."
Argument by Sign

(So)"Nicaragua refuses
make peace[ ... ] They
are against peace."
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CHART VII
TIJREE EXAMPLES OF REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS ON TIIB SEVENTII
COMMON TIIBME, U.S. STAKE IN PRESERVING
STABILITY IN ALLIED COUNTRIES
Discourse
ILa1a.
No
P #
3
486 Those who dissented
(XV)
in the past from the
US position against
the Nazis and US
involvement in WWII
did not stop the war.
Argument by analogy

Warrant

ClJii.m

(Since) Isolation didn't
stop the Nazis in the past
there is no reason why it
can stop the Sandinistas or
the communists.

(So)" [Isolationism]
assures war
instead of preventing
it. n

452-3 The goal of the SovietCu ban-Nicaraguan
backed"professional
guerrilla movements
in Central America is
as simple as it is
sinister- to destabilize
the entire region from
the Panama Canal to
Mexico."
Argument by cause

(Since) The US has a stake
in preserving stability.

(So) The "US will
support the security
of the region's
threatened nations."

1
(V)

(Since) The US supports
freedom (police role)
from the US

(So) "Freedom and
peace requires help
to those nations
confronted with
communist
aggression. n

2

(XI)

325 "Freedom's foes would
stamp out human
rights, pluralism, and
free institutions. n

Argument by sign
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ANALYSIS

Narrative forms
According to Lewis, Reagan's narrative discourse combines
three key elements: the story which is told, the moral which provides
a direction to the story or situation narrated, and the common sense
which makes the story intelligible and any disagreement with the
story irrelevant. The sample arguments given above are the basis to
locate and analyze narrative forms in Reagan's rhetoric on Central
American issues. Each argument is part of the twenty-seven
mentioned, and each is assigned a Roman numeral in the arguments
chart on the previous pages. There is a continuous reference to these
numerals in describing and analyzing each speech's narrative
structure.
The data given by Reagan to justify his claims are often stories
or anecdotes. In this section the story-situation, moral and common
sense elements are introduced according to the lines of arguments
common to the seven discourses previously described. This section
follows, in order, the seven lines of argumentation, focusing on one
story at a time. The arguments presented are illustrations, and not
exhaustive of all those available.
Reagan's 1983 address on "The Problems in Central America,"
stressed the Caribbean basin's strategic value, which was the first
line of argument, through reminiscences of events which occurred
during World War II. "In early 1942 a handful of Hitler's
submarines sank more tonnage there than in all of the Atlantic
Ocean. And they did this without a single naval base anywhere in
the area" (p. 450). This reminiscence was compared with a
description of the modern Soviet submarine brigade which operates
in Cuba, the Soviet-Cuban military presence now in Nicaragua, and a
Libyan airlift camouflaged supply of weapons to Nicaragua which
was discovered by the Brazilian government. Because the Libyan air
cargo could not use the Grenada airfield due to U.S. military
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intervention of the island, this last element, is brought by Reagan as
a favorable argument to foster an active role of his country in the
region's affairs. These three stories were told one after another by
Reagan, to show again how the evil-enemies of the U.S - Nazis,
communists, and terrorists- used the Caribbean Basin to dominate
and threaten U.S. security and well being (Argument VII).
The question Reagan posits at the end appeals to the common
sense of his audience. "If the Nazis during War World II and the
Soviets today could recognize the Caribbean and Central America as
vital to our interests," he asks " shouldn't we also?" The moral
behind this story is explained to the audience by using common
sense. That moral is the appropriateness of American goals, the
moral right the U.S. has to protect its own well being. By recognizing
the strategic value of Central America and the Caribbean Basin, the
right of the U.S. to get involved is validated in the name of defense of
its own interests. Reagan does not stop there. In fact, to assure the
validity of U.S. concerns on Central America, he equates Central
Americans to U.S. citizens. By listing several similarities between US
colonization and Latin American colonization, Reagan asserts that
"We are the new world[ ... ] We [U.S. and L.A.] are all America."
(Argument I) He also uses the credibility of President John F.
Kennedy to support the notion that in the"commitment to freedom
and independence, the people of the hemisphere are one." (Argument
II) If we are all consubstantial, then we may logically conclude that
happenings in Central America are the United States' business.
In Reagan's 1987 address to the Organization of American
States, "Central America at a Critical Juncture" (Discourse 6), several
events are presented in support of the second line of argument. The
harassment by the Sandinistas of an authorized peaceful
demonstration in Managua is recounted, as well as other events
which would prove that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua are
undemocratic and thus untrustworthy (Discourse 6, Argument XXIII).
In the aforementioned address, Reagan presents freedom as a
concept which doesn't exclude anybody. "Democracy," he says,
"doesn't mean selectively granting temporary freedoms in order to
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placate world opinion but permanent, across-the-board human
rights, guaranteed by a constitution and protected by the checks and
balances of democratic government" (Discourse 6, p. 2).
Reagan's 1988 "State of the Union" address included a story
which relates to the third line of argument, that democracy is
flourishing in Central America. Democracy is an inevitable outcome
in that region, Reagan argued, because it is based on "the love of
freedom that God places in each of us and whose defense He has
entrusted in a special way to this nation" (p. 258). In this discourse,
he claimed that movement toward "economic freedom is indivisible
of political freedom - and against totalitarian rule" (p. 261). Reagan
uses "tide" as a metaphor for this movement towards democracy in
Central America, and as a force which the Sandinistas cannot deny
unless their cause is not freedom (Argument XXVII). While Reagan
praises the tide of freedom, he subordinates this drive to two factors:
Freedom Fighters emerging worldwide (Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Angola, Nicaragua), and the American tradition of fostering freedom
abroad which is illustrated by Lafayette, Pulanski and Von Steuben
during the American Revolution of 1776. Reagan's story begins
inductively. He tells of the emergence of democracies everywhere,
the role of freedom fighters in creating conditions for
democratization in Nicaragua, and the importance of international
democratic support to freedom fighters anywhere shown by the
American Revolution. The story makes sense because of the common
places Reagan touched upon, such as the role of international
freedom fighters in the U.S.' war for independence and the
knowledge that communist regimes backed by the Soviets are
embattled by Freedom Fighters.
The moral, that the U.S. goal of helping democratic forces
makes democracy flourish is correct, is shown by idealizing those
who die fighting for freedom anywhere as fighting for the same
cause as revolutionary Americans did. Reagan says "[They are]
fighting and dying for the same democratic liberties we hold sacred.
Their cause is our cause. Freedom." He allows no difference between
the Freedom Fighter and the American people; "they are like us," he
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says.
This approach, which is further analyzed in Chapter IV as
relating to ethnocentrism , permits his audience to consider that
democracies in Central America should be structured like the U.S.,
because the values of the people are the same.
In Reagan's 1986 address on "Nicaragua," the Nicaraguan
government is referred to as " a second Cuba, [and] a second Libya"
(p. 386), while the Contras are said to be "freedom fighters" who are
"like the French Resistance that fought the Nazis" (p. 388). The
discourse is rooted in the fourth line of line argument which
advocates that Freedom Fighters are Americans because they protect
America's doorstep by fighting communism (Argument XVIII). The
moral direction is given by accepting that there is a "right way"
which Americans use to solve problems, particularly in dealing with
its traditional foes: atheism, communism, and Naziism.
As Lewis has pointed out in referring to the same discourse:
By using the daily dilemmas of diets and allowances
and the widely accepted evils of the Nazis and Cuba as
parallels to current American policy-making, Reagan
suggests that what might have been seen as complex and
distant problems are amenable to simple and familiar (if
not always pleasant) solutions (p. 293).
Finally, people make sense of this complex situation by only
following the didactic metaphor employed by Reagan: Sandinistas =
Nazis, while Freedom Fighters= French resistance. This example also
reflects the type of reasoning known as analogy which is, among
other reasoning types, later explored when the way how Reagan
asserts his arguments is explained by the warrants found.
The fifth line of argument is conveyed strongly in Reagan's
1987 speech "Central America in a critical juncture" (Discourse 6) to
the Organization of American States. Reagan shares his own
interpretation of the Guatemala accords to negotiate peace in Central
America. He argues that the Central American peace initiative began
with the 1979 OAS- negotiated settlement, to bring democracy and
peace m Central America and says the Sandinistas won't comply with
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the democratic expectations of its neighbors. The reason, he says, 1s
that they are a regime backed by the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, and
therefore, should not be trusted (Discourse 6, Argument XXV). In the
same address before the OAS, Reagan said that "the Soviet-bloc
Cuban forces must leave" Central America (Discourse 6, p. 2). The
reason they must depart, however, is not rooted in Latin American
concerns, but those of the U.S. "We will not tolerate communist
colonialism on the American mainland. Freedom in Nicaragua,
liberation from all tyrants, domestic and foreign- that is the
commitment of the United States, a bipartisan consensus on the
conditions that will satisfy U.S. security interests" (Discourse 6, p. 2).
The moral is presented here as a goal-setting that is, communism
cannot be negotiated in American's mainland which includes,
consubstantially, Central America and the Caribbean. This policy is
called a bipartisan consensus by Reagan himself. The consensus is
inclusive, says Reagan, of "every democratic nation in the
hemisphere." So, again, those Central American nations are
presented as like the U.S.; they are American. And Reagan
attributes to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters the same purposes,
origin and situation of the Freedom Fighters of the United States'
independence of 1776 (Argument XXIV). To make sense of their
situation, Reagan demands the audience think only in American
terms.
In Reagan's 1986 address "Nicaragua: Aiding the Contras"
(Discourse 3, Argument XIV), his 1984 presentation"Central
American Policy: No communist colonies in America" (Discourse 4,
Argument XVI) and his 1983 talk " The problems in Central America"
(Discourse 2, Argument VIII) there are explicit references to the
sixth common theme, that the U.S. has good-will and peaceful
intentions versus Sandinista ill-will and terrorist-warfare intentions.
Reagan tells the story of how much money and military presence the
Soviets have invested in Nicaragua, and contrasts this with the
mostly altruistic, economic, and technical aid the U.S. gives all the
nations of Central America and the Caribbean (Discourse 2, p. 451 ).
He points out that a second difference between U.S. and Sandinista
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policy toward the region is that the U.S. insists on diplomatic efforts
rather than military intervention, which the Sandinistas promote
(Discourse 4, pp. 482-83). The third part of the story relates the fact
that Nicaragua offers refuge and training to international terrorist
groups such as PLO, the Red Brigades, and guerrilla movements from
elsewhere in Central America, whereas the U.S. shows continuous
support for international cooperation and rule of law (Discourse 4, p.
387). The moral of each element in the story - good will vs. ill will,
diplomacy vs. violence, international law vs terror are explained in
common sense terms. This three-fold story is neatly explicit in the
following remarks: In Reagan's 1984 speech "Central American
Policy" (Discourse 3) he said " the defense policy of the United States
is based on a simple premise: We do not start wars" (p. 483). In his
1983 address "The Problems of Central America" (Discourse 2)
Reagan asks, "Can anyone doubt the generosity and good faith of the
American people?" (p. 451). Finally, in his 1986 speech, "Nicaragua,"
(Discourse 4) he asks, "will we permit the Soviet Union to put a
second Cuba, a second Libya, right on the doorsteps of the United
States?" (p. 386).
The last common theme to Reagan's discourses concerns testing
the willingness of the U.S. to protect its allies and interests in Central
America. In Reagan's 1984 presentation "Central American Policy"
(Discourse 3, Argument XV) a new story was unfolded to justify U.S.
involvement in Central America, showing the U.S.'s willingness to
defend its allies and interests. Reagan compares those who dissent
from his policies towards the region with those who fostered
isolationism during the thirties, a policy which allowed fascists to
take power in Europe and part of Africa.
Like these new isolationists, those of the past" knew what was
happening ... but chose not to face the terrible challenge history had
given them," says Reagan. Here Reagan's purpose is to label those
who dissent from modern U.S. policy toward Central America as
isolationists who become accomplices of terrorism and international
transgression, and enemies of freedom and democracy. Instead of
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preventing WW II, Reagan remarks, the isolationist of the 30's
"assured it" (p. 486).
This half-century flashback narrows the complexity of
democratic opposition to Reagan policies within the United States.
The moral direction given was that of doing, engaging in action "to
stop the aggressors" rather than retreating to the passive posture of
"wishful thinking" of the isolationist.

Warrants
The seven common themes or lines of argument found in our
sample of seven discourses concern U.S. policy towards Central
America and have proven useful to locate and analyze narrative
forms. Even though myth structures the fabric of stories in Reagan's
discourses, it is not the intention of this thesis to study the myths in
Reagan's discourse. There are two reasons for this: first, the study of
the myths is appropriate only in a specific narrative study, thus it
goes beyond the scope of this thesis; second, other elements of
Reagan's narrative forms such as stories and anecdotes pervade the
warrants by showing principles or moral direction of his arguments
which relate more directly to the thesis' goals. Therefore this
chapter focuses on the warrants underlying Reagan's claims given
certain data.
Lewis' narrative approach has proven useful by illuminating
how story, moral and common sense existed in Reagan's choice of
narrative forms, as well as how it conjured up alternative
conceptions. All the stories analyzed were chiefly supported by
warrants. As has been explained in the methodology section of the
first chapter, the warrants rarely are explicit in the rhetoric. In fact,
the implicitness of them is what allows the speaker to establish a
link with his audience. The warrant provides justification for the act
of inference require to move from data to claim (Sweeney, 1981, p.
42).
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Chart VIII (p. 40) shows a sample of warrants related to each
specific line of argument, numbered from one to seven, according to
the type of reasoning used by Reagan to assert his arguments case by
case. Even if not exhaustive, the chart shows a noticeable dominance
of argument by sign in his discourses. Out of the twenty-seven
arguments studied for this research, twenty-two of which are shown
in Chart VIII, argumentation by sign counts for 48%. Arguments by
generalization, cause and classification together account for another
44%.
Argument by sign is a type of reasoning known legally as
argument from circumstantial evidence. A sign type is based on a
warrant that everything, condition, or idea has characteristics which
will tell you whether or not it is present. (See Rieke & Sillars, pp. 756.) This type of reasoning seems to fit Reagan's concerns for specific
details or facts to support an argument. In fact, argument by sign is
frequently used by Reagan in connection with all lines of arguments,
but particularly those concerning the idea of "threat" to the United
States well-being coming from Soviet and Cuban presence in
Nicaragua, and the spreading of leftist guerillas in Central America.
Reasoning by sign is stressed chiefly when dealing with aspects
of the Central American crisis which are unclear, or unknown, and
which are presented to the audience as unfamiliar (Arguments VIII,
X, XIII,XVI, XVII, XX, XXIII, XXVI, XXVII).
Arguments by generalization, which follows inductive
reasoning (see Rieke & Sillars, p. 73) are preferred by Reagan m
arguing the consubstantiality of U.S goals and those of Central
American countries covered under the umbrella of a "common
destiny" which validates U.S involvement in Central American affairs
(Arguments I, XIV).
Reagan applies reasoning by classification to specific cases or
elements which have been identified as a member of one class. In
order to exploit what he conceived as existing similarities between
U.S. and Central American countries a remark, which was made by
John F. Kennedy, was recalled to put all nations into the common
destiny category (Argument II). Similarly, to back U.S. diplomatic
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efforts in the region Reagan puts forth a categorization according to
which the future of democracy is not possible in the presence of
expanding communism (Argument XXI).
Reasoning by cause is considered Western. Western cultures,
like that of the United States, tend to see people, things, and ideas as
causing events. In this type of argument, the data function as a
cause for the claim, and the warrant is a statement justifying the
cause-effect relationship (p. 7 4 ). Reagan turns his attention to this
type when clarity and simplicity are more important. This type is
not useful to make a case about "Soviet-Cuban threat" which requires
facts to be credible. This type is useful when linear understanding is
required, when there is no other way to explain a stance. As Reagan
points out "The resistance has contributed directly to the security of
the U.S." Why? Because those who support and fight for democracy
help the U.S. ( Argument XVIII). Reagan also said "I won't walk
away from the fight for freedom in Central America." Why? Because
he is the commander-in-chief of the United States, thus he is the
protector of the moral commitment of preserving freedom and
democracy anywhere (Argument XXV). Other types of reasoning,
such as parallel case, analogy, and authority, are downplayed in
Reagan's arguments. It seems their importance is sacrified for the
sake of the dominant role of reasoning by sign. The narrative style
which has been described to be characteristic of Reagan's rhetoric
has the sign type as a better means to achieve soundness and
consistency because of the Reagan liking for specific details. Also,
the issues addressed by Reagan often have origins - dubious,
unknown, incomplete information- and they are hard to prove by
using any type of reasoning but sign. Reagan's arguments studied
are supported by the warrants and types of reasoning displayed in
Chart VIII.
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CORRELATION OF WARRANTS AND CLAIMS

To make clear the correlation between Reagan's warrants and
claims an additional task has been undertook. Figure 3 (below)
shows the degree of connectedness between warrants and the claim
they support. In the figure, the warrants summarized on chart VIII
are grouped according to their degree of connectedness between
Reagan's warrants and between Reagan's warrants with respect to
claims. The following synthesis takes into account all twenty-seven
of Reagan's arguments (See Figure 3) to draw the main warrants and
its respective claims.
The first general warrant (Wl) is concerned with
consubstantiality. For example, [Nations who seek and share
common destiny are consubstantial] ( Argument I) synthesizes the
warrants which underlie the following claims:
(1) "We are the new world [... ] We [ U.S. and Latin America] are all
America" (Argument I, p. 322).
(2) In the "commitment to freedom and independence, the people
of the hemisphere are one" (Argument II, p. 322).
(3) "[U.S.] must help Central America and the Caribbean people to
protect those values and principles that shape the proud heritage of
this hemisphere" (Argument VI, p. 325).
(4) "Central America is the U.S. lifeline to the outside world"
Argument VII, p. 450).
The second general warrant (W2) is concerned with political
dualism, for most nations there are only two political alternatives,
communism or democracy (capitalism). This is shown by the
warrant [Communism and democracy are the two world ideologies at
struggle] (Argument Ill) which synthesizes into one the warrants
related to the following claims:
(1) "There are only two possible futures for Central America:
[Democracy or dictatorship]" (Argument III, p. 324).
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The third general warrant (W3) concerns the U.S.' role as
international policeman of stability and freedom. The warrant [U.S.
supports freedom - U.S. as a policeman] (Argument V) synthesizes
the warrants which underlie the following claims:
(1) "Freedom and peace requires U.S. help for those nations
confronted with communist aggression" (Argument V, p. 325).
(2) "U.S. will support the security of the region's threatened
nations" (Argument XI, p. 452-3).
(3) Reagan "won't walk away from the fight for freedom in Central
America" (Argument XXV, p. 4).
The fourth general warrant (W4) describes the U.S. as a
responsible and fair power. The warrant [the U.S. acts in good faith
to those who also act in good faith] (Argument VIII) is at the core of
the warrants which support the following claims:
(1) "Our actions were hardly the actions of a nation implacably
hostile to Nicaragua" (Argument VIII, p. 451).
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CHART VIII
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF WARRANTS LINKED TO TYPES
OF REASONING SUPPORTING REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS
Argument Common Theme

Warrant

Reasoning type

I

Nations who seek and
share common destiny are
consubstantial.

Generalization

II

People who share the same
aspirations are the same.

Classification

VII

Regions
security
the U.S.
the U.S.

Parallel case

XVI

The Soviet Union and Cuba
back regimes because of a
desire to dominate.

Sign

which affect the
and well-being of
are as important as
proper.

XXVI

2

Past violations of trust can
only be overcome by large
acts of good faith.

Sign

XXIII

2

Democracy guarantees
freedom for all.

Classification

XXI

2

The only thing that can stop
democratization is violent
communist expansion.

Classification

XXVII

3

Moves to democracy reflect
a general trend.

Sign

XIV

3

Only democracy and
freedom guarantees people's
hope for a better future.

Generalization

XVIII

4

Those who support and
fight for democracy help
the US.

Cause

Those who fight communism
in Nicaragua today and those
who fought for US independence
in 1776 are alike.

Parallel case

XXIV

4
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CHART VIII
COMPREHENSNE LIST OF WARRANTS LINKED TO TYPES
OF REASONING SUPPORTING REAGAN'S ARGUMENTS
(continued)
Common Theme

Argument

XXII

4

Warrant

Reasoning type

Noble struggles prevail.

Cause

xxv

5

The commander-in-chief
(President) is the protector
of that moral commitment.

Cause

XII

5

Today the situation is the
same as then (1947).
(Since)"The political and
strategic stakes are the same
[in Central America]."

Parallel case

XVII

6

Nations that harbor and
support terrorists are outlaws.

Sign

:xx

6

To stand for peace, a nation
cannot harbor aggressive
intentions.

Sign

XIII

6

U.S. defense policy stresses
military strength to preserve
peace and freedom.

Sign

VIII

6

The U.S. acts in good faith to
those who also act in good faith

Sign

x

6

What is true of these cases is
true of all. These are signs of
war.

Sign

xv

7

Isolation didn't stop the
Nazis in the past, there is no
reason why it can stop the
Sandinistas or the communists.

Analogy

XI

7

The US has a stake in preserving
stability.

Cause

v

7

The U.S. supports freedom
(police role).

Sign
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(3) "the U.S. has sought and still seeks - a negotiated peace and a
democratic future in a free Nicaragua" (Argument XIX, p. 388).
(2) "the U.S. will never be the aggressor" (Argument XIII, p. 482).
The fifth general warrant (W5) concerns depriving the
insurgency in Central America from political legitimacy. The warrant
[Those who turn against their own are only out for themselves]
(Argument IX) illustrates the claim below.
(1) "Salvadoran guerillas are a small minority who want power for
themselves and their backers" (Argument IX, p. 451).
The sixth general warrant (W6) concerns those few signs of
war or ill-will from which a general negative evaluation can be
made. An example of this is the warrant [ To stand for peace, a
nation cannot harbor aggressive intentions] (Argument XX). This is
the core principle of the warrant which supports the following
claims:
(1) "Nicaragua refuses to make peace [... ] They are against peace"
(Argument X, p. 452).
(2) "Nicaragua "is an outlaw regime" (Argument XVII, p. 387).
(3) "Nicaragua doesn't stand for peace" (Argument XX, p. 388).
(4) "The Sandinistas in Nicaragua are not democratic" (Argument
XXIII, p. 2).
The seventh is a general warrant (W7) and applies opinions
from the 1930's and 1940's to contemporary problems. The example
offered is the warrant [Today the situation is the same as then]
(Argument XII) which supports the following claims:
(1) "President Truman's words are as apt today as they were in
1947" (Argument XII, p. 452).
(2) "[Isolationism] assures war instead of preventing it [in Central
America]" (Argument XV, p. 486).
(3) "Freedom fighters won't allow the Soviets to have a beachhead
[on the U.S. doorstep]" (Argument XXII, p. 259).
The eighth general warrant (W8) is concerned with democracy
guaranteeing freedom and development. The example selected is
that of [ Only democracy and freedom guarantees people's hope for a
better future] (Argument XIV) which is at the core of warrants to the
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following claims:
(1) "Central American people want freedom and democracy"
(Argument XIV, p. 485).
(2) "Political freedom is winning a battle against totalitarism.
Freedom is findings its way in Central America" (Argument XXVII,
p. 261).
The ninth general warrant (W9) concerns the threat posited by
totalitarism on democratic systems and actions. This principle is
illustrated by [Soviet Union and Cuba back regimes because of a
desire to dominate] (Argument XVI) .. This warrant is at the core of
those principles supporting the following claims:
(1) "The Soviet Union and Cuba can become the dominant powers
in the regional corridor" (Argument XVI, p. 386).
(2) "[U.S.] diplomatic efforts will fail in Central America if
communism prevails and expands from Nicaragua" (Argument XXI,
p. 259).

SUMMARY

In this chapter a select number of Reagan's public discourses
on Central America were described and analyzed. Using Lewis' ideas
on narrative forms, Reagan's free-flowing speech was broken down
to three elements: story, moral and common sense. Analysis
demonstrated how Reagan used his chosen form of narrative to guide
his audiences along the path he constructed from data to claim.
Reagan's success depended on the degree to which a particular
audience identified with the values underlying his words.
Toulmin's approach to analyzing argument provided a
complementary angle to this chapter's research. Using the data and
claims put forth on Reagan's speeches the chosen research
methodology extracted the corresponding warrants, which provide
authority to move from data to claim and determined the types of
arguments employed. Reagan used argument by sign in nearly half
the discourses studied here. Warrants found to be repetitive through

45
the block of Reagan's discourse chosen for this study provide a base
for determining cultural values which are inherent to his speeches
and necessary to identify and understand in order to truly
comprehend his words.

CHAPTER III
ARIAS' USE OF ARGUMENT ON
CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUES

From the onset of his administration, President Oscar Arias
defined the course of action of the Costa Rica government towards
Central American problems as "in keeping with our highest ethical
values. These values," he said, "should govern domestic policies as
well as international relations with other governments" (Inaugural
address, May 8, 1986, p. 9).
During the preceding political campaign the preservation of
Costa Rica's peace and neutrality, despite the on-going politicalmilitary struggle in Central America had been one of the most
important issues. For instance, in his inaugural address, Arias called
for an international "Alliance for Freedom and Democracy" in Central
America after promising (1) to keep Costa Rica neutral, (2) to foster
economic and social changes lawfully, and (3) to defend the country
from freedom foes using only international law. (The army had been
abolished in Costa Rica in 1948, by the former president Jose
Figueres.) (Monge, p. 14)
Between 1986 and 1989, Oscar Arias designed and executed
domestic and international policies based on his three promises. The
Alliance for Freedom and Democracy of early 1986 was replaced by
the Arias' Peace Plan for Central America in mid 1987. The Peace
Plan called for a cease-fire, peace negotiations among all the
belligerent forces in Central America nations, an end to outside aid to
rebel groups, and the adoption of democratic reforms. (Guatemala's
summit, 1987) According to Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith
in their handbook Modern Latin America (1989) all five Central
American republics endorsed the plan, as did the U.S. (albeit
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reluctantly). The Nobel Prize committee gave Arias the 1987 Peace
Prize, but by early 1988 it was clear that his ambitious peace efforts
faced great odds, given the bitter ideological and geopolitical
interests underlying the region's warfare (p. 322).
During his administration, Arias defined a policy towards
Central America through public discourse to four main audiences: the
general public of Costa Rica, the governments and citizens of the U.S.,
Latin America and Europe. Reactions to his policy both in the
diplomatic arena and by international audiences show its lasting
success, no matter how much opposition or how many obstacles the
plan has encountered. The emergence of Latin American, U.S. (nongovernmental), and European political, moral and economic support
for the Costa Rican peace initiative, which was designed to bring all
the conflicting parties to the negotiating table rather than isolating
any of them, illustrates the reaction in the diplomatic arena.
Additional success followed the 1st and 2nd summits at Esquipulas,
at which all participating Central American nations committed
themselves to reach regional peace. The disapproval of U.S. policy
towards Central America, in general, and the reduction of
humanitarian and military aid to the so called "Freedom Fighters,"
well-known in Central America as "Contras," in particular, were due
to four main factors: (1) the emergence of the regional peace
initiative independent of U.S. desires; (2) the explicit demand from
the U.S. public (43.7% in a 1987 poll) for less involvement in Central
American affairs (Janda & Schrodt, 1987, p. 85); (3) the effort by the
leaders in Central America to find their own solutions to their areas'
conflict through the Arias' peace initiative rather than following the
leadership of the out-of-region Contadora group members (Mexico,
Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia); and (4) the winning of the Nobel
Peace Prize by Arias. The last factor illustrates the positive reaction
to Arias' peace plan before international audiences.
As was mentioned in Chapter II, other factors should be taken
into account to fully explain the success of the Costa Rican president's
policy in Central America. This chapter focuses on the role of Arias'
rhetoric in persuading the aforementioned audiences to support his
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plan. Unlike Reagan, Arias has not been called a gifted
communicator. In fact, during his race for the presidency of Costa
Rica, between 1984-86, he was criticized for his ineffective attempts
to communicate with large audiences. According to an official text,
Arias was more effective in his interpersonal relations with rank-and
file members of the social-democratic party, "Liberaci6n Nacional"
(National Liberation), where he held the highest positions including
the office of general secretary ( 1979-1984) (Oscar Arias: El lider de
la nueva generaci6n, 1985).
Victor Ramirez, who was the media and publicity advisor for
Arias during the 1984-86 presidential campaign, has said that Arias
was sent to New York to be coached to improve his speech delivery
and non-verbal communication. This account was confirmed by
Guido Fernandez in his book, The first Sunday of February (1986).
Fernandez said that Joe Napolitan, who is a veteran campaign advisor
well known for his role in the triumph of John F. Kennedy during the
sixties, suggested the idea. According to this account, Napolitan has
said that
Oscar Arias doesn't need to worry because he lacks
the appearance of John F. Kennedy, or because he
doesn't inspire trust as Winston Churchill, or because
he lacks the skills to communicate like Ronald Reagan
[... ] but he is who he is, so he needs to feel good about
being himself, not trying to project a different image
because of what he thinks people wants from him
(p. 272).
The campaigner suggested that Arias go to New York for
cosmetic changes, rather than radical surgery. According to
Fernandez, the coaching session took place in September, 1985.
According to Ramirez, the main reasons such action was taken were
that Arias was so ineffective in several political stumps because of
physical problems related to his voice, pitch, and articulation, and
because his political message was often better understood by voters
through the media and political advertising, which defused the
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awkwardness of Arias' communication "skills" (V. Ramirez, personal
communication, December 10, 1985). Nevertheless, Arias' speaking
ability was considered a disadvantage during the political campaign
(Fernandez, 1986, p. 26).
Compared to Reagan, President Arias has a hard time trying to
manipulate his language, his strategy, or his style to make himself
and his policies appear to be attractive. ,. It is also noticeable that the
form which has prevailed in most of his pre- and post-presidential
speeches has not been identified as narrative forms. In fact, it has
not been categorized as any formal structure. He sometimes used
poems or philosophical remarks, and occasionally even short
anecdotes. Although these elements are an accessory to the
structure, they lack the attachment or congruency with the whole of
the discourse that is prevalent in Reagan's speeches. With Arias,
these types of inclusions seem intended to embellish the discourse
rather than to increase persuasion.
Most of Arias' discourses are
concerned with some sort of intellectual transcendentalism. He
appeals to abstract ethical or spiritual categories which, contrary to
Reagan, are never fully explained, detailed or defined. In fact, Arias'
advisers have said that "Oscar [Arias] developed a style on the
political stump which evolved from the academic chair to an
emotional rhetoric" (Fernandez, 1986, n.p.). It is noteworthy to point
out that even though all of Arias' speeches have been compiled,
published, and translated from Spanish into English, French, and
German, there has been little research based on his rhetoric, even
among Costa Rican scholars. Both the nature of Arias' discourse and
the reasons for the lack of information concerning it are beyond the
scope of this research, although those topics may have relevance to
future studies.
The discussion here will consider Arias' discourses using
Stephen E. Toulmin's approach to argument (1958). As demonstrated
in the preceding chapter, this approach is useful in describing and
analyzing political arguments . The same methodological
assumptions concerning the Toulmin model described in Chapter I
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were taken into account in studying the public discourses of Oscar
Arias.
In order to describe and analyze Arias' discourses, twentythree arguments were selected. The same criteria used to pick
Reagan's arguments were followed in choosing Arias' arguments. The
latter have been chosen to represent the different themes used by
him and discussed in this chapter. Each of the chosen discourses is
described, its arguments extracted, the themes which it supports
introduced, and the types of reasoning as well warrants supporting
its claims described and analyzed.

DESCRIPTION OF ARGUMENTS

This chapter is based on data from seven discourses presented
publicly by Oscar Arias between 1986 and 1988, concerning the
specifics of Costa Rican foreign policy towards Central America in
general, and Nicaragua in particular. These discourses were chosen
as representative of the policies articulated by the Arias
administration during its first three years in power. Three of them
were presented before U.S. audiences between 1986 and 1988, one
to President Reagan (1986), one to the media (1986), and one before
U.S. students (1988). Two other discourses were presented to Latin
American audiences, in 1986 and 1987. Another discourse was
delivered to the Costa Rican people in 1988. The last discourse
discussed was given to a European audience in 1987. The main
topics of those discourses are described next.
"The roads to freedom" (1986) speech delivered to President
Reagan and the press, is concerned with two main objectives, to
explain ( 1) that threats to peace and democracy can only be
overcome if all tyrannies are destroyed, and (2) that Central
American democracies can only avoid war and oppression if given
fair treatment in international trade and finance.
"Democracy in the Americas" (1986) an address delivered to
the U.S. media, has two main claims: (1) despite the fact that in this
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era Latin America is returning to democracy, this return will remain
unstable if severe economic pressures on these new democracies
continue, and (2) democracies should not intervene militarily in
Nicaragua's affairs, but politically encourage democratic reform.
The speech "Architects of the century of peace" (1988) was
delivered before the 1988 graduates at Georgetown University in
Washington D.C. It had a three-fold purpose and demonstrated: (1)
that the Arias Peace plan is being crucified by the enemies of peace,
(2) that there is no reason to support a military solution for Central
American problems, and (3) that Central Americans are committed to
peace.
"Peace- supreme hope of the world" (1988), an address
delivered to Costa Rican academics and laymen at the Peace
University in Costa Rica, was concerned with one claim, that in
Central America there is no peace because there is no reconciliation
between opposite parties in the on-going struggle. Both speeches
"Opportunities for democracy in Latin America" (1986), presented to
Latin American delegates to an International Democratic Exchange
Conference in Costa Rica, and "The Peace is first" (1987), delivered to
the president of Mexico and his cabinet, had four main purposes: (1)
to establish that there won't be peace and justice without democracy,
(2) to state that if deeds don't encompass words of peace in Central
America, the subsequent accords will be useless, (3) to increase the
awareness that if concerns of the majority are not incorporated into
political agendas, democracies will fail with a resulting spreading of
violence, and (4) to remark that is too early to talk about the
consolidation of democratic process in Latin America.
The address "Peace doesn't recognize borders" ( 1987), was
delivered before European diplomats, academicians and politicians m
Oslo, Norway, after Arias received the Nobel Peace Prize. It was a
summary of the Arias political agenda. Five goals were achieved m
this speech: (1) to explain that the peace process may never be
finished because its development and preservation is part of
democratic life, (2) to encourage democracy everywhere by giving no
political or economic support to tyrannies, (3) to frame the peace
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initiative as basically anti-dogmatic and for freedom, (4) to reiterate
that majority concerns must be included in political agendas to help
democracy defeat tyranny, and (5) to remind the listeners that as
long as the aforementioned objectives are achieved, democracy
cannot be overpowered by totalitarism.
Six common themes can be drawn from these seven discourses:
( 1) Threats to peace and democracy can be overcome if all
tyrannies fall, and democracy is successful.
(2) Only fair treatment in international trade and finance can
assure the political and economic stability of countries which are
returning to democracy.
(3) Peaceful dialogue, rather than military intervention, is viable to
solve Central American conflict. Democracies should encourage
political reforms, but should not intervene militarily in other
countries' affairs.
(4) The Arias Peace Plan is opposed only by those who favor war in
Central America.
(5) Violence spreads when majority concerns are not included in
Central American political agendas.
(6) There will be no permanent peace in Central America without
reconciliation. Arias points out that in order to achieve peace and
democracy requires deeds, not just words, and cooperation even if
political agendas differ. These six common themes, found in the set
of discourses studied, have been illustrated in Arias' rhetoric by the
arguments shown in six corresponding charts .
In considering the first common theme, regarding overcoming
threats to democracy, the arguments offered by Arias look like the
Chart IX.
Following the second common theme, which questions how
new, unstable Latin American democracies can possibly form without
fair treatment in international trade and finance, Arias establishes
his position through the Chart X.
The third common theme is concerned with the viability of
peaceful solutions to the Central American conflict. It tacitly rejects
military intervention in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua,

53
by defining democracies as nations which encourage political reform
without physically intervening in other countries' affairs. The
selection of arguments in Chart XI are used by Arias to support this
point.
Following the fourth line of argument, the examples in Chart
XII show Arias' intention to correlate his initiative to peace-seeking
people, and opposition of it with those who favor war and are against
Central America's wishes for peace.
The fifth line of argument, which addresses the need of Central
American countries to include concerns of the majority, especially
peace, on their political agendas is supported by the arguments
included in Chart XIII.
The sixth line of argument reveals Arias' concern that the
peace accord, be carried out by the five Central American Presidents
in 1987. Arias assumes that reconciliation, expressed by working
together to reach national and regional goals which were agreed
upon by consensus, is a pre-requisite to permanent peace and
democracy. The Chart XIV demonstrates this.
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CHART IX
THREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS
ON THE FIRST COMMON 'IHEME, DEMOCRACY
CAN OVERCOME TOTALITARIAN THREATS
Discourse
DiWl
No
P #
17
Democracy causes peace
2
(XXXID

wa.r.r..a.n1

llii.m

(Since) Only democracy
can guarantee reconciliation,
allow peace, and preclude
violence from
crossing borders.

(So) "Only if we
endeavor to enable
all people to enjoy
democracy ,[and)
cause the downfall
of all tyrants
equally, can we
prevent threats to
world peace from
growing in the
Americas."

(Since) Political oppression
can only be created by
people who are afraid of
freedom and have no human
values.

(So) "The only
defense against the
enemies of freedom
is to strengthen
freedom and
democratic
institutions."

(Since) What free people
believe in their souls
and live daily can't be
taken away.

(So) "(Democracy)
is invulnerable to
totalitarian attacks.

Argumentation by cause

4

36

cxxxvn

History shows that those
who are afraid of
freedom have allowed
signs of oppression to
exist.

Argument by generalization
5

12

Costa Rica has been
strong, free and
democratic without
having an army.
Argument by generalization

(XXXXlV)
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CHAR.TX
THREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON
THE SECOND COMMON THEME, FAIR TREATMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE
Discourse
Data
No
P. #
1
17
Internal and external
(XXXIII)
factors are
detrimental to Central
American economies.

Warrant

.CT.aim

(Since) Good economic
conditions precludes
poverty and social
unrest.

(So) "Central America
needs [... ] fair
treatment in trade
and finance to
avoid war and
oppression."

(Since) Economic and
political support from the
the industrialized world
and international
economic institutions
are a pre-requisite for
democracy ..

(So) "[It] is too
early to talk
about consolidation
of a democratic era
in Latin America."

Argument by cause
4
6
(XXXVII)

New democracies do not
receive the economic
and political support
expected from international economic
institutions and the
industrialized world.
Argument by sign
1

12

(XXIX)

Using the"pretext of
(Since) Unfair economic
saving democracy,"
treatment precludes
democracy.
severe economic
deprivations are
being forced on
Latin American countries.

Argument by classification.

(So) "Sacrificing
the political system
of freedom to very
severe economic
pressures could have
serious consequences
for the political
future of Latin
America."
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CHART XI
FOUR EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON THE THIRD
COMMON TIIEME, VIABILITY OF PEACEFUL
SOLUTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Discourse
Data
No
P. #
Costa Rica is peaceful,
1
13
(XXX)
neutral and believes in
self-determination
for Nicaragua and all
countries.
Argument by generalization

7

19

(IL)

The USSR and the US are
negotiating peace and
reducing nuclear
armaments through
peaceful dialogue.

Warrant

lliim

(Since) Physical intervention
in other country's affairs is
not appropriate for neutral,
peaceful democracies.

(So) "Nicaraguans
are the ones who must
solve their internal
problems."

(Since) Conflict between
superpowers is not different
from conflict between
Central American nations.

(So)"There is no
reason to support the
use of military force
in the solution of the
Central American
conflict."

Argument by parallel case

5

Nuclear and conventional (Since) Nuclear war and
wars have their own
conventional war are
horrors.
equally harmful and
threatening to
humankind.
Argument by parallel case
14

(XXXXVI)

5

7

(XXXXl)

Latin American
tyrannies are
oppressing their
people.

Argument by generalization

(Since) The oppression of
people should never be
supported.

(So) "[We must]
equally fight together
against the possibility
of other Hiroshima, [or
another] Vietnam."

(So)"We should be
neither political or
economic allies of
governments which
oppress their people."
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CHART XII
THREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON
TIIE FOUR1H COMMON TIIEME, CORRELATION
BE1WEEN PEACE-MAKING AND OPPOSITION
TO WARFARE
Discourse

P.

N

5

14

(XXXXV)

Argument
7

D .ala.
#

Some people pursue war
in Central America.

by

Wfilll!ll

CT.aim

(Since) The pursuit of war
is antagonistic to the
pursuit of peace.

(So) "No matter how
noble the crusade is
[peace efforts], some
wish for and
encourage its failure."

(Since) The force of peace
should not be silent.

(So) "History
repeats itself [with
the Peace plan]."

(Since) The desire for peace
is permeating Central
America.

(So) "Central America
is committed to
peace."

classification

15-6 "The Central American

(XXXXVIII) Peace Plan is being
crucified [as Christ was
in his time]."
Argument by analogy
7
23
Various events and
(L)
people in Central
America show a
desire for peace.
Argument by generalization

CHART XIII
TWO EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON THE
FIFTH COMMON THEME, ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF
MAJORITY CONCERNS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENfS
Discourse
No
P

4

Dau

Warran1

Qaim

#

6
In Central America,
(XXXVIII) people are affected by
things not under their
own control.
Argument by generalization
5
11
Central American's
(XXXXIII) desire for freedom had
not been adequately
addressed by politicians
and public officials for
centuries.
Ar~ument
by analo~y

(Since) People denied a
a voice will respond with
violence.

(So) "Migratory
problems and violence
will continue
spreading."

(Since) The people's call
for freedom cannot long
be suppressed.

(So) "Ignoring the
clamor for freedom
may condemn Latin
America to another
century of horror
and death."
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CHART XIV
TIIREE EXAMPLES OF ARIAS' ARGUMENTS ON
TIIE SIXTH COMMON TIIEME, RECONCILIATION
AS PRE-REQUISIIB FOR LASTING PEACE
Discourse
N
5

D.iWl

P.
5

(XXXXI)

Warrant

Qfilm

#

There are many viewpoints and interests in
the Central American
conflict.

(Since) "[Peace] cannot be
forced in the smallest
nations nor can it be
imposed by the biggest
nation."

(So) "The endless
process [of peace]
requires that we
work together."

(Since) Reconciliation is a
prerequisite to peace.

(So) "[In Central
America] there is
no peace because
there is no
reconciliation."

(Since) Words are part of a
commitment, action is the
next logical step.

(so) "Peace and
democracy demand
datelines and deeds,
not just words. The
accords in good faith
bring us closer to
peace, if we are able
to put them into
practice."

Argument by generalization

6

8

Conflicting parties in

(XXXXVII) Central America are

having a hard time
reconciling their
differences to reach a
peace accord with one
another.
Argument by cause
3

11-2 Several discussion have

(XXXIV)

taken place to foster a
a major role for Central
Americans in the
peaceful solution of
their own conflicts.

Argument by classification
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ANALYSIS

Arias' arguments have not been analyzed using available
approaches to analyze argument such as those of Lewis' narrative
forms(1987), Wander's ideological criticism (1984), and McGee's
ideograph ( 1980) which apply to the study of political
argumentation. Because those approaches mainly focus on
intracultural aspects of presidential rhetoric, and there are no similar
or alternative studies on Costa Rican discourses or Arias' presidential
rhetoric they did not seem appropriate for this chapter. Despite that
fact, Arias' rhetoric carries a message which is consistent and has
received the attention of many audiences around the world. The
attention paid to Arias' words contributed to the success of his peace
plan.
The respective common themes or lines of argument drawn
from Arias' arguments, introduced above, serve as guidelines to
analyze his discourse. The data Arias presents to justify his claims
are often factually insufficient, but related to situations tacitly or
contextually understood by his audience. In other words, where
Reagan uses an inductive pattern of thinking - moving from details
to general principles -, Arias does the opposite, trying to
communicate broad principles while demanding an active effort from
his audience. Because deductive reasoning dominates European and
Latin American patterns of thinking, Arias claims that he "speak [s]
of our problems with the simplicity of [his] people." Arias further
explains that Costa Ricans decided that their "problems would be
solved by reason and reason alone. [This may explain why] there is
no violence in our behaviour, nor threats in our speech" (Discourse 1,
p. 12).

Arguments
In Arias' 1986 addresses, "Roads to freedom" and
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"Opportunities for democracy in the Americas," both of which
directly relate to his first line of argument, the threats to democracy
come from the absence of a set of intertwined elements of

democratic living, such as freedom of expression, pluralism, dialogue
and transaction, and equality, within any nation. Arias assumes that
democracy cannot be defended if those elements do not exist.
"Freedom is out of reach for dictators only if it is based on freedom,
justice, and the absence of poverty" (Discourse 4, p. 5), he says.
Democracy, then, prevails as long as the system increases the
political and economic participation of its citizens. Ideally,
democracy must not foster what Arias considers traits of the
enemies of freedom, envy, selfishness, fear, and immorality (p. 5).
Arias' 1986 speech "Democracy in the Americas" provides a
strong support for the second line of argument. Arias has posited
here two pre-conditions for democracies if they are to prevail in the
Americas. They are the following: that all tyrannies, whether from
the left or the right, must be overcome, and that democracies must
be accorded better economic treatment from those nations which
already have privileged economic positions in the world. His stance
is derived from thinking in a North-South direction rather than a
geopolitical East-West configuration. This approach is consistent with
the ideological position of his political party, which is a member of
the International Socialist party and has subscribed to the Brandt
report on North-South relations. Basically, that document suggest
policies which address the inequality, in terms of economic exchange,
between third world countries and superpowers and industrialized
countries. Through most of his discourses Arias suggests that
violence in Central America is not, as Reagan assures, due to the
expansionist intent of Soviet-Cuban backed regimes in the region, but
chiefly a result of the underdevelopment of Central American
economies as well as the dominance of dictatorial regimes whose
concerns reflect those of a small powerful elite, rather than those of
the majority.
Arias' 1986 address "Democracy in the Americas" (Discourse 1),
which was already cited, and his 1988 speech "Architects of the
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century of peace" (Discourse 7) are fundamental to understanding his
third line of argument. They provide a basis to define the role of
democratic systems in political and military crises in other countries.
On this topic, Arias draws heavily on his Costa Rican experience. He
claims that "peace and social progress can only be achieved in open
societies with democracies where the government is chosen through
free and pluralistic elections" (Discourse 1, p. 13). Costa Rica is not
neutral regarding the alternatives of democracy and dictatorship, but
will take that position in face of a war. The role of a democracy is to
encourage change peacefully, without physically intervening in
another country' affairs. And because Arias stresses that equality,
among other elements, sustains democracy, he expects that between
democracies or states equality should be the source of peaceful
change. This correlates with a strong desire which Arias made public
during the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly in
1986. There he expressed Costa Rica's "desire to see all of the great
powers remove themselves from Central American disputes." He
said: "Costa Rica does not tolerate the fueling of war or the extension
of death in the region by external forces" ( p. 15). Arias specifically
demanded that the same civilized treatment that dominated the
USSR-US armament talks be applied in Central America. "If the
conflicts between superpowers are solved through dialogue, there 1s
no reason to foster the use of military force in the solution of the
Central American conflict" (Discourse 7, p. 19).
In Arias 1987 speech, "Peace doesn't recognize borders"
(Discourse 5), which relates to the fourth line of argument, Arias
explores the topic of commitment, to either peace or war. Those who
attack and mock the Peace Plan are compared by Arias, in a rare use
of reasoning by analogy, to those who tried to crucify an ideal of
peace by crucifying a man, Christ. The analogy is extendable to
many polarities such as moral-immoral, good-bad, peace-war, friendenemy, etc. The purpose of the comparison seems to be to establish
a tacit difference between those who are committed to peace, and so
to the Arias Peace Plan, and those who are not. This is particularly

62
important to Arias because one of the premises of the peace process
initiated in Guatemala in mid-1987 is that all the presidents who
signed the peace accord known as Esquipulas I, were committed to
peace. Thus, any disagreement about the procedures to reach that
desirable peace are bound to the acceptance of the plan, even if
critical. Those who rejected it, chose the easy way "to forecast defeat
rather than triumph, war rather than peace," said Arias (p. 7). They
value hate more than love, and military victory more than human
reason, Arias continued (P.14). He disregarded those who opposed
the peace plan in order to ensure the right, perhaps a moral right, of
those who are working for peace to talk about it. However, as in
most of his claims concerning this line of argument there are no
substantial facts or details offered as data. Given certain data lacking
specifics the audience is obliged to draw deductively a conclusion.
For instance, given the data that some people pursue war in Central
America, Arias claims that "no matter how noble the crusade is when
started [peace efforts], some wish for and encourage its failure"
(Argument XXXXV). Neither the specific people nor the reasons why
they oppose the peace plan are mentioned. Only the warrant "the
pursuit of war is antagonistic to the pursuit of peace" sustained the
move from data to claim.
A sort of tacit understanding seems to
prevail between Arias and his audience. Perhaps Arias never
mentions names, countries, and facts for giving grounds to his claims
because the details are already known by the audience, or perhaps
the audience may at least infer who or what they are.
Arias 1986 speech "Opportunities for democracy in the
Americas" (Discourse 4) addresses the fifth line of argument more
precisely than any other discourse made by Arias. After explaining
the poor economic conditions which frame the return of democracy
to most Central American countries, Arias stresses that its advent
heightens the expectations of the majority, which are oppressed
under dictatorships. As a result, there is a growing demand for
political and economic participation in the less resourceful
democratic regimes. Lack of response from the government
encourages the underprivileged country people to move to the
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urban areas and increases social unrest. Arias deplores this
situation. "Ignoring the clamor for freedom may condemn Latin
America to another century of horror and death," he says (Argument
XXXXIII). Arias holds the opinion that as long as concerns of the
majority are not addressed by new democratic leadership, as is the
practice under dictatorships, new migratory tides will begin and
violence will spread rapidly. This is consistent with the thesis he has
developed for the last fifteen years. That is, democracy only works
and prevails as long as a "greater participation of the population in
the process of adopting decisions" takes place, creating a "society
capable of producing the basic necessities for its population under a
basically democratic political and economic control system" (Arias,
Aside from suggesting the inclusion of popular
1973, p. 9).
concerns in the political agenda, Arias does not explain if such a
situation is avoidable. His presentation of the problems is more a
diagnosis than a cry for change. And, his claims here, like others
previously cited, (such as the need for a fair economic treatment and
threats to freedom) are tied together. The responsibility for making
a difference is divided between the returning democracies, which
fight against great odds, and the United States, whose government
and economic agencies, public and private, financed dictatorships all
over Latin America for years. It seems, as Arias points out, that "the
international political support in favor of the re-establishment of
democratic regimes is not consistent with the goodwill expended m
the economic arena" (p.7). In fact, Arias remarks that the still
existing Latin American dictatorships enjoy better economic
treatment than do new democracies (p. 6).
The last theme claims reconciliation as the pre-requisite for
peace in Central America, framed by the Arias peace plan. In his
1988 speech, "Peace- Supreme hope of the world" Arias presented
arguments to justify reconciliation as a primary step to carry out the
peace accords signed the previous year in Guatemala by the five
Central American presidents. As he does in many arguments, Arias
frames the claim that "[In Central America] there is no peace because
there is no reconciliation," in contemporary history (Argument
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XXXXVII). However, rather than citing historical facts he begins a
monologue in which he thoughtfully asks himself about the origin of
"a bloody and martyred Central America" (p. 8). The story is
abruptly interrupted by a claim, tied to a moral chain of concurrent
elements, which allows peace to exist. Arias says "there is no peace
because there is no reconciliation. There is no reconciliation because
there is no justice. There is no justice because there is no
compassion; there is no compassion because there is no love" (p. 8).
After the claim is established he seems to have no need for
elaboration. As indicated earlier, Arias draw general conclusions
without explicitly addressing the reasoning process through which
the conclusion has been obtained. Following the process of reason
seems to be the work of his audience.
In general, thoughts proclaimed in a self-reflective fashion are
Arias' basis for making claims. Nevertheless, as it is shown in the
next section, Arias often uses reasoning by generalization to build his
arguments.

Warrants
The six lines of argument found in our sample of seven
discourses concerning Costa Rica's policy towards Central America
have been illustrated by sample arguments using Toulmin's model.
All the claims analyzed were chiefly supported by warrants. The
warrants, as has been explained, are rarely made explicit by the
speaker. In fact, their implicitness is what allows the speaker to
establish a link with his audience. As Jeffrey R. Sweeney (1981)
elaborates, the warrant provides justification for the act of inference
require to move from data to claim.
This chapter as well as Chapter II is concerned with showing
the warrants of the speaker's discourses. Chart XV below shows a
sample of those warrants related to each specific line of argument,
numbered from one to six, and according to the type of reasoning
used by Arias to assert his arguments case by case. Although not
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exhaustive, the chart shows a noticeable dominance of argument by
generalization in his discourses. From the twenty-three arguments
studied, seventeen of which are shown in Chart XV, argumentation
by generalization counts for 36% of all Arias' arguments studied for
this particular research. Arguments by cause account for 22% of the
total, and arguments by sign, parallel and classification make up 40%.
Clearly, reasoning by analogy is disregarded by Arias.
Argument by generalization uses a reasoning which can move
from small examples to general principles or viceversa. This process
works deductively in Arias' arguments. He offers a few outlines as
the claim from which one may infer deductively the supporting data.
Two arguments illustrate Arias' preference for the deductive
generalization type of reasoning. First, when Arias claims that
"Democracy is the only road to peace and justice [in Central America]"
(Argument XXXV), which is a broad statement, the data he offers
should be inferred deductively because is not explicit in his
argument. In fact, the grounds for the claim he asserts are not
specific or detailed [Undemocratic regimes deny individual rights].
In another case, Arias puts forth the claim that "The endless process
[of peace] requires that we work together" (Argument XXXIX). The
data from the latter could be inferred deductively [There are many
viewpoints and interests in the Central American conflict] Despite
the fact, that Arias sometimes gives specifics which we can infer as
data, these specifics are broad statements rather than particular
details or facts. The data of reasoning by generalization was used by
Arias to argue the stability of democratic systems which fulfill their
citizens lives even in the face of totalitarism (Arguments XXXVI,
XXXXIV), and he defined a democracy as a system that does not,
intervene militarily in other countries affairs (Argument XXX).
Reasoning by cause ranks second in importance. In this type of
argument, the data function as a cause for the claim, and the warrant
is a statement justifying the cause-effect relationship (Rieke &
Sillars). Arias' reasoning by cause differs from Reagan's reasoning m
that he approaches life events such as war, peace, democracy and
freedom more wholistically. That is, he points out causes of
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problems, but does not commit himself to one cause, or one effect.
His arguments should be seen as part of a whole set of interacting
causes and effects. This causal reasoning seems more interactive
than that of Reagan's arguments as outlined in the following
discussion. Arias uses reasoning by cause when clarity and
simplicity are important. This is not the case of the "Soviet-Cuban
threat" which, to be accepted by the listeners, attains from the
speaker plenty of convincing details. This is a case of linear
understanding to which the causal path of reasoning fits better. As
Arias points out, "Central America needs fair treatment in trade and
finance to avoid war and oppression." Why? Because good economic
conditions preclude poverty and social unrest (Argument XXXIII).
Therefore, there is a causal relationship between severe economic
pressures on a democratic system and the presence of war,
oppression, poverty or social unrest. In another speech, Arias said
"[In Central America] there is no peace ... " Why? He answered
because "there is no reconciliation." Indeed, conflicting parties in
Central America are having a difficult time reconciling their
differences in their attempt to reach a peace agreement with each
other (Argument XXXXVII). The causal relationship between peace
and reconciliation is quite clear.
Considering reasoning by classification, Arias seldom uses
specific cases or elements which behave as a member of a class with
which they have been associated. The only situations in which Arias
uses this type of reasoning is to differentiate himself and those who
support the peace initiative he leads, from those who disapprove or
attack the plan (Argument XXXXV), and when he wishes to
distinguish between words and deeds concerning the peace initiative.
Because Arias has shown a lesser interest in providing specific
details or facts to prove his arguments than Reagan, reasoning by
sign, which is preferred by Reagan, is quite unimportant to Arias.
The only circumstance in which this type of reasoning acquires
relevance here is in connection with the idea of the "instability" of
Central American freedom systems due to economic, rather than
military, pressures (Argument XXXVII). Other types of reasoning,
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such as parallel, analogy and authority, are downplayed in Arias'
arguments. Their importance seems to be thwarted by the dominant
role of reasoning by generalization. The lack of a clear-cut style,
which has been described as characteristic of Arias' rhetoric, uses
reasoning by generalization in order to achieve soundness and
consistency. Nevertheless, the primary issues addressed by Arias
cultural context, political decision-making by consensus, among other
factors -- often don't require probing via other types of reasoning,
but should be examined by generalization.
Arias' arguments that were analyzed are supported by a
selection of warrants and the types of reasoning which are
represented in Chart XV.

CORRELATION OF WARRANTS AND CLAIMS

For the purposes of making clear the correlation between
warrants and claims in Arias' arguments, the warrants summarized
on chart XV are grouped according to the degree of connectedness
between Arias' warrants and claims (See Figure 4.) This time all
twenty-two of Arias' arguments are taken into account to draw the
main warrants and their respective claims.
The first general warrant (W.1) is that fair treatment in
international trade and finance guarantees democratic stability. The
example selected is that [Unfair economic and political development
is only possible in peace] (Argument XXIX), which underlies the
following claims:
(1) "Sacrificing the political system of freedom to very severe
economic pressures could have serious consequences for the political
future of Latin America" (Argument XXIX, p. 12).
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CHART XV
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF WARRANTS AND TYPES
OF REASONING SUPPORTING ARIAS' ARGU1\1ENTS
Argument Common Theme

Warrant

Reasoning type

XXXII

Only democracy can guarantee
reconciliation, allow peace, and
preclude violence from crossing
borders.

Cause

XXXVI

Political oppression can only be
exerted by people who are afraid
of freedom and without human
values.

Generalization

XXXXIV

What free people believe in their
souls and live daily can't be taken
away.

Generalization

XXXXI

The oppression of people should
never be supported.

Generalization

XXXIII

2

Good economic conditions
preclude poverty and social
unrest.

Cause

XXXVII

2

Economic and political support
from the industrialized world and
international economic institutions
is a pre-requisite of democracy.

Sign

XXIX

2

Unfair economic treatment
precludes democracy.

Classification

:xxx

3

Physical intervention in other
country's affairs is not
appropriate for neutral, peaceful
democracies.

Generalization

IL

3

Conflict between superpowers
is not different from conflict
between Central American nations.

Parallel case

XXXXVI

3

Nuclear war and conventional war
are equally harmful and threatening for humankind.

Parallel case
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CHART XV
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF WARRANTS AND TYPES
OF REASONING SUPPORTING ARIAS' ARGUMENTS

(continued)
Argument Common Theme

Warrant

Reasoning type

x:xxxv

4

The pursuit of war is antagomsuc
to the pursuit of peace.

Classification

XXXXVIlI

4

The force of peace cannot be
silenced.

Parallel case

L

4

The desire for peace is permeating
Central America.

Generalization

xxxvm

5

People denied a voice will respond
with violence.

Generalization

XXXXIII

5

A people's call for freedom cannot
be suppressed for long.

Analogy

XXXXI

6

"[Peace] cannot be forced in the
smallest nations nor can it be
imposed by the biggest nation."

Generalization

XXXXVII

6

Reconciliation is a pre-requisite
for peace.

Cause

:xxxrv

6

Words are part of a commitment.
Action is the next logical step.

Classification
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Arg.IJ:IX
Warrant
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Arg. XXXXVl I l

Arg. :nxV'CI

Arg.XXX

Arg. :n:n:r

Arg.mI

K

Arg. CL

Arg. XXXXIJ

Arg. XXXIl
~

-Arg.:nxV'
Arg. XXXVJ
Arg.XXXIV

Arg.XXXCV

\
Warrant
4

/

Arg.XXXVICI

~ Arg.XXXJ:JIJ
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Arg. XXXXVI

Figure 4. Graph correlation between general
warrants and daims in Arias' arguments.
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(2) "Central America needs [ ... ] fair treatment in trade and finance
to avoid war and oppression" (Argument XXXIII, p. 17).
(3) "[It] is too early to talk about consolidation of a democratic era
in Latin America" (Argument XXXVII, p. 6).
The second general warrant (W.2) concerns the role of
democracies in avoiding military intervention in other countries
affairs. This is shown by the warrant [Physical intervention in other
country's affairs is not appropriate for neutral, peaceful
democracies], (Argument XXX) which synthesizes the available
warrants to the following claims:
(1) "Nicaraguans are the ones who must solve their own internal
problems" (Argument XXX, p. 13).
(2) "Costa Rica is neutral with respect to war" (Argument XXXI, p.
13 ).
(3) "There is no reason to support the use of military force in the
solution of Central American conflict" (Argument IL, p. 19).
The third general warrant (W.3) states how democracies can
defend themselves from the threat imposed on them by totalitarism.
This is illustrated by the warrant [Only democracy can guarantee
reconciliation, allow peace, and preclude violence from crossing
borders] (Argument XXXII), which lies at the core of the principles
supporting the following claims:
(1) "Latin America is living an era of a return to democracy"
(Argument XXVIII, p. 11 ).
(2)

"Only if we endeavor to enable all peoples to enjoy democracy,

[and] cause the downfall of all tyrants equally, can we prevent
threats to world from growing in the Americas" (Argument XXXII,
p. 32).
(3)

"Democracy is the only road to peace and justice" (Argument
xxxv, p. 5).
(4) "The only defense against the enemies of freedom is to
strengthen freedom and democratic institutions" (Argument XXXVI,

p. 5).
(5) "[Democracy] is invulnerable before the totalitarian attacks"
(Argument XXXXIV, p. 12).
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The fourth general warrant (W .4) names Central American
leaders as responsible for putting peace into practice . The warrant
[Words are part of a commitment; action is the logical next step]
(Argument XXXIV) is at the core of the warrants which support the
following claims:
(1) "Peace and democracy demand datelines and deeds, not just
words. The accords in good faith bring us [Central Americans] closer
to peace, if we are able to put them into practice" (Argument XXXIV,
pp. 11-2).
(2) "Migratory problems and violence will continue spreading"
(Argument XXXVIII, p. 6).
(3) "Ignoring the clamor for freedom may condemn Latin America
to another century of horror and death" (Argument XXXXIII, p. 11).
The fifth general warrant (W.5) claims reconciliation and
cooperation as necessary supports for peace. The warrant ["[Peace]
cannot be forced on the smallest nation nor can it be imposed by the
biggest nation" (Argument XXXIX) supports the following claims.
(1) "The endless process [of peace] requires that we [Central
Americans] work together" (Argument XXXIX, p. 5).
(2) "[We all must] equally fight together against the possibility of
another Hiroshima, another Vietnam" (Argument XXXXVI, p. 14).
(3) "[In Central America] there is no peace because there is no
reconciliation" (Argument XXXXVII, p. 8).
The sixth general warrant (W.6) concerns peace as a desirable
outcome, opposed only by those who favor war. An example of this
is the warrant [Peace is to be sought as desirable] (Argument XXXX).
This is the core principle of the warrants which support the following
claims:
(1) "I can't accept defeatism" (Argument XXXX, p. 7).
(2) "No matter how noble the crusade is [peace efforts], some wish
for and encourage its failure" (Argument XXXXV, p. 14).
(3) "History repeats itself [with the Arias Peace Plan] " (Argument
XXXXVIII, pp. 15-6).
(4) "Central America is committed to peace" (Argument L, p. 23).
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The seventh general warrant (W .7) is concerned with
individual rights and freedom, as opposed to totalitarianism,
oppression and dogma. The warrant, [The oppression of the people
should never be supported] (Argument XXXXI) maintains the
following claims:
(1) "We [democrats] should be neither political or economic allies of
governments which oppress their peoples." (Argument XXXXI, p. 41)
(2) "Dogmas are the enemies of human creativity [individual
freedom] " (Argument XXXXII p. 11).

SUMMARY

Although Oscar Arias has not been considered as talented a
speaker as Ronald Reagan, his public discourses on Central American
policy have met with consistent success. Chapter III examined the
role Arias' words played in convincing audiences of the validity of
the claims presented in his discourse. Unlike Reagan's speeches
Arias' seem to have no specific structure and no clear style. He tends
to cite fewer facts than Reagan and to speak on a more philosophical
or idealistic plane.
As was done in Chapter II to Reagan's discourse, in this chapter
Toulmin's model of analyzing argument was applied to a selection of
Arias' public speeches on Central American policy. The warrants
underlying Arias' discourse - reflecting cultural values inherent in
Arias' words- were determined. Types of reasoning employed were
examined; Arias used argument by generalization more than any
other type of reasoning. Finally, following the pattern of Chapter II,
the warrants repetitive through Arias' speeches studied in this
research were displayed according to the degree to which they
connected corresponding data and claims. This data will provide a
base for determining the cultural values Arias' relies upon to
effectively communicate with his audiences.

CHAPTER IV

CULTURAL VALUES AFFECTING POLID CAL ARGUMENTS
EXCHANGED BE1WEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND ARIAS

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the data
collected: It looks at the warrants of each speaker's arguments,
interprets their similarities and differences in terms of cultural
values, and draws implications for an intercultural communication
perspective. By doing so, this chapter finds that since Arias and
Reagan belong to different cultures, their political arguments are
underlaid with different cultural values which may affect their
mutual understanding.
The interpretation of the data presented relied on three
sources: the list of value orientations used by Condon and Yousef
(1975) in linking argumentation and cultural values, the summary of
cultural assumptions and values developed by Stewart, Danielian and
Foster (1969) and, Edward C. Stewart's cross-cultural perspective of
American cultural patterns (1971) in contrasting U.S. patterns with
those of other cultures. These three sources have relied heavily on
the original five sets of value orientations proposed by Florence
Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck in their study, Variations in value
orientations (1961). Condon and Yousef have kept the three
variations for each set, but they have added to the original five sets,
for a total of twenty. Thus, a new chart of value orientations
combining the three sources has been developed to suit the need for
the identification of value orientations found in each speaker. (See
Chart XVI )
In referring to the chart, this chapter takes into consideration
the following aspects: (1) All the variations summarized may exist in
any society beyond the United States and Costa Rica; (2) this
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summary 1s neither definitive nor exhaustive, and to apply it to the
specific inquiry of this thesis concerning communication between
political speakers from particular cultures, it has been necessary to
make major adjustments.
Each of the sources consulted for this section provides a
different, but complementary approach to the authors' common field:
intercultural communication. Condon and Yousef provide a base for
understanding relativism in public argument that is, the different
cultural frames, which, existing across cultures, give different
perspectives to help describe, interpret and evaluate political claims
because of differences in cultural values reflected in warrants.
Nevertheless, "culturally [influential] rhetorical forms themselves
help shape one's world view, one's thoughts, and one's actions"
(Condon & Yousef, 1975, p. 233). Stewart, Danielian and Foster
established a cross-cultural set of categories within which the
cultural values and patterns of thinking underlying public argument
explain differences between different cultural speakers. Finally,
Stewart provides the four different components to classify the
cultural values underlying Reagan and Arias' arguments by way of
warrants. They are form of activity, form of relation to others,
perception of the world and perception of the self (Stewart, 1971, p.
26). These components are fully explained through the three
sections of this chapter: first, cultural values underlying warrants,
which relate warrants to cultural values using the XVI, which is
based on E. C. Stewart et al.'s (1969) and Condon and Yousefs value
orientations lists; second, a brief description of distinctive patterns of
thinking operating in Reagan and Arias' arguments, which enhance
our understanding of how cultural values affect reasoning; third,
conflict(s) between Reagan and Arias' arguments, obtained by
eliciting and discussing conflicts between arguments when comparing
them; and fourth, implications according to the intercultural
communication perspective.
It is important to emphasize that cultural values cannot be
found alone, because they are part of a vast fabric of culture. As has
been observed, values classify within the perception of human
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nature which under a broad perception of the world (Stewart, 1971,
p. 26) merge into one another subconsciously as human behavior
does in an underlying value system. Stewart points out that "each
component of a culture affects the others and, in turn, is limited by
them." In American culture, for instance, the stress on the value of
equality among all is sometimes incompatible with achievement and,
also, freedom (Williams,1964, pp. 27-8). Therefore, this chapter
stresses the prevailing cultural values over those which may be
there implicitly, but may be dependent on the main value.
I have established in chapters II and III that warrants carry
important information which increases understanding of how and
why arguments are made. The arguments selected from either
Reagan's or Arias' discourses about the Central American conflict
have been explored and their main warrants summarized in Charts
XVI and XVII.

CULTURAL VALUES UNDERLYING ARGUMENTS

In order to first relate Reagan and Arias' warrants to cultural
values this section relies on the data from chart I to XVIIII and
figure 3 of Chapter II for Reagan's cultural values, and from chart IX
to chart XV and figure 4 of Chapter III for Arias' cultural values.
Reagan's warrants are analyzed first, followed by Arias' warrants.

Reagan's warrants
In chapter II, Reagan's warrants were summarized into nine
categories which are orderly consubstantiality (WI), political dualism
(W2), U.S. international role as policeman (W3), U.S. fairness and
maturity (W4), legitimacy (W5), signs of war and ill-will (W6), old
solutions to new problems (W7), only democracy guarantees freedom
and development (W8), and totalitarism threatens democratic
systems and actions (W9).
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CHART XVI
CULTURAL VALUE ORIENTATIONS
AND PATfERNS OF 1HINKING

A. Cultural Value Orientations:
FORM OF ACTIVITY

Orientation
1.

to

action
2.

doing

Temporal
1. past

being-in-becoming

3.

being

3.

future

orientation
2.

present

FORM OF RELATION TO OTIIERS

Social
1.

reciprocity

2.

Independence

Fair-play
1. fairness

2.

symmetrical-obligatory 3.
complementaryoblig atory
mixture of both

3.

unfairness

PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD

Progress

and

the

concept

1. linear-causal chain of
event s

of

time

2.
interaction of events
(one event affecting the
the other)

3. events are
cyclical
(no
events, only a
time and space
working as a
system)

PERCEPfION OF SELF

Individualism-interdependence
1.

Individualism

Good and Evil
1. Good

2.

Individuality

2. Mixture of good and
evil

3.

Interdependence

3. Evil

Based on sets of value orientations proposed by Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961), Stewart,
Danielian, Foster (1969), Stewart (1971), and Condon and Yousef (1975)

B. Patterns of thinking:
1.

1.

Dichotomous (Dualistic)

Inductive

2.

2.

Non-dichotomous

Circular

3.
third

Relativistic (or
perspective)

3.

Deductive

Based on Edward C. Stewart (1971) list of patterns of thinking connected with cultural
values.
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The general warrant 1 concerns consubstantiality, which is
common ground. Reagan, as speaker, seems to seek common ground
with his audience showing that the United States and Central
America or the Caribbean basin are really very much alike. This is
true of most of his addresses whether to Latin American or U.S.
audiences. As shown in 1982 "Aid to the Caribbean Basin": he claims
"We are the new world [... ] We [U.S. and Latin America] are all
America" (Argument I, p. 322); 1983 "The Problems in Central
America" where in stressing the strategic value of
Central America he puts forth the claim "Central America is the U.S.
lifeline to the outside world" (Argument VII, p. 450); or 1986
"Nicaragua" where in defending the "Contras" Reagan says "The
resistance has contributed directly to the security of the United
States" (Argument XVIII, p. 388).
Reagan's focus on common ground as warrant for the
aforementioned claims supposes the existence of the theme of
equality. The term has been estimated by Stewart (1971, p. 46) as
one which pervades the American (U.S.) social relationship.
Consubstantiality or common ground is rooted in the value of
equality understood here as one of humanness, "We're all human
after all," explains Stewart. Paraphrasing it, "We're all [U.S. and
Central America] America [after all]" a claim that implies that the
link Reagan wanted to establish with his audience was one of an
interpersonal relationship. In other words, Reagan apparently was
not talking down to the people listening, but horizontally as in typical
interpersonal relationships, conducting a communication between
presumed equals. The purpose, which is explored to a greater extent
in the discussion section of this chapter, seems to reduce the risk of
confrontation with seemingly different audiences from different
social strata and culture by establishing an atmosphere of equality.
By using the list of value orientations from XVI, the general
warrant 1, common ground, fits into the category of the value
equality under form of relations to others .
The general warrants 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 can be summarized into
one chief concern, dualism, that is the use of an "either/or" pattern.
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Reagan, as speaker, seems to warrant many of his claims by
suggesting to his audience that there is always a choice between only
two alternatives, and that one of them, usually implicit as a rejection
of the explicit one, is better than the other in dealing with or
describing the Central American or Caribbean basin problems. This
is noticed in addresses such as the 1982 "Aid to the Caribbean Basin"
where he claims that "There are only two possible futures for Central
America: [Democracy or dictatorship] (Argument III, p. 324); or the
implicit appeal to a positive choice instead of the negative alternative
explicit in the warrant as in 1983 "The problems in Central America"
where in depicting negatively the leftist guerrillas Reagan says
"Salvadoran guerrillas are a small minority who want power for
themselves and their backers" (Argument IX, p. 451); or 1987
"Central America at a critical juncture" where in dividing the political
scenario into democrats or antidemocrats he says "The Sandinistas m
Nicaragua are not democratic" (Argument XXIII, p. 2).
Reagan's use of dualism, which has been cited above as an
"either/or" pattern, as warrant for the aforementioned claims has
been widespread in most of his speeches. Dualism supposes the
existence of the theme of good versus evil, and the existence of a
choice between them. In the logic of Reagan speeches, he tends to
judge every situation as being good or bad.
The term dualism, as
used in this chapter, is considered by Condon and Yousef ( 197 5,
p. 97) as one connected with how human nature is perceived in
American culture. Dualism is underpined by the values of choice,
good and evil and change. In Stewart's words "while religion in the
U.S. is committed to the doctrine that man is evil
by nature, most Americans are unlikely to give the
concept much thought. More likely they will see
man as a mixture of good and evil or a creature of
his environment and experience. Most important,
they will stress his ability to change" (1971, p. 59).
Through the arguments linked to the above mentioned
warrants, this value orientation takes many forms: susp1c10n
towards the Sandinistas "Nicaragua is an outlaw regime" (Argument
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XVII, p. 3 87), pessimism about Soviet and Cuban political intentions
in Central America "Foes of freedom will destabilize Caribbean basin
countries" (Argument IV, pp. 324-25). Therefore, Reagan claims
there is a choice between one alternative that is better than another,
good versus evil, in a scenario where things can change for the good
only if the U.S is allowed to intervene. This last element implies the
value of "doing" which is located under the category of form of
activity according to Condon and Yousef (1975), and Stewart,
Danielian and Foster (1969) and Stewart (1971).
By using XVI , the general warrant 2, to which has been added
warrants 5, 6, 8 and 9, dualism, fits into the category of the value
choice between good or evil under perception of the world .
The general warrant 3 is concerned with the U.S. role as the
international policeman, that is, assuming task-oriented activities
such as a moral commitment to preserving freedom and stability in
and out of the United States. Reagan, as speaker, seems to warrant
some claims by suggesting to his audience that there is a moral
obligation from the U.S. to its allies in Central America and elsewhere
which is manifested by engaging in some activities which can change
the future for the better no matter how serious the problems are.
This is noticeable in addresses such as the 1982 "Aid to the
Caribbean Basin" where he claims that "Freedom and peace requires
help from the U.S. to those nations confronted with communist
aggression" (Argument V, p. 325); or the explicit commitment
acquired unilaterally by the U.S. with Central American nations,
whether or not its governments agree. Additional support to U.S.
international policing is found in Reagan's 1983 "The problems in
Central America" where he says that the "U.S. will support the
security of the region's threatened nations" (Argument XI, pp. 4523); and 1987 "Central America at a critical juncture" where Reagan
makes personal his position towards the region, by saying that he
"won't walk away from the fight for freedom in Central America"
(Argument XXV, p. 4).
Reagan's use of a police role, which has been cited above as
engaging in task-oriented activities because of a moral commitment,
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as the warrant for the aforementioned claims, has permeated his
rhetoric. Policing supposes that there is a duty. In his 1988 "State of
the Union" address Reagan has noted that "the love of freedom that
God places in each of us ... has [been] entrusted in a special way to this
nation [by God]" (p. 258). He supported this vision in the work ethic-doing. In the logic of Reagan speeches, he tends to place a high
value on action which yields the principle that one can improve upon
the present. Following such logic, action and hard work will bring
about what the individual, the nation and the government wants;
hence, Reagan describes his policies as having what Clyde and
Florence Kluckhohn call the attribute of effort-optimism (194 7).
That is, through one's effort or hard work one will achieve one's
ambitions. No goal is too remote, no obstacle is too difficult, for the
individual or nation which has the will and the determination and
which expends the effort. Stewart summarizes the spirit of this
when saying "hard work is rewarded by success" (1971, p. 34).
As Reagan highly regards task-oriented action, "doing", he also
stresses other values such as "individualism" and "progress". The
form of activity developed as a category by Stewart (1971 ).includes
the aforementioned values as an interrelated group. It is possible to
delineate them from the Reagan's arguments already cited and put
them under a form of activity.
Therefore, the warrant of the U.S
policing the world is underpined by Reagan's action values. Reagan,
the speaker, uses them to enable his administration to carry out the
policies he wishes, such as supporting the "Contras" and increasing
economic and military pressures against Nicaragua or other
opponents. In Reagan's arguments linked to the general warrant 3,
the value orientation using action to change Central American
conflicts, stresses the value "doing" to change the present time, thus
tacitly implying a temporal orientation to the future. In Florence
Kluckhohn's words the most distinctive feature of the value of doing
"is a demand for the kind of activity which results in
accomplishments that are measurable by standards conceived to be
external to the acting individual" ( 1963, p. 17). Through the
arguments linked to the mentioned warrants, this value orientation
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has taken two main forms: Reagan insists on "getting things done"
when he says that he "won't walk away from the fight for freedom in
Central America" (Argument XXV, p. 4). He also shows that the U.S.
will take action, employing phrases like the "U.S. will support the
security of the region's threatened nations" (Argument XI, pp. 4523).

By using XVI, the general warrant 3 fits into the category of
the value doing, which is closely related to the values of progress and
individualism. Doing is under form of activity .
The general warrant 4 concerns the U.S. image as a fair power,
that is one which engages in fair play. Reagan tries to persuade his
audience of his administration's ability to maturely and responsibly
handle international crises, particularly in Central America. This is
true of three of his speeches delivered to the American people as, for
example, his 1983 speech "The Problems in Central America" where
in diminishing the impact of the economic embargo and the funding
of the "Contras," he sets forth the claim that "Our actions [are] hardly
the actions of a nation implacably hostile to Nicaragua" (Argument
VIII, p. 451 ); in the 1984 speech "Central America policy" Reagan
notes the good will of his country in world affairs by saying that "the
U.S. will never be the aggressor" (Argument XIII, p. 482-3); and in a
1986 speech "Nicaragua" Reagan depicts U.S. policy towards Central
America as one of peace-seeking rather than that of a belligerent
supporter of the "Contras", by saying that "the U.S. has sought and
still seeks - a negotiated peace and a democratic future in a free
Nicaragua" (Argument XIX, p. 388).
Reagan focuses the above mentioned claims on fair-play
warrant and supposes the existence of the warrant as a cultural
value. The term fair-play has been defined by Stewart (1971, p. 53)
as one which pervades American decision-making. Margaret Mead
points out that fairness doesn't consists of rules which ought to be
followed as
The inclusion of [the] other person's weakness inside the
rule so that "fair play" [encompasses] a statement of relative
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strength of the opponents and it ceases to be fair [when it]
beat a weak opponent (Mead, 1965, p. 143).
In Reagan's arguments the notion of "fair-play" stands for his
administrations fair share in world and regional affairs as well as its
concern in acting fairly towards other nations. Therefore, Reagan
cannot initiate action if it involves aggression since he, according to
the logic of his arguments, does not believe in beginning a war. It
resembles his claim that the "U.S. will never be the aggressor"
(Argument XIII, pp. 482-3). Nevertheless, it becomes very
important to him to be able to say "they started [war]," and then of
course, "we'll finish it." According to Stewart, "the significance of the
value - accommodation to the weakness of another-- is brought out
in the mutual misunderstanding of the concept of fair play between
Americans and member of other cultures" (1971, p. 54).
Fair-play is rooted in the value of fairness understood here as
one of "accommodation to the weakness of the other" explains
Stewart. In Reagan's words that would equal the claim, "Our actions
were hardly the actions of a nation implacably hostile to Nicaragua"
(Argument VIII, p. 451 ). This claim implies that the link Reagan, the
speaker, wanted to establish with his audience is again, as in the first
general warrant, a connotation of an interpersonal relationship. In
other words, Reagan appeals to his audience by exploiting the value
of fairness which is shared by the American audience. The purpose,
which is explored more in depth in the discussion section of this
chapter, seems to enhance the seriousness and consideration with
which the decision-makers view a hostile or friendly confrontation
with Central American nations.
By using XVI, the general warrant 4, fair play, fits into the
category of the value fairness under form of relation to others .
The general warrant 5 covers the adequacy of "cold-war"
solutions to contemporary problems. Reagan tries to persuade his
audience of the validity of old policies to new problems, implying
that the usefulness of those policies is directly related to the
sameness of political conditions along different stages in history. The

84
applicability of such analogy in terms of Reagan's decision-making
processes depended on the selective perception of causes as
producers of the present crisis in Central America as existed in the
region during the cold war years. This is evident in the claims that
suit the following three discourses: in the 1983 speech "The Problems
in Central America," Reagan posits Truman's success in preventing
communism from expanding in 1947, by stating that "President
Truman's words are as apt today as they were in 1947" (Argument
XII, p. 452); in the 1984 speech, "Central America policy" Reagan
engages again in an analogy by finding the U.S. citizens' opposition to
his policies in Central America as a repetition of the isolationism
during World War II, he then claims that "[Isolationism] ensures war
instead of preventing it" (Argument XV, p. 486); and, in the 1987
"State of the Union," address Reagan causally finds that the Soviets
are at war and consequently want to have a beachhead at the U.S.
doorstep and he warns that "Freedom Fighters won't allow the
Soviets to have a beachhead [in Central America]" (Argument XXII, p.
259).
At first glance, Reagan seems to have relied heavily on the
past, but to consider that his arguments are not directed to the
future seems attractive. However, his concept of time is eminently
suited to a rational view of the world. One can distinguish various
moments in time, note their relationship, and convey their
connection by calling the preceding moment a cause and the next an
effect. The description made by Stewart ( 1971, p. 65) identifies
Reagan's predilection for seeing the world, Central America in
particular, in rather simple terms and, ideally, evoking a simple
cause and effect sequence to explain events.
Despite Reagan's apparent lament for the passing of the good
old days, he is optimistic that the future will be bright if one
acknowledges the lessons of the past in a linear fashion, suggesting
that the same cause produces the same effect. This made his
arguments future-oriented or concerned with progress. As has been
pointed out by Condon and Yousef "the past, too, is not denied or
forgotten; more likely it is interpreted as a more distant present"
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Reagan's focus on progress from the past, old
(1975, p. 110).
solutions to new problems, warrants the aforementioned claims and
supposes the existence of progress as a cultural value. Reagan
introduced an appealing past, whether the lessons of the cold war or
isolationism during WW II, to his audience, but moves forward to
show its applicability under new historical conditions. The
differences are neglected and the similarities enhanced, thus
allowing Reagan to master the past and to conquer the future.
Reagan draws from history what he needs, and forgets the rest.
Social inequality, external debt, corruption, civil war are not the
causes of Central American problems, at least not the ones
externalized in Reagan's rhetoric.
In his arguments he sees Central
America as being threatened, invaded, troubled by external factors-Soviets, Cubans and communism. By using XVI, the general warrant
7, old solutions to new problems, fits into the category of the value
progress under Perception of the world .

Arias' warrants
In Chapter III, Arias' warrants were summarized into seven
categories which include: fair treatment in international affairs and
finance in order to guarantee democratic stability (WI), nonintervention in other nations' affairs (W2), democracies' self-defense
capability against totalitarian threats (W3 ), leaders' responsibility to
change words into deeds (W4 ), cooperation (W5), peace as a
desirable outcome over war (W6), individual rights and freedom as
opposed to totalitarian oppression and dogma (W7).
The general warrants 1, 4, and 5 are permeated by the
concepts of fair treatment in international affairs and finance, and
social reciprocity within underdeveloped Central American societies
as a means to achieving democratic stability. That is, first, fair play
based on cooperation between democratic nations, particularly aid
from the rich to the poor countries, and second, acknowledgment of
people's needs and possibilities within social classes in democratic
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nations. Arias, as speaker, seems to seek an understanding with his
audience about the fragility of democracies before poor external and
internal economic conditions because of unfair international trade
and finance and because of internal social injustice and lack of
cooperation to carry out politic and economic reforms. He also
implies that democracies, whether economically rich or poor, should
respect each other- but that the wealthy might help those that are
not as wealthy. This is true of most of all his addresses as
demonstrated in a 1986 speech entitled "Democracy in the
Americas," in which Arias claims that "Sacrificing the political system
of freedom to very severe economic pressures could have serious
consequences for the political future of Latin America" (Argument
XXIX, p. 12); in a 1987 speech, "Peace doesn't recognize borders,"
Arias stresses the notion that peace in the region cannot be achieved
without acknowledging popular needs, he warns that "Ignoring the
clamor for freedom may condemn Latin America to another century
of horror and death" (Argument XXXXIII, p. 11); or, in a 1988 speech,
"Peace -supreme hope of the world," he explains that the first step to
filling the gap between political enemies and classes divided because
of social injustice is social reciprocity and cooperation. In his own
words, "[In Central America] there is no peace because there is no
reconciliation" (Argument XXXXVII, p. 8).
Arias focuses on fair-play based on international cooperation
and national social reciprocity warranting that these claims seem to
underpin two value categories: form of activity and form of social
relations. The first category is understood as the link between the
individual and the concrete event in the world. It reflects other
assumptions, such as the second category - form of social relations, m
the context of a specific moment and place and the demands of a
given situation (Stewart,1971, p. 26). According to the reading of
Arias' arguments, being, which is form of activity, is the dominant
cultural value underlying warrants 1, 4 and 5. Likewise, Arias'
warrants underlie the values of fair-play and cooperation, which are
under the form of social relations in Stewart list.
These values
require further explanation. Although Arias' exhortation to change
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words into deeds "Peace and democracy demand datelines and deeds,
not just words. The accords in good faith bring us [ Central
Americans ] closer to peace, if we are able to put them into practice"
(Argument XXXIV, pp. 11-12) seems at first a typical American
orientation to action, but it is not. The inclusion of the qualifier "if"
makes any claim a proposal, an intent, not an assertion to which
action or reaction automatically follows. In other words, Arias
apparently was not talking literally. As explained by Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck
In the being form of activity, there is a preference ...
for the kind of activity which is a spontaneous expression
of what is conceived to be "given" in the human personality.
As compared with [other value orientations], it is a
nondevelopmental conception of [form of] activity. It might
even be phrased as a spontaneous expression in the activity of
impulses and desires; yet care must be taken not to make
this interpretation a too literal one (1961, p. 16).
Arias' being orientation toward activity, which is explored
more deeply in the discussion section of this chapter, seems to
enhance his persuasiveness before Central American audiences and
political leadership, particularly the presidents who came together to
sign the peace accords and who are responsible for carrying out
political and economic reforms in their own countries.
In considering the values of fair play and cooperation, more
precise definitions must be applied. Cooperation for Arias is not
necessarily given for the sake of action, but because it often implies
that the Costa Rican, in particular, and the Central American, in
general, doesn't easily yield in matters of principles. For instance, m
dealings with the different pro or anti-government in the Central
American scenario, Arias has acknowledged that "[We all must]
equally fight together the possibility of another Hiroshima, another
Vietnam" (Argument XXXXVI, p. 14) but that first reconciliation must
be achieved, "[In Central America] there is no peace because there is
no reconciliation" (Argument XXXXVII, p. 8). In other words, Arias'

88
audience has a difficult time adjusting its private and national goals
to those of the region or making a practical adjustment "to getting
the job done," because it would be interpreted by the audience as a
compromise of principles. In other words, Arias' intent to increase
understanding and inform the U.S. and European audiences about the
Central American viewpoints and needs precedes any intent by
making the principles a matter of agenda. That happens when he
promotes among the above mentioned audiences a major
understanding and support for a new international economic order,
based on such principles as fair international trade and finance,
cooperation of rich countries in favor of poor countries, and social
justice, and acknowledgment of public needs and rights within
nations. To him, as well as to most of his Latin American audience,
principles should precede any orderly list of priorities in any agenda.
Agreement around the contents of an agenda should be underpined
by an acceptance of principles ruling the whole process whether
economic or political.
The third value, fair-play, can be better understood by relying
on Condon and Yousef s value orientation of complementaryobligatory social reciprocity, located in Chart V under Stewart's form
of relation to others. Condon and Yousef have indicated that this
value orientation supposes, in a sense, that a people or a nation, are
forever indebted to other(s), "especially those of superior ... status"
(1975, p. 81). This pattern stresses the importance of the obligation
of returning, in kind or worth, what has been given, be it an actual
thing or a favor. In the pattern of complementary-obligatory values,
the interaction valued is between unequals, what is often called, by
Arias, the North-South relationship between the U.S. and Central
America. The United States, as well as other industrialized nations,
has certain obligations to its democratic allies, or zones of influence,
and they in turn have obligations to the U.S. Failure to meet these
obligations, of course, can alter the countries' relationship and thus
such systems are difficult to stop because the mutual obligations
have accrued over a long period of time.
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By using XVI, the general warrants 1, 4 and 5, fair
international treatment and local social justice, fit into the three-fold
values of being, which is located under form of relations to others ,
and fairness and cooperation (that is complementary-obligatory
social reciprocity) located under form of activity .
The general warrants 2, 3 and 7 concern two ingrained themes:
(1) non-intervention in other nations' affairs, which is a focus on
influence from the outside; and (2) the individual as a pillar of
freedom and democracy. The first concept is included by Condon
and Yousef as one of the categories suggested to link arguments with
cultural values by way of warrants (1975, p. 220).
Arias regards
outsiders' influence in the internal affairs of a nation as having
serious consequences, particularly when linked to economic or to
military pressures whether directly or through a proxy such as the
"Contras." By relying on Condon and Yousefs ideas, it is noted that
Arias' claims, warranted by non-intervention, implies that he
perceives "social constraints and the power structure of society as
the motivating agent in human events." That is, people and nations
exert influence only through acts, not through thoughts. The second
concept, individual rights and freedom, reveals Arias' confidence in
the strength of his countrymen and Central American neighbors'
characters, values, and idiosyncrasies. Following Stewart's ( 1971, p.
69) observations of Latin American individuality, the people on
whom Arias relied to carry out the defense of democracy against its
foes seem to live in cultures where authority (usually family) or
tradition exercise considerable control over the individual.
Therefore, Arias may seek to persuade an audience, which may be
outside the region, of the pivotal principles underlying his claims:
non-interference from outside in Central American affairs, and
reliance on people's individuality to defend democracy. This is true
of most of his addresses whether they be to Latin American or to U.S.
audiences as shown in his 1986 speech "Democracy in the Americas":
where Arias claimed that "Nicaraguans [were] the ones who must
solve their internal problems" (Argument XXX, p. 13); in his 1988
speech, "Architects of the century of peace," in which he pointed out
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the breakthrough in U.S.-U.S.S.R relations and the reduction of
nuclear armaments.
Later he claimed "There is no reason to support
the use of military force in the solution of Central American conflicts"
(Argument IL, p. 19); in another 1986 speech, "Opportunities for
democracy in Latin America," Arias praised democracy and assigned
to individuals the responsibility of defending freedom and
democracy, "The only defense against freedom's foes in
strengthening freedom and democratic institutions" (Argument
XXXVI, p. 5); or in a 1987 speech "Peace doesn't recognize borders" m
which Arias made a case for others to imitate Costa Ricans who
benefit from democracy, making it, Arias claims, "invulnerable
before the totalitarian attacks" (Argument XXXXIV, p. 12).
Arias' focus on outsiders' influence and the individual as
warrants for the aforementioned claims supposes the existence of
two values, with one merging into another -- independence into
individuality. Individuality has been estimated by Stewart (1971, p.
70) as pervading Latin American perceptions of self and of society.
It carried political and social freedom as well as an implication of
solitary action; but, in contrast with U.S. individualism, it lacked the
idea of the self as the source and sole-limiting factor. There is in
Arias' arguments, warranted by individuality, a strong attachment to
family and the immediate group. Actually, individual's dependence
on society is not deplored. It explains why Arias stresses the need
Central America has for fair international treatment in trade and
finance and its rejection of outsider influences. That is, from Arias'
perspective the region wants help which doesn't constrain its
individuals' freedom. Another claim made by Arias should clarify
the point. This is taken from a 1986 speech, "The roads to freedom,"
a direct address before President Reagan, "Only if we endeavor to
enable all peoples to enjoy democracy, [and] the downfall of all
tyrants equally, can we prevent threats to peace throughout the
world from growing in the Americas" (Argument XXXV, p. 32). To
paraphrase this claim: only if the United States and other
industrialized countries create conditions for Central American
countries to have economically stable democracies where benefits
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can be divided justly between individuals, and the same powers do
not again enthrone dictators, can Central Americans defend
democracy without outsider influences.
By using XVI, the general warrants 2, 3 and 7, nonintervention and the individual as pillars for freedom and
democracy, fit chiefly into the category of the value individuality
under perception of the self, although the values being and present
orientation lie behind the same set of warrants.
The general warrant 6 concerns peace as a desirable outcome
over war, that is what is called in this section a relativistic "both/and
another" pattern. Arias, as speaker, seems to warrant many of his
claims by suggesting to his audience that there is always a choice,
but not necessarily between only two alternatives, and neither of
them being the absolute best.
Although Arias sometimes explicitly rejects one of the
alternatives, he often does so by choosing what he considers to be
the most appropriate choice within the context of the situation at
hand, rather than openly judging an alternative as bad or evil. It
makes his judgments less comparative and more contextual, less
linear and more relativistic in over-looking the cause-effect
relationship as a means to deal with Central American problems.
This is apparent in addresses such as in 1987, "Peace doesn't
recognize borders," where the appropriate response to defeatist
statements about the Costa Rican peace plan, which according to him
paralyze people and jeopardize peace efforts in Central America, 1s
that he "can't accept defeatism" (Argument XXXX, p. 7); also in that
address, even when he implicitly appeals to a positive choice instead
of the negative alternative, such as the choice between war and
peace, he is not absolute, "No matter how noble the crusade is [peace
efforts], some wish for and encourage its failure" (Argument XXXXV,
p. 14); or 1988 speech "Architects of the century of peace," he
stressed the commitment to peace made by most Central Americans,
labeling their choice not as the "right one", but merely by claiming
that "Central America is committed to peace" (Argument L, p. 23).
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Arias' use of a relativistic "both/and another" pattern, differing
from the Reagan's "either/or" pattern, warrants the aforementioned
claims which are widespread through his discourses. This pattern
supposes the existence of choice beyond good and evil, and black and
white comparative judgment. In the logic of Arias speeches, he
judges solutions as being best within the appropriate context. This
observation may be misinterpreted if a comparison is made using an
absolute standard or a literal reading of his discourses. Arias in fact,
criticizes cruelty, violation of human rights, social injustice,
oppression and war as undesirable outcomes to the Central American
situation, but his judgments are oriented to creating consensus
among his audiences rather than towards dividing the world
between "good guys, and bad guys, "good and evil", or "black and
white".
By contrasting Arias with Reagan's judgment some important
differences emerge. They are, first, Arias doesn't base his
comparison only on his country's experiences as Reagan generally
does. The only exception is when he speaks of the Costa Rican
democratic experience; second, his viewpoints rarely pose a threat m
the other Central American democracies by comparing how well-off
they are with respect to Costa Rica, as happens with Reagan. In
Arias' speeches there is no mention of the leftist guerrillas or the
rightist "Contras" as good or bad movements, more likely he points at
the danger of war and poverty for democracy than to one cause, one
effect. Whether this finding suggests that it is not the subject matter
as much as it is the way of thinking about almost everything that
leads to this relativistic distinction, is further developed in the
discussion part of this chapter.
In Arias' arguments the link to the general warrants 6, the
direction toward contextual appropriateness in Central American
problem-solving methods, stresses essentially the value of seeing
human nature as a mixture of good and evil, but above all capable of
change. Through the arguments linked to the mentioned warrants,
this value orientation takes many forms: optimism about the peace
efforts "Central America is committed to peace" (Argument L, p. 23),
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and will to influence attitudes "We [democrats] should be neither
political or economic allies of governments which oppress their
peoples " (Argument XXXXI, p. 41).
By using XVI, the general warrant 6, peace as desirable
outcome over war, fits the value of choice by seeing the individual
and the world as a mixture of good and evil under the category of
perception of the world.
The chart XVII lists the findings of this first section, in
accordance with the four components of value orientations and
assumptions cited at the opening of this chapter.
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CHART XVII
FINDINGS ON VALUE ORIENTA TIO NS
FROM REAGAN AND ARIAS' ARGUMENTS
Components:
Form of activity

Warrant #
3

Form of relation to others

Reagan's arguments

Warrant

Perception of the self

Arias' arguments

Doing

1,4,5

Being
Fairness

Equality

1,4,5

Cooperation =
Fairness
complementaryobligatory social
reciprocity.

4

Perception of the worid

#

2.5.6.8.9

Choice between
good and evil

7

Progress
Individualism

6

Choice
according to
context:
mixture of good
and evil

2,3,7

Individuality

Based on sets of value orientations proposed by Kluckhohn & Strodbeck (1961 ), Stewart.
Danielian, Foster (1969), Stewart (1971 ), and Condon and Yousef (1975)
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PATIERNS OF TIIlNKING UNDERLYING ARGUMENTS

Cultural differences in patterns of thinking are important
issues for both Reagan and Arias' perception of the world and each
other. They can not be separated from the main focus of this
research: cultural values affecting political argumentation. In fact,
the inclusion of patterns of thinking used by both speakers will make
the differences between Reagan as an American thinker and Arias as
a European-oriented Costa Rican more striking.
Two types of patterns of thinking have been explicit between
Reagan and Arias in the previous chapters: inductive-deductive and
dichotomous (dualistic)- non-dichotomous (relativistic) ways of
thinking. Because dichotomous patterns and relativistic patterns
were fully discussed in connection with the value choice of good and
evil, this section explores in more detail the first type of thinking
which pervades Reagan and Arias' argumentative reasoning.
It has been noted in Chapter II that Reagan used argument by
sign in nearly half the discourses studied here, where in Chapter III,
it has also been noted that Arias used argument by generalization
more than any other type of reasoning. Each type of reasoning
stresses a different type of thinking in public argumentation: the sign
type stresses induction, and the generalization type, deduction.
Reagan is not one hundred percent inductive, and Arias is not
totally deductive, therefore the use of the term "more" will precede
any characterization of their opposing styles. Reagan is more
inductive than Arias because he sees the world as composed of facts
which he relies upon to make his claims. The inductive process of
thinking (beginning with facts and then proceeding to ideas) has an
operational quality that makes Reagan's thinking culturally
grounded. He expresses an incessant need to systematize the
perception of the world, Central America in our research, into a
frame that enables the U.S. and him to act.
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Arias is more deductive than Reagan; he is more concerned
with ideas, rather than facts. Because of his deductive thinking he
tends to attach primacy and reality to ideas and theories. His
deductive and abstract style of thinking give priority to the
conceptual world. Although the empirical world is not necessarily
disdained in his arguments, it is treated with a symbolic and
demonstrational attitude.
As a deductive thinker, Arias relies heavily on his ideas and
theories so that it suffices for him to show one or two connections
between his concepts and the empirical world. It explains why most
of his claims use few facts as data, where Reagan fully details the
grounds for his claims. Arias does not feel compelled in the same
way as Reagan is to amass facts and statistics. He prefers to
generalize from one concept to another, or to present facts by means
of logic. As noted by Stewart, the deductive thinker has a faith and
trust in the powers of thought which the American places upon his
methods of empirical observation and measurement.
An important implication of the use of these opposite ways of
thinking is that Arias, as deductive thinker, considers ideas as part of
the world of reality, that is he considers them as organic and alive,
while Reagan, the inductive thinker, considers concepts more in the
nature of a construct or an invention and only "facts" as real.

INTER CULTURAL CONFLICT INV ALUES AND STYLES

This section consists of three main divisions: first, it focuses on
some of the potential and explicit conflict(s) derived from the
exchange of arguments between Reagan and Arias, in describing and
dealing with the Central American problems; second, the implications
of each speaker's cultural values, found in the intercultural setting of
political arguments exchanged between the speakers from different
cultures; and, third, the implications of each speaker's patterns of
thinking, drawn from the cultural values underlying their arguments,
in affecting intercultural understanding.
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Intercultural conflicts
To depict some of the potential and explicit conflicts between
Reagan and Arias, a small selection of the total arguments from each
speaker studied during this research has been made. In order to
elicit differences or similarities between such arguments from both
speakers, their claims and its supporting warrants are matched up.
For each general warrant, whose underlying cultural value has
been previously elicited, a corresponding claim was selected. For
instance, to Reagan's general warrants 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 which underlie
the cultural value "choice," corresponds the following claim, "There
are only two possible futures for Central America:" [Democracy or
dictatorship]" (Argument III). In addition, because warrants are
linked to each speaker's cultural values discussed in the first section
of this chapter, the respective warrants have been reduced in
number. Hence, Reagan's nine categories of warrants became five
categories ruled by the following cultural values: Equality for
general warrant 1, choice for general warrants 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9, doing
for general warrant 3, fairness for general warrant 4, and progress
for general warrant 7. On the other hand, Arias' original seven
categories of general warrants have became three ruled by the
following cultural values: being-fairness-cooperation for general
warrants 1, 4 and 5; individuality for general warrants 2, 3 and 7;
and, choice and individual as mixture of good and evil for general
warrant 6.
In applying the chart XVI several conclusions can be drawn.
First, claims' content and warrants from each speaker are different
when contrasted. Second, despite the fact that some cultural values
found in each speaker's warrants may imply some commonality, for
example fairness and choice, that is only superficial, as noticed in the
third part of this section. Third, differences which may be conflictive
rather than commonalties between Reagan and Arias' arguments can
be elicited from the chart XVI.
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The conflicts respectively are between U.S. policing (Doing) and
non-intervention (individuality), dualism (choice) and peace as
desirable outcome over war (choice based on individuals as mixtures
of good and evil), and between the U.S as a fair power (fairness) and
fair international treatment and social reciprocity (being, fairness,
and cooperation).
The nature of the conflict between claims, warrants and values
from each speaker goes beyond grammar and semantics. Each
speaker articulates claims which are opposites. In Argument V while
Reagan claims that the U.S. must help those countries confronted
with communist aggression because freedom and peace require it,
Arias in Argument XXXVI responds that the only defense in a
democratic system against freedom's foes is the individual, who
believes and benefits from the system. Thus, it is possible to infer
that if the individual doesn't benefit from democracy or that
democracy doesn't respond to individual needs, any attempt from
outside to help would be useless, or make matters worse. Rather
than U.S. intervention, Arias in Argument XXIX claims that Central
America in particular, and Latin America in general, needs an
improvement in trade and finance relations from the North to the
South. It, Arias says, should accompany increasing social justice
within Latin American democracies. Then, Reagan in Argument XIII
argues in favor of U.S. defense and that his country "will never be
the aggressor" that is, the United States is a mature power based on
fairness to relate to those who are weak such as Central American
nations. Reagan doesn't address the need to change the international
economic order greatly influenced by the U.S. He just disregard
Arias' argument by stressing what seems an American value, fair
play. Therefore, for Reagan it is inconceivable to consider that the
U.S. could be unfair to its democratic allies at "the U.S. doorstep."
Another conflict emerges from Reagan's dichotomous pattern of
judgment and Arias' relativistic or contextual pattern of judgment, as
shown in their respective Arguments III and XXXXV. Where Reagan
only sees a choice between democracy and dictatorship in Central
America, Arias also sees a choice but beyond the good-evil
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comparison, he praises peace over war avoiding judging the parties
involved in the latter whether or not their political agendas are
democratic.

Cultural Values: implications
In order to explore some of the potential implications of the
conflicts already elicited between Reagan and Arias' arguments, this
section further discussed two aspects which can bring more light to
the understanding of each speaker' patterns of thinking and cultural
values, even if they did not have a corresponding value in Chart
XVII. The first aspect concerns the implications of each speaker's
cultural values, found in the intercultural setting of political
arguments exchanged between speakers from different cultures;
and, the second aspect concerns the implications of each speakers'
patterns of thinking, drawn from the cultural values underlying their
arguments, in affecting intercultural understanding. As pointed out
before cultural values cannot be found alone, "each component of a
culture affects the others and, in turn, is limited by them" (Stewart,
1971, p. 26), On the other hand, patterns of thinking underlying and
embodying those cultural values make useless the study of the
components of each argument if not acknowledged properly.
Equality and Progress. The fact that these two value
orientations could not be matched up with any opposite value
orientations for the purposes of this chapter demands some
attention. Certainly, Arias did not elicit a value contrast, but it
doesn't mean that equality and progress are values shared in his
culture. However, it should be noted that these values underlie
better Reagan's intent to gain acceptance from either American or
Latin American audiences. That's not Arias' case. In his speeches
there are cultural variations with respect to Reagan that will merit
further discussion later. Each value's implications are seen
separately.
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Based on equality Reagan looks for common ground, that is to
establish an atmosphere of equality. He doesn't want to talk
vertically to unequals, but horizontally to equals. Arias avoids this
appeal to common ground in most of his speeches. Instead he goes
after humanistic principles which are ARCHETYPICAL in their
symbolism such as peace, love, and reconciliation, regardless of
whether they have the same specific meanings for all his audiences.
While Reagan is specific in similarities, Arias is vague and general.
For instance, Reagan goes to the Organization of American States and
emphasizes the similarities in history and destiny between the U.S.
and all Latin American countries. Arias, instead goes to Europe and
United States and never mentions common ground, but talks about
what Costa Rica is in particular, and what the presidents and peoples
of Central America, in general, agree upon and carry out.
Reagan's stand reflects the pursuit of an ideal of equality which
makes it difficult for him to understand hierarchical patterns of
organization overseas, with the consequence that he ends up ignoring
political questions. Common ground, Condon and Yousef point out,
would seem common enough across cultures. But the role
expectations of the speaker, the philosophical and political realities of
the society in which he speaks, and the values which lie beneath all
these suggest some culturally related differences (1975, p. 245). In
fact, a culture may value a leader as one who is above and beyond
them, as with the typical Latin American dictator or as Condon and
Yousef suggest "a culture may demand the leader to speak as one of
the people, seeking all possibilities for cultivating that common
ground" (p. 245). The latter fits Reagan's case better .
Based on progress, Reagan tries to prove the adequacy and
actuality of the cold war approach to contemporary conflicts, that is
to establish an atmosphere of optimism. He wants to point out that
the future will be bright if the lessons of the past are learned and
included as part of a future orientation. Arias avoids this appeal to
progress in most of his speeches. Instead he goes after an
understanding that peace, love, democracy and reconciliation, are a
painstaking process which cannot be forced from outside, or
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accelerated imprudently. Despite the fact that Arias also draws
lessons from the past, he seems more interested in applying them to
the present, working out one problem at the time, allowing things to
take a normal course. While Reagan is future oriented and motivated
to action by doing things, Arias is present-oriented and being-active.
Reagan, for example, updated Truman's words to engage in action to
protect U.S. interest in Central America, seemingly threatened by
communism. Suddenly everything looks so simple and linear,
Truman's words becoming the cause or struggle for freedom, in its
use by Reagan in Central America to get rid of of communism.
Arias, instead, meets with Latin American presidents and his region's
colleagues and talks about datelines and changing words into deeds,
without specifics, not pressing for an immediate answer, or invoking
action as a solution for everybody's problems. Rather he talks of
dialogue and flexibility within different time frameworks. He seems
to consider more factors and people being involved in the peace
process, no one having the absolute truth or power to overcome the
main problems.
Reagan's stand reflects a temporal orientation to the future
associated with doing in a linear fashion, where Arias is more
present and being oriented in an interacting fashion, which makes it
difficult for Reagan to understand the complexities of Central
American problems and problem-solving methods, with the
consequence that he ends up evaluating his allies negatively, and
trying to get things done by himself rather taking into account
Central American viewpoints and concerns. Progress is integrated
with other values such as time and doing, which suits a rational view
of the world, as noticed by Stewart (1971, p. 65). Progress, according
to him, implies the dominant American belief in one's ability to
master his environment. That implies, between Reagan and Arias, a
potential for misunderstanding. Reagan negatively judging Arias or
the Central American --independent from U.S. decision-making-efforts for reaching peace, as insufficient, irrational, or too slow. By
contrast Arias may judge Reagan as dominated by emotion, more
interested in war than peace, or bellicose.
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In contrasting Reagan and Arias' arguments, at least two

implications can be drawn for these values. The first, equality,
suggests that as long as Reagan the speaker stresses similarity across
cultures he will miss political, economic and social cues vital for
reaching his potential audience in order to be understood. The
second, progress, indicates that because not all societies share the
rational view of the world as one of linearity and subject to control
as Reagan does, his message becomes a simplistic one. Because of
this, his audience may not only overlook his content, but deny him
intellectual abilities. Arias' stress on solutions that acknowledge
differences between countries and within nations at present, rather
than projecting into the future, allows him to focus on those aspects
m which the five nation leadership agree upon.
Doing and Individuality. Reagan's valued doing as form of
activity, as well as Arias' valued individuality as perception of self,
are not dissociated from other cultural values which may enrich the
understanding of their conflict when dealing with the issue of
intervention or non intervention in other nations affairs. In fact,
when examining the preeminence of the value of doing in Reagan's
orientation to action, the values of progress, understood as futureoriented, and individualism emerge. Likewise, with Arias' reliance
on individuality which is associated closely with being as oriented to
action and present as time orientation. Therefore, any contrast
between Reagan and Arias needs to be based on three-fold values:
Reagan's doing-individualism-progress (future), and Arias' beingindividuality-progress (present). Progress, was discussed in the
previous segment, so it won't be covered here. However, let us keep
in mind that doing and individuality are the predominant values in
each speaker's argument concerned with intervention.
The differences between speakers begins with a discrepancy
between Reagan's conviction that the U.S. must act to help those
threatened by communism, while Arias seems convinced that
intervention is useless, because the only defense of democracies is to
be more democratic. Their noticeable difference is reflected also in
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terms of cultural values. Reagan stresses "doing" and "individualism"
while Arias stresses "being" and "individuality," while both are
perceiving activity and the self differently. Accordingly, where
Reagan tries to bring change to a situation by showing confidence
that "where there's a will there's a way" Arias responds with sheer
simplicity "we have other ways." That is, Reagan's focus on a linear
approach to problems limits his vision, while Arias conceives of
problems more as a part of an organic whole, not subject to change
by focusing on cause-effect. Revealing as to their differences is
Reagan's more technical approach in contrast to Arias' intellectual or
philosophical approach. Arias' being oriented as form of activity, for
instance, seems to enhance his persuasiveness before Central
American audiences and political leadership, particularly the
presidents who came together to sign the peace accords and who are
responsible for carrying out political and economic reforms in their
own countries, as individuals attached to their own culture's norms,
and values.
Some evaluations affecting the exchange of arguments between
Arias and Reagan may be from the doer's perspective, who may feel
pity (for Arias' unwillingness to alter Central American conditions
and improve them), or a willingness "to get things done" whenever
Central Americans seem to him " lazy, inefficient, or philosophical."
From the perspective of Arias' being orientation, Reagan may seem
"arrogant, simple-minded, or imperialistic." By shifting now to the
perception of self held by each speaker, Reagan's individualism and
Arias' individuality, it is possible to realize that the lack of social or
traditional attachments in Reagan approach allows him to be
apparently more independent than Arias. The latter conceives of the
individual as tied to tradition and familiar aspects of Central
American societies, but with political and social freedom to defend
his system. An interesting implication may be that Reagan perceives
Arias as constrained by atavism or tradition which may seem to him
a sign of "primitivism or immaturity", while for Arias Reagan may be
perceived as "selfish, irresponsible, pushy."
These evaluations,
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mostly negative, may affect their mutual understanding when
exchanging arguments across their original cultures.
Choice and 2ood/evil. The analysis of intercultural implications
concerning the value of choice and its distinctive applications by each
speaker's culture is carried out as part of the discussion of patterns
of thinking culturally pervading Reagan and Arias. The reason is
that dichotomies and relativism are more a matter of ways of
thinking than subject or specific cultural values. The discussion on
patterns of thinking is presented in pages 106-7 of this chapter.
Fairness. Talking about the same thing doesn't mean sharing
the same assumptions. In fact, when faced with the cultural value of
fairness, found in either Reagan and Arias speeches, more differences
than similarities can be drawn. First of all, the significance of the
value fairness - accommodation to the weakness of another (Stewart,
1971, p. 54) is relative to who is considered weak and to the
speaker's convenience. Reagan approaches Central America by
describing the U.S. and its neighbors as equals, as discussed in
connection with common ground, but at the same time he uses
national security reasons for intervening politically or militarily in
Central American affairs. Arias approaches U.S. and European
audiences by demanding "equality" in terms of external debt, when
he really is asking for a special economic treatment, that is
inequality. This is like a reverse approach, Reagan trying to acquire
political support from Latin America, in order to impose his will
there. Arias in trying to acquire economic support for Central
America, is trying to allow the region's countries to be democratic.
Reagan is trying to seem fair, in order to be legally unfair with those
opposing his policies, while Arias is trying to seem unfair, to be fair
with his regional neighbors. This is not as complicated as it seems.
There are political and economic inequalities between both
speakers' countries, as between the United States and Central
America. However, while Reagan thinks of political and economic
gaps with respect to the region, Arias thinks of only economic
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disparities. Therefore, each of them is trying to gain some advantage
from the status of affairs. But, because their political agendas
underlie different cultural values, they misunderstand each other.
Reagan, for example, tries to gain foreign acceptance for carrying out
his anti-communist policies in Central America by sending more
economic aid to the region's nations and taking some steps to
eliminate some U.S. economic barriers to products coming from the
Caribbean basin. In exchange, governments in countries like El
Salvador and Honduras become beholden to U.S. decision-making, m
areas such as foreign policy, economy, and national security. The
difference with Arias' approach is that there is no political price paid
by Central America for being helped from outside the region. Arias
asks, first, for fair international treatment, which means that
democracies are too fragile too carry the burden of an external debt
acquired in most cases under dictatorships. Second, in exchange for
that help Arias "promises" to keep democracy working, and asks for
nothing else--no constraint of their political system through military
or any other form of intervention. Obviously, fairness means to both
leaders different things. But, nevertheless, the value is there.
Reagan doesn't seem to think that he is taking advantage of the
weak, rather he is helping them to be rid of communism. Arias
doesn't seem to think that he is also taking advantage of the strong,
because Central America is poor, or begging like a servant, rather he
is asking for respect from the U.S. but acknowledging economic
differences not political ones; Central America is as sovereign as the
U.S. is Arias' bottom line.
Mutual misunderstanding results from some of the implications
of their contrasting cultural value, fairness. Mutual
misunderstanding because of Reagan's difficulty in understanding
why Arias, who is the weaker element in this equation, pretends to
be treated like an equal without paying for his share. One may
speculate that, if Arias wants to be considered an equal and treated
fairly then he should not ask for help which he cannot reciprocate.
He is not asking for fairness, but unfair play. On the other hand,
Arias may see Reagan's fair play concerns as foolish, or hypocritical.
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Why should he trust Reagan if he does not realize that Central
American democracies are politically worthy and equals to the
United States? Why should he consider fair Reagan's statement that
the U.S. is not an aggressor, if the U.S. is applying economic pressures
to achieve political goals on many Central American countries?
Paradoxically, the implication that Reagan may be perceived as
hypocritical or unfair by Arias, is consistent with Margaret Mead's
notion that Americans cannot understand the deliberate and ruthless
exploitation of a weak adversary by power and position in other
cultures ( 1965).

Patterns of thinking: implications
Dichotomies and relativism. Dichotomous and relativistic
patterns have been discussed, as have some of their implications,
drawn under the subheading of choice and of good and evil.
Dichotomous patterns which merged into the value of choice between
good and evil, which dominates Reagan's rhetoric, and Arias' choice
based on appropriateness to a particular context, which contemplates
both, human nature and the world as mixtures of good and evil.
Reagan's dichotomous pattern of thinking and Arias' relativistic
pattern of thinking have been stressed before as resulting from
culturally different values. These values are choices based on seemg
human nature and the world as divided into good and evil, and
choices based on seeing human nature and the world as a mixture of
good and evil. Reagan's discourse fits into the former description,
Arias' into the latter. In both cases, the speakers reflect their own
cultural values concerning the kind of choices they are willing to
make or have made in dealing with Central American problems.
It is noteworthy to point out that in this particular case
patterns of thinking and values are neatly contrasted to each other,
justifying an additional discussion on their specifics and then, on
their implications.
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Dichotomous patterns in Reagan's speech have been discovered
in this line of research. His tendency to describe as an either/or
pattern fit what the General Semanticists define as a "two-valued
orientation, which is [contrary] to the facts of a multi-valued reality
[like that stressed by Arias]" (Condon and Yousef, p. 234). This
either/or pattern was identified centuries earlier as a fallacy in logic,
"the disjunctive fallacy." The pattern can be attributed to influences
of language, as some writers have indicated, and to cultural
assumptions irrespective of the language, as concluded from this
thesis so far.
This dualism differs from a dialectical system in that it, at least
in Reagan' case, demands a choice of the better of the two rather
than accepting the two as in a necessary opposition which will yield a
third (thesis, antithesis, synthesis pattern). So consistent is this that
even attempts by Reagan to seem neutral, make objective
descriptions, usually involving choice, imply that one is better than
the other. Thus modern and old-fashioned, slow and fast, peace and
war, democratic and communist, protectionist or free market, are
often not real choices; built into the usage of the terms is the
expectation of one being better than the other.
As noticed by Stewart et al., (1969) in the U.S., the process of
decision-making unfolds primarily through the anticipation of the
consequences of alternative courses of action, the either/or pattern.
That is consistent with Reagan's claims that any political decision
concerning the future of Central America must be based on either
democracy or totalitarism (Argument III). In Costa Rican society,
however, the function of the decision maker or makers is to evaluate
a situation by classifying it according to pre-established categories.
In the view of Kalman H. Silvert (1961), whose expertise concerns
Latin American cultural differences, whatever action ensues, or
whatever decisions are made, will follow automatically from this
tradition of classifying activity (p. 11).
A primary intercultural implication of these differences in
decision-making is that Reagan may conclude that in underdeveloped
Central America few decisions are required, where Arias thinks the
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opposite. The exploration of some of the cultural values
underpinning Reagan and Arias' opposite patterns of thinking bring a
major understanding of the preceding implications and of others,
cited later .
Choice is a commonality between both speakers, but on which
perspective becomes a major contrast. Reagan's dichotomous
pattern, "either/or," has been fed by that value orientation, and has
been strongly influenced by conservative religious views, of human
nature and the world divided between good and evil, subject to
change though, by active individualistic thrust. Instead, Arias'
relativistic pattern, described before: a "both/and another" has been
fed by that value orientation of man and the world as mixtures of
good and evil. Because Reagan views the world and human nature as
divided into polarities, it is possible that this affects his
understanding of what Central Americans, through Arias' speeches,
perceive as viable political systems, or even democracy. When
Reagan, for instance, says that there are only two possibilities for the
region, democracy or dictatorship, he is not talking about what
Central America may think of democracy, that's taken for granted, he
talks about U.S. conception of democracy. In his 1987 speech
"Central America at a critical juncture", Reagan specifically details
that democracy for him is "permanent, across-the-board human
rights, guaranteed by a constitution and protected by the checks and
balances of democratic government.. .democracy means returning
power to the hands of the people" (p. 2). As a contrast, in his 1986
address "Opportunities for democracy in Latin America" Arias
stresses that it is possible to have "political democracy if we are able
to enlarge our economic democracy. Freedom is out of reach of the
dictator's paw only if it is based on justice and lack of poverty" (p. 5).
Interestingly enough is the fact that Reagan stresses a democratic
ideal concerned with political aspects, whereas Arias focuses on
social and economic justice as chief concerns of democracy.
It is possible to point to other differences in their perceptions
about dictatorship, but the point has been made that Reagan's views
on democracy differ from those of Arias. Therefore, a second
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intercultural implication may be that for Reagan it is hard, if not
impossible, to see that the choice he proposes could be perceived as
less good than he thinks it is, because its meaning is culturally
different. Moreover, Arias' relativistic choice, implies that he may
see more than two alternatives for Central America, but from the
intercultural point of view may have a hard time adjusting to the
idea that Reagan does not see the realm of social and economic
democracy as more important. In fact, Arias may evaluate Reagan
negatively by assuming a shortsightedness on Central American
problems, as well as a closedmindedness because he only stresses
those political aspects of democracy, which for him are worthless if
people cannot afford to live with dignity.
Inductive and deductive patterns. Other implications drawn
from the findings of this chapter concern the conflict between the
two different patterns of thinking dominating Reagan and Arias'
arguments: the inductive and the deductive, respectively.
Reagan
and Arias have often had corresponding positions in their topics and
sometimes worked together under circumstances where political,
social and economic factors were more salient Central American
issues. Both speakers have met several times, and whether or not
they have developed positive perceptions about each other, their
discourses have shown sharp contrasts in terms of patterns of
thinking.
A potential intercultural implication pervading their exchange
of arguments is that because political, social and economic factors
seemed more salient, differences in patterns of thinking have been
ignored. Instead, Reagan and Arias, each one considered the
foreigner by the other, may be perceived as irrational, uncultured,
arrogant or antagonistic. These descriptions do not exhaust the range
of depreciatory reactions elicited by differences in patterns of
thinking.
Since international politics is not insulated from
competitions for power and influence, it does not facilitate the
recognition and understanding of cultural differences in thinking.
This is illustrated by Arias' depiction of the opponents to his peace
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initiative as people "anxious to bury the last hope, to close the door
to the reason, reconciliation and dialogue in our America" (Discourse
7, p. 14) and Reagan's claim that "anyone who demands anything less
[than true democracy] is not serving the cause of peace" (Discourse 6,
p. 2).
The examples suggest that Arias' negative evaluation of those
who, like Reagan, opposed his plan, are based on a lesser concern
with facts, political agendas, accountability of democratic progress in
the region. Arias deductively operates on the assumption that peace
ideas fostered in Central America are more important while Reagan
inductively stresses those democratic facts whose consequences will
be subject to measurement.
Further connections can be established with specific cultural
values, but this section's main focus is the two prevailing patterns of
thinking found in Reagan and Arias' argumentation processes.

TIIE GOLDEN RULE
A Far-reaching Intercultural Implication
From the preceding discussion several implications have been
drawn using the intercultural perspective. Summing up, there are
noticeable differences between Reagan and Arias concerning their
contrasting values.
While Reagan's warrants are underpined by the cultural values
of equality, progress-future, doing-individualism, fairness and choice
between good or evil, Arias supports his claims with cultural
variations of them. Arias' dominant values are equality, presentorientation, being-individuality, fairness and choice of good and evil.
Despite the use of similar nouns for two of the values mentioned,
their meanings differ as explained in the respective discussions of
equality and fairness.
At the core of the intercultural implications of these contrasting
values is the pervasive influence of the assumption of similarity,
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which may be used unconsciously by both speakers. The assumption
of similarity implies that others are like ourselves and therefore
want to be treated similarly. Milton Bennett in his Overcoming the
golden rule: Sympathy and empathy (1979, p. 407) has pointed out
that underlying that assumption lies another: "that all people are
basically the same, and thus they really do want the same treatment
(whether they admit it or not)." This is what seems to happen in
both speakers' discourses studied.
The extent to which each man implies that underlying values m
his argument are universal indicates an assumption of similarity.
Since both speakers are from different cultures, they are pretending
to persuade their own constituents of the rightness or
appropriateness of each others arguments on specific issues. To do
so they primarily start with their native culture's view of the world
which permeates their search for common ground. Reagan looks at
specific commonalties between the U.S. and Latin America on
historical and political aspects, Arias focuses on humanistic concerns
expressed poetically, and philosophically, that seem to him common
enough across cultures. However, because they are trying to find
commonalties in order to persuade and get their viewpoints across,
most similarities found imply a single, absolute reality, which means
that if there were not a single, discoverable reality, we could never
be sure whether the similarity we observed was "really" the case, or
whether it was merely a function of our point of view. Therefore,
intercultural misunderstandings may result because such thinking is
the foundation of ethnocentrism.
Ethnocentrism is one of the main social consequences implied
by the cultural values underlying Reagan and Arias' arguments. This
is understood here as the tendency by each speaker to see their "own
culture as the center of the universe - that is, as the true realitywhich affects all intercultural communication" (Bennett, 1979,
p. 410). This concept is further refined by Porter and Samovar m
their handbook Jntercultural communication: A reader (1976).
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Porter and Samovar say that,
A major source of cultural variance in attitude is
ethnocentrism, which is a tendency to view people
unconsciously by using our own group and our own
customs as the standard for all judgments ... The
greater their similarity to us, the nearer to us we
place them: the greater the dissimilarity, farther
away they are ... We tend to see our own groups, our
own country, our own culture as the best, as the
most moral. This view also demands our first loyalty
and produces a frame of reference that denies the
existence of any other frame of reference. It is an
absolute position that prohibits any other position
from being appropriate for another culture (p. 10).
The preceding definition operates perfectly on Reagan's claims
that Americans have a right entrusted by God to protect freedom
anywhere, and Arias' stand on Costa Rica as a standard of democracy
and role-model for other nations. Despite Reagan's intent to claim
U.S. superiority and Arias more humble intent to brag about Costa
Rican prowess in social, economic and political life, there is a
consistent ethnocentric view in their arguments and underlying
cultural values. Reagan and Arias use their own values as the basis
for behaving toward others, and each other. There is a morality m
behavior, whether or not they are aware of each others cultural
values and patterns of thinkings. The conflict between their
arguments, however, emerges when they find that no matter how
much they try to persuade each other, and their audiences, many
people don't respond to them. Then they face a choice, either they
alter their behavior (and underlying cultural assumptions and
values), or they must alter the unresponsive people. Supported by
the ethnocentric conviction that those other people, Reagan, Arias,
the Sandinistas, the guerillas, the Contras or, in general, the Central
Americans are somehow wrong or ignorant, each speaker may choose
the latter course.
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In fact, neither Reagan, nor Arias needed to fight each other
bare-handed, or any of their opponents. They just simply relied on
public arguments exchanged directly or mediated through the media
in Central America, the United States and Europe. Their arguments
may escalate in tone and content, and their disagreements increase,
but they continue trying to convince each other of their own
rightness. Interestingly enough, ethnocentrism always remains at
the core of the cultural values sustaining their public arguments.
This is the most noticeable intercultural implication found in this
research.

CHAPTERV

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The concerns of this thesis have been with the pattern of
thinking and cultural values underlying political arguments
exchanged in an intercultural setting and with how those patterns
and values affect understanding across cultures. Used, if sometimes
briefly, have been argumentation theories (Rieke & Sillars, 1984;
Condon & Yousef, 1975; Toulmin, 1958), the narrative forms
approach (Lewis, 1987), and intercultural communication
perspectives (Bennett, 1986, 1979; Samovar and Porter, 1975;
Condon & Yousef, 1975; Stewart, 1971; Stewart, Danielian & Foster,
1969).

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

Major findings are presented here in three parts, e~ · 'l
representative of a main line of inquiry, and answer to one of the
research questions toward which this study has been oriented.
Three questions about the role of cultural values and patterns of
thinking in affecting international political understanding by way of
arguments have dominated this research: (1) what salient arguments
concerning Central American foreign policies exist in either Reagan
and Arias' public discourse; how do Reagan and Arias' particular
arguments reveal their respective underlying cultural values; and (3)
how might the difference in underlying cultural values affect mutual
understanding.
The following results are based on an analysis first of
Presidents Reagan and Arias' arguments using the Toulmin model,
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second Lewis' narrative forms approach for Reagan's discourses, and
third an Intercultural Communication Perspective as articulated
chiefly by Condon and Yousef (1975), Edward C. Stewart (1969, et al.,
1971) and Milton Bennett (1976, 1986).
The results are as follow:
First, fifty salient political arguments concerning Reagan and
Arias' respective policies toward Central American political, economic
and military problems have been found.
Second, each speaker's arguments have revealed contrasting
underlying cultural values which operate by way of warrants
pertaining to conclusions (claims).
And third, these differences in underlying cultural values may
affect the mutual understanding between the two political leaders,
since their discourses did not acknowledge each other's cultural
differences in values and patterns of thinking when engaging in
public exchanges about contemporary Central American problems.
Because of the novelty of this type of interdisciplinary
interpretative research, the results found could not be compared
adequately with previous research. However, some pertinent
intercultural implications, as well as directions for action can be
drawn. The differences found between the speakers were reduced to
five value orientations: On the one hand, Reagan valued equality,
progress with a future temporal orientation, doing and individualism,
fairness. His thinking operates in a linear- inductive way, and relies
on dichotomous patterns to make comparisons and judgments. On
the other hand, Arias valued equality but respected traditional
hierarchies and status, progress with a present temporal orientation,
and he valued being and individuality. His thinking operates in an
interactive-deductive, non-linear way, and relies on relativist
patterns which are non-dichotomous, leading him to suggest rather
than judge or compare. In addition, most of the warrants underlying
cultural values appear to be built on the assumption of similarity
which is not a recommended strategy for intercultural interaction
"[I]ncreasing sensitivity to difference, [by] moving from
'ethnocentrism' through stages of greater recognition and acceptance
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of difference" (Bennett, 1986, p. 27) seems to be the key in order to
acquire intercultural sensitivity and increase communication
effectiveness across cultures. That is what Bennett has called
e thnorelati vi sm.
Because of the preceding noted differences between Reagan
and Arias, the following misunderstanding, among others, could
occur: mutual negative evaluation, reluctance to cooperate, distrust,
different (if not opposite,) readings of each other's arguments,
undermining of each others' efforts in Central America, and creating
conditions for escalation of political conflict with unpredictable
consequences. These likely misunderstandings may explain some of
the change in attitude of the United States towards Costa Rica cited in
the first chapter, which resulted in a substantial reduction of
economical aid, less support to alleviate the Costa Rican external debt
with the International Monetary Fund, and delays in sending highranked U.S. embassy officials to Costa Rica, etc.
However, further critical and descriptive research should be
done to confirm such connections between U.S. governments policies
towards Costa Rica and differences in cultural values and patterns of
thinking underpinning open disagreement through public political
arguments.

LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY

Some limitations to this study should be noticed. First of all,
when the disagreements between Reagan and Arias' discourses were
noted, the point of departure was that they argue about similar
issues from different standpoints and to similar audiences. However,
it may be possible that some if not many of the addresses and
speeches selected for this thesis were not directed toward each other
or to the other's policies, but to their own constituencies. If that is
the case, this thesis may not be useful to draw broad conclusions
about the relation between the U.S. and Costa Rica, but as a potential
line for further research. Secondly, the number of discourses
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selected, fourteen in all, and arguments chosen, fifty altogether, may
not be enough to draw generalizations about how cultural differences
affect political understanding internationally. Those discourse were
selected because they focus on Central American issues, and
articulate two distinctive policies toward the solution of the state of
affairs in the region where U.S. and Costa Rica have concern for
political and economical stability at the core of their foreign policies.
It is important for future researchers to explore content in
areas of Ronald Reagan and Oscar Arias' discourses which were
overlooked in this research because of the selective use of speeches
made. Additionally, the application of more formal methods of
content analysis may bring major understanding about how
differences in cultural values by way of warrants pertaining to
claims affect understanding across cultures.

RECOM11ENDATIONS

In order to change or improve Reagan and Arias' intercultural
perspective, they must acknowledge that "fundamental to
ethnorelativism is the assumption that cultures can only be
understood relative to one another. There is no absolute standard of
'rightness' or 'goodness' that can be applied to cultural behavior.
Cultural difference is neither good nor bad, it is just different. One's
own culture is not anymore central to reality than any other culture"
(Bennett, 1986, p. 46).
At this point, taking into account the findings of this research
and Bennett's affirmation in the sense that intercultural sensitivity is
not natural, I am going to suggest some concrete actions that can be
easily taken that can help Reagan and Arias, as political speakers, can
improve and their mutual relationship as representatives of different
cultures. Each speaker must be more sensitive in intercultural terms,
but not simply sensitive in understanding their counterpart's culture
specifics, what Stewart (1971) calls cultural norms or customs from
which each member of a culture is usually aware. In order to be
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better at intercultural communication, both leaders must overcome
their ethnocentric point of view and assume a difference-based
approach to intercultural interaction. That is, to assume differences
implies that to interact within a culture, a person can keep his or her
own identity. It means, for instance, that Reagan and Arias, will
interact based upon their own frame of reference, trying to create
meaning together and attempting to originate a third culture. The
concept created by John Useem, Ruth Useem, and John Donoghue
(1963) supposes a culture different from either Reagan's or Arias'
culture, that is from either the first or the second culture. In the
third culture (Useem, et al., 1963, p. 171) it is assumed that the
relationship between the members of the two societies, Costa Rica
and United States for example, as well as the two societies
themselves, should be coordinate. Instead of assuming that
everybody is the same, a difference-based approach implies that
there are differences among people from different cultures and one
must respect them. Therefore, they need to shift completely from
the similarity-based approach to the difference-based approach;
otherwise they may continue being attached to a philosophical
perspective which share the following kind of thinking: "the Central
Americans or the U.S. Americans have to learn from us because we
are better; our institutions must be imitated by those countries from
where the political opponents or allies come; if they do what we do
they will have what we have: i.e. freedom, higher standard of living,
fair rules, better health, peace, democracy, etc." It is my concern also
that through education and training in intercultural communication,
as Bennett stated, politicians as well as public officials will be able to
modify their "natural" conduct. So, a positive way to start a change
in the presidents' intercultural approach is to improve the kind of
training that they and their staff and cabinet receive and provide.
Actually almost none of the Reagan and Arias staffers undertook any
training or advising concerned with the intercultural communication
perspective. In addition, for both statesmen some basic reading
would be advisable that will give them a better understanding of the
assumptions that support the intercultural communication.
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In conclusion, the direction that I suggest for both political
speakers is to encourage adjustment to each other's views rather
than try to assimilate each other, taking into account only their own
states' interests. This must be accomplished by creating or
increasing cultural self-awareness and sensitivity. I think that
Reagan and Arias should be more aware of their own culture, values.
patterns of thinking and norms when engaging in mutual political
debates. Each speaker must learn to respect the other's culture in
general as something normal, maybe different from their own
culture but not wrong. The orientation of their rhetoric could be to
try to create a third culture or perspective from which arguing,
facilitated by the fact that they need each other to achieve their
democratic goals. This will allow each to increase his repertoire, and
not impose his own U.S. culture or Costa Rican culture as a substitute
of the other's culture, even if one or both of them realizes a kind of
weakness in the other's position, because of a cultural bias, when
commg to political debates before their own constituency or before
foreign audiences.
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APPENDIX

REAGAN'S AND ARIAS' ARGUMENTS

This appendix includes the selection of public addresses,
speeches and discourses exchanged by the Presidents Ronald Reagan
and Oscar Arias concerning the Central American situation. Reagan's
rhetorical pieces were made public between 1982 and 1988, where
Arias' speeches were presented between 1986 and 1988. Fourteen
discourses has been included in this section, seven for each speaker.
A second selection took place for this thesis research, leaving for
study purposes twenty-seven arguments from Reagan's discourses
and twenty-three from Arias' discourses. The following arguments
have been numbered from 1 to 27 for Reagan, and from 28 to 50 for
Arias. Each of the arguments presented has been broken down into
its parts in accordance to Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation
(1958).
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Discourse 1
"Aid to the Caribbean Basin"
Date: February 24, 1982
Argument I
P. 322
Data:
[There are several reasons why the U.S. and Latin America share a
common destiny.]
Backing:
1- The migrants in US and Latin America faced,
a) the dangers and dreams of build a new world
b) moved from colonialism to nationhood
c) came from Europe for better life and searching of God
d) fought for independence and freedom
2- Ideals and principles are also similar
a) Rooted in self-government and nonintervention
b) Belief in the rule of the law
c) Belief that a nation cannot be liberated by depriving its people of
liberty
d) Knowledge that a state cannot be free when its independence is
subordinated to a foreign power
e) Knowledge that a government cannot be democratic if it refuses to
take a test of a free election.
Warrant:
(Since), Nations who seek and share common destiny are
consubstantial
Claim:
(So), "We are the new world ... We [ Latin America and the US) are all
America."
Reasoning by Generalization
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Arg. II
P. 322
D.

John F. Kennedy has said that "all people in America have the
mission to demonstrate that man's unsatisfied aspiration for
economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free
men working within the framework of democratic institutions."
W:

(Since), people who share same aspirations are the same.

B:
John F. Kennedy is a credible source

c
(So), in the "commitment to freedom and independence, the people of
the hemisphere are one".
Reasoning by Classification
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Arg. III
P. 324
D:

There is a new colonialism in the Caribbean Basin which endanger
democratic development.

B:
1 - Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua served as a vehicle for the
expansion of Soviet-backed Cuban-managed support for violent
revolution in Central America
2 - Communism has exploited and aggravated temporary economic
suffering to seize power, and then to institutionalize economic
deprivation and suppress human rights
3 - Six million people worldwide are refugees from communist
systems.
4 - Guerillas systematically burn, bomb and destroy bridges, farms
and power and transportation systems to worsening economic and
social problems in Central America.
W:
Communism and democracy are the two world ideologies at struggle.

c
(So), "There are only two possible futures for Central America :
[democracy or dictatorship]"
Reasoning by Classification
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Arg. IV (*)
P. 324-5
D:
Communists fear the success of democracy.

B:
a) Cuban and Soviets train guerillas to destabilize successful
democracies.
b) Communists exploit Central American economical problems
through an international campaign.
c) Cuba is receiving now more military supplies than m any year
since 1962 missile crisis.
d) Nicaragua serves as a platform for covert military actions
W:
(Since), "Democratic success will make the radical message a hollow
one."

c
(So), "Foes of freedom will destabilize Caribbean basin countries."
Reasoning by Sign
Arg. V
P. 325
D:
"Freedom's foes would stamp out human rights, pluralism and free
institutions."

B:
a) Guerrillas armed and supported by and through Cuba
attempting to impose Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in El Salvador.
b) 194Ts Rio Treaty has established reciprocal defense
responsibilities linked to "our common democratic ideals"
( consubstantial).

W:
(Since), The US supports freedom, (Policeman role).

c
(So), "Freedom and peace requires U.S. help for those nations
confronted with communist aggression."
Reasoning by Sign

13 1
Arg. VI (*)
P. 325
D.

"The people of the Caribbean and Central America are in a
fundamental sense fellow Americans."

B:
1 - Freedom, pluralism and free enterprise are common values to US
and Central America and the Caribbean people.
2 - US as well as Central America and the Caribbean belong to the
same Western civilization.
W:

(Since), Freedom is the common destiny for the hemisphere.

B:
Freedom cannot survive if US neighbors live in misery and
oppression.

c
(So), "[US] must help Central America and the Caribbean people to
protect those values and principles that shape the proud heritage of
this hemisphere."
Reasoning by Generalization
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Discourse 2
"The problems in Central America"
Date: April 27, 1983. Joint session of Congress
Argument VII
Page 450
Data:
"[CA] problems directly affect the security and well-being of [US]
people"
Backing:
a) Many US cities are closer to Central American countries than to
Washington D.C.
b) In an European crisis half of our (US) supplies for NA TO would go
through the Caribbean basin by sea.
c) Two thirds of all US foreign trade and petroleum pass through the
Panama canal and the Caribbean.
d) In early 1942 a handful of Hitler's submarines sank more tonnage
there than in all the Atlantic Ocean. They did so without an single
naval base.
e) Today Cuba is host to a Soviet combat brigade, a submarine base
capable of serving soviet submarines and military air bases visited
regularly by Soviet military aircraft.
Warrant:
(Since), Regions which affects the security and well being of the U.S.
are as important as the U.S.-proper.
Backing:
It is in the public interest to care about Central America and the
Caribbean troubled area.
Claims:
(So), "Central America is the US lifeline to the outside world."
Reasoning by Parallel
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Arg. VIII
P. 451
D.

US works in good faith towards Nicaragua and other regional
countries.

B:
a) send massive economic aid to the new regime in Nicaragua, more
than any other after the Sandinist revolution of 1979: By January
1981, our emergency relief and recovery aid to Nicaragua totaled
$118 million. US sent five times more aid to Nicaragua in the first
two years of Sandinist rule, then in the last two of Somoza's regime.
b) Nicaragua reject US peace efforts.
c) Nicaragua treated us as enemies.
d) Sandinists broke their promises for democratization before the
OAS.
W:
(Since), US acts in good faith to those who also act in good faith.

B:
Justice

c
(So), "Our actions were hardly the actions of a nation implacably
hostile to Nicaragua."
Reasoning by Sign
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Arg. IX (*)
P.451
D.

Salvadoran leftist guerrillas have turn against their own people.

B:
a) Guerrillas destroyed hundreds of buses and trucks to keep the
people from getting to the polling places.
b) Their slogan was brutal;" Vote today, die tonight."
c) A woman threatened by the guerrillas when voting told them
:"you cant' kill us all." Guerrillas don't want elections they may know
they would be defeated."
d) The government has invited the guerillas to participate in the
election and is preparing an amnesty law. But they sabotaged the
economy.
W:

(Since), Those who turn against their own are only out for
themselves.

c
(So), "Salvadoran guerrillas are a small minority who want power for
themselves and their backers."
Reasoning by Generalization
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Arg. X
P. 452
D:

The "US has attempted to have a dialogue with Nicaragua.
[Nicaragua] persists in spreading violence."

But

B:
a) Costa Rica is a peaceful and unarmed democracy which has been
object of bullying and threats from the Nicaragua's dictators
b) 36 new military basis have been built in Nicaragua (only 13 were
during the Somoza regime).
c) The headquarters of the Salvadoran guerillas is in the capital,
Managua, Nicaragua. From there attacks are directed against El
Salvador.
W:

(Since), What is true of these cases is true of all.
war.

These are signs of

c
(So), "Nicaragua refuses to make peace.[ ... ]
Reasoning by Sign

They are against peace."
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Arg. XI
P. 452-3

D.
The goal of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan backed "professional
guerrilla movements in Central America is as simple as it is sinister to destabilize the entire region from the Panama Canal to Mexico."

B:
a) Cayetano Carpio, Salvadoran guerrilla leader, has ,said that after El
Salvador falls, El Salvador and Nicaragua would be "arm-in-arm and
struggling for the total liberation of Central America."
b) Nicaragua like to pretend that they are today being attacked by
forces based in Honduras.
c) Nicaragua radio announced on April 18th the creation of a new,
unified revolutionary coordinating board to push forward the
Marxist struggle in Honduras.
d) Nicaragua, supported by weapons and military resources provided
by the communist bloc, represses its own people, refuses to make
peace and sponsors a guerrilla war against El Salvador.
e) More than a million of Central Americans had fled from Central
America violence.
f) President Ortega has said that Nicaragua are willing to receive
nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union if it is offered
W:
(Since), The US has a stake in preserving stability.

c
(So), The "US will support the security of the region's threatened
nations."
Reasoning by Cause
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Arg. XII
P. 452
D.

President Truman said in 1947 that the "US must support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures."

B:
a) Truman's policies secure decades of peace, prosperity and
freedom.
b) Political and strategic stakes of postwar Europe are the same m
Central America today.
W:
(Since), Today the situation is the same as then. "The political and
strategic stakes are the same [in Central America]."

B:
Truman is a credible source

c
(So), "President Truman's words are as apt today as they were m
1947."
Reasoning by Generalization
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Discourse 3
"Central America Policy"
Date: May 9, 1984 National Television from the White House
Argument XIII
Page 482-83
Data:
The "US doesn't start wars."
Backing:
a) U.S. won't send troops to Central America, like it did in Vietnam
b) Soviet Union provides Cuban with $4 billion in assistance and it
sends tons of weapons to foment revolution in our hemisphere
c) U.S. instead help its friends defend themselves.
d) U.S. maintain military strength in order to deter and defend
against aggression - to preserve freedom and peace.
Warrant:
(Since), The U.S. defense policy stresses military strength to preserve
peace and freedom.
Backing:
U.S. defense policy is based on fair play and freedom as values.
Claim:
(So), "U.S. will be never the aggressor."
Reasoning by Sign
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Arg. XIV
P.485
D.

"People in CA want hope and better lifes."

B:
a) Costa Rica is a well-established and healthy democracy.
b) Honduras made a peaceful transition to democracy in 1982.
c) In Guatemala political parties and trade unions are functioning;
this country can return to full constitutional government in 1985.
d) 26 of 33 Latin American countries are democracies or striving to
become democracies.
e) El Salvador is a democracy but many of its people cannot farm
their land, they will be killed by the guerrillas if they do.
W:

(Since), Only democracy and freedom guarantees people's hope for a
better future.
B:

Majority and Freedom

c
(So), "Central American people want freedom and democracy."
Reasoning by Generalization
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Arg. XV
P. 486
D.

Those who dissented in the past from the US position against the
Nazis and U.S involvement in World War II did not stop the war.

B:
a) People who called for not involvement equals the isolationist of
the late1930's who knew what was happening in Europe but chose
not to face the terrible challenge history had given them.
b) The appetite of international aggressors is never satisfied.
c) Isolationist used a policy of wishful thinking.
W:
(Since), Isolation didn't stop the Nazis in the past, there is no reason
why it can stop now the Sandinistas or the communists.

B:
Wishful thinking policy is dangerous
There is no control of the events.

c
(So), "[Isolationism] assures war instead of preventing it."
Reasoning by Analogy
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Discourse 4
"Nicaragua"
Date: March 16, 1986
Delivered to the American people
Argument XVI
Page 386
Data:
Nicaragua is a Soviet-Cuban backed communist regime.
Warrant:
(Since), The Soviet Union and Cuba back regimes because of a desire
to dominate.
Claim:
(So), The "Soviets and [the] Cubans can become the dominant powers
in the regional corridor."
Reasoning by Sign
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Arg. XVII
P. 387
D.

The "Sandinistas are transforming their nation into a safe house, a
command post for international terrorism."

B:
a) Sandinists sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Honduras that led last summer to the murder of four US marines in a
cafe in El Salvador.
b) Italy has charged Nicaragua with harboring their worst terrorist,
the Red Brigades.
c) Sandinist are involved in the international drug trade; a picture,
secretly taken at a military airfield outside Managua, shows Federico
Vaughn, a top aide to one of the nine commandants who rule
Nicaragua, loading an aircraft with illegal narcotics, bound for the
United States.
W:

(Since), Nations that harbor and support terrorists are outlaws.

B:
Sandinists threat the public interest and freedom.

c
(So), "Nicaragua is an outlaw regime."
Reasoning by Sign
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Arg. XVIII
P. 388
D.

Freedom fighters are fighting communism in hopes of democracy.

B:
a) Freedom fighters who had fought the old Somoza dictatorship
took the hills when the Sandinist betrayed the revolution.
b) They like the French resistance that fought the Nazis, begin
fighting the Soviet bloc communist and the Nicaraguan collaborators.
c) Today its numbers more than 20.000 volunteers but are running
out of supplies and cannot fight against the Soviet helicopter
gunships.
W:
(Since), Those who support and fight for democracy help the U.S.

c
(So), "The resistance has contributed directly to the security of the
U.S."
Reasoning by Cause
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Arg. XIX(*)
P. 388
D.

The U.S. has been acting responsible in Central America.

B:
a) Ten times US officers have met and tried to reason with the
Sandinists.
b) Ten times those officers were rebuffed.
c) In 1985 US endorsed church-mediated negotiations between the
regime and the resistance. The Soviets and the Sandinists responded
with a rapid arms buildup of mortars, tanks, artillery and helicopter
gunships.
d) The Soviet Union, Warsaw pact, Fidel Castro, Arafat, Qaddafi and
the Ayatollah decided to support the communists in Nicaragua, US
didn't take a last decision on this respect.
W:
(Since), Responsible nations pursue all arenas of peace.

c
(So), "US have sought and still seeks - a negotiated peace and a
democratic future in a free Nicaragua."
Reasoning by Sign
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Arg.:XX
P. 388
D.

There are signs that Nicaragua isn't preparing for peace.

B:
a) Soviets, East Germans, Bulgarians, North Koreans, Cubans and
terrorists from the PLO and the Red Brigades are in Nicaragua.
b) Soviets have invested $600 million to build Nicaragua into an
armed force almost the size of Mexico's, a country 15 times as large,
and 25 times as populous.
c) Daniel Ortega go to Cuba to endorse Castro's cause for the
worldwide triumph of communism.
W:
(Since), To stand for peace, a nation cannot harbor aggresive
intentions.

c
(So), "Nicaragua doesn't stand for peace."
Reasoning by Sign
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Discourse 5
"State of the Union"
Date: January 27,1987,
Congress
Argument XXI
Page 20
Data:
Backed by U.S. diplomatic effort in the region, democracy in C.A. 1s
moving forward despite aggression from Nicaragua.
Backing:
a) More than two thirds of Latin American countries is democratic
contrasted with one third ten years ago.
b) US has fostered economical and military aid to countries willing
to become democracies.
c) Nicaragua is the only country in Central America which has
resisted diplomatic efforts to become democratic. In fact, they
sponsor guerrillas against other democracies such as El Salvador.
d) The headquarters of the Salvadoran guerrillas are in Managua.
e) Freedom and basic human rights are not granted for all in
Nicaragua.
Warrant:
(Since), The only thing that can stop democratization is violent
communist expansion.
Claim:
(So), "[US] diplomatic efforts for democratization in Central America
will fail if communism prevails and expands from Nicaragua."
Reasoning by Classification

147

Arg. XXII
P. 259
D.

The Freedom fighters are struggling against the Soviets and
communism.

B:
a) Soviet backed and Cuban managed military build-up in Nicaragua
b) International terrorists camped there.
c) Political repression and a belligerent attitude against its neighbors
d) Freedom fighters have dwarf Sandinists forces gaining time to US
democratic efforts in the region.
W:
(Since), Noble struggles prevail.

B:
Communism can only be deter by military strength.

c
(So), "(The] Freedom Fighters won't allow the Soviets to have a
beachhead [on the U.S. doorstep]."
Reasoning by Cause
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Discourse 6
"Central America at a Critical Juncture"

Date: October 7, 1987 Organization of American States
Argument XXIII
Page 2
Data:
"Nicaragua does not grant freedom to all its citizens."
Backing:
a) A Christian Democrat legal demonstration of 4.000 person-rally
was harassed by "divine mobs" paramilitary Sandinist forces.
b) Former president of Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campins, who was
there condemn the repression.
c) A dozen of radio stations remain closed or censored in Nicaragua.
d) Only two media were reopen "La Prensa" and "Radio Catolica."
e) Only a few political prisoners were release. 10.000 remain
imprisoned.
Warrant:
(Since), Democracy guarantees freedom for all.
Backing:
Freedom and Majoritarism
Claim:
(So), "The Sandinistas in Nicaragua are not democratic."
Reasoning by Sign
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Arg. XXIV
P. 3
D.

"Nicaraguans are against tyranny and they fight for this ideal." B:
a) The US independence freedom fighters of 1776 like the
Nicaraguans today stood against outside tyranny, and freedom.
b) The US freedom fighter like those in Nicaragua were mainly
farmers fighting against odds.

W:
(Since), Those who fight communism in Nicaragua today and those
who fought for independence in 1776 are alike.

c
(So) "They [Freedom Fighters] are fighting for independence [in
Nicaragua]."
Reasoning by Parallel
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Arg.
P. 4
D:

xxv

The U.S. is committed to preserve freedom and democracy anywhere,
particularly, on its doorstep.

B:
Central America and Caribbean.
W:

(Since), The commander-in-chief (President) is the protector of that
moral commitment.

c
(So) Reagan "won't walk away from the fight for freedom in Central
America."
Reasoning by Cause
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Discourse 7
"State of the Union"
Delivered to the American People
Date: January 25 , 1988
Argument XXVI
Page 6
Data:
The Sandinistas broke their promises for democratic reforms, by
failing to comply with international accords.
Backing:
a) Consensus among the four Central American democratic Presidents
that the Sandinists have not comply with the Arias peace plan.
b) They did not comply with the 1979's OAS agreement to
democratize Nicaragua after the revolution.
c) Roger Miranda, former high-level Sandinist Major, revealed that as
Sandinists talk of peace its government has established plans for a
large 600,000-man army.
Warrant:
(Since), Past violations of trust can only be overcome by large acts of
good faith.
Backing:
Communism uses democratic facades to hide their real intentions
Claims:
(So), "[Sandinist'] challenge is to take irreversible steps towards
democracy."
Reasoning by Sign

152
Arg. XXVII
P. 261
D.

There are signs of democratization in Central America.

B:
a) 90% of CA countries are democratic now, as contrasted with 33%
ten years ago.
b) Resurgence of democracy is owed to those who have struggle to
take control of their own destiny.
c) Democratic rights negotiate with church authorities and release of
few political prisoners even in non-democratic Nicaragua result from
resistance by freedom fighters.
W:
(Since), Moves toward democracy reflect a general trend.

c
(So), "Political freedom is winning a battle against totalitarism. [... ]
Freedom is finding its way in CA."
Reasoning by Sign.

153
ARIAS' ARGUMENTS
Discourse 1
"Democracy in the Americas"
Date: December 5, 1986
International Press Club, Washington DC
Argument XXVIII (*)
Page 11
Data:
Never have so many people been able to freely elect their leaders as
has been in the last 5 years.
Warrant:
(Since), Elect freely political leaders is the cornerstone of democracy
Backing:
Majority principle
Claim:
(So), "Latin America is living an era of return to democracy."
Reasoning by Sign

Arg #XXIX
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Arg XXIX
P. 12
D.

Using the "pretext of saving democracy," severe economic
deprivations are being forced in Latin American countries.
W:
(Since), Unfair economic treatment precludes democracy.

B:
In account that economical and political development is only possible
m peace.

c
(So), "Sacrificing the political system of freedom to very severe
economic pressures could have serious consequences for the political
future of Latin America."
Reasoning by Classification.
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Arg. :xxx

P. 13
D.

Costa Rica is peaceful, neutral and believe in self-determination for
Nicaragua and all countries.

B:
a) Costa Rica first proclaimed its neutrality 163 years ago.
b) Costa Rica has reiterated its neutrality during its history on more
than ten occasions because of continuous internal armed conflict in
Nicaragua.
c) Again Costa Rica reiterated its neutrality before a new internal
conflict in Nicaragua after the Sandinist revolution.
d) Costa Rica has encouraged peaceful negotiations and dialogue
between nicaraguans.
W:
(Since), Physical intervention in other country's affairs is not
appropriate for neutral, peaceful democracies.

B:
(In account of the fact that) Non-intervention is the base of peace
among nations.

c
(So), "Nicaraguans are the ones who must solve their own internal
problems."
Reasoning by Generalization
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Arg. :XXXI (*)
P. 13
D:

"Costa Ricans believe in democracy not in totalitarism."

B:
a) For the last five years Costa Rica has been active proponent of
democracy and freedom.
b) Costa Rica support a lasting peace for the Americas through the so
called Alliance for Democracy.
W:

(Since), Democracy cannot be neutral in the battle of ideas but it can
with respect to war.

B:
Democracy attains freedom of expression not violence.

c
(So), "Costa Rica is neutral with respect to war."
Reasoning by Sign.

157
Discourse 2
"The roads to freedom"
Date: December 4, 1986, Rose Garden White House
Argument XXXII
Page 17
Data:
Democracy causes peace.
Backing:
a) Costa Rica is a democracy whose people live in peace.
b) Costa Rica has been bordered on the North (Nicaragua) by
oppression and violence.
c) Oppression and violence are part of most tyrannies, and troubled
countries in Central America.
Warrant:
(Since), Only democracy can guarantee reconciliation, allow peace,
and preclude violence from crossing borders.
Backing:
Tyrannies should fall to have democracy.
Claim:
(So), "Only if we endeavor to enable all people to enjoy democracy,
[and] cause the downfall of all tyrants equally, can we prevent
threats to world peace from growing in the Americas."
Reasoning by Cause
Arg. XXXIII
P. 17
D.
Internal and external factors are detrimental to Central American
economies.

W:
(Since), Good economical conditions precludes poverty and social
unrest.

c
(So), "Central America needs ... fair treatment in trade and finance to
avoid war and oppression."
Reasoning by Cause.
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Discourse 3
"La Paz esta primero" (Peace is first)
Date: February 26, 1987 State's dinner offered by the president of
Mexico, Miguel de la Madrid
Argument XXXIV
Page 11-12
Data:
Several discussions have taken place to foster a major role of Central
Americans in the peaceful solution of their own conflicts.
Backing:
a) Contadora Group and its Latin American support group.
b) Central American Presidents summit in Guatemala; it is now also
as Esquipulas I
Warrant:
(Since), Words are part of a commitment, action is the next logical
step.
Backing:
Words without deeds isn't useful (Pragmatism)
Claim:
(So), "Peace and democracy demand datelines and deeds, no just
words. The accords in good faith bring us closer to the peace, if we
are able to put them into practice."
Reasoning by Classification.
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Discourse 4
"Oportunidades para la democracia in America" (Opportunities for
democracy in Latin America)
Date: October 25, 1986, Cariari Hotel, Exchange Conference on "La
democratizaci6n del hemisferio" (The Democratization of the
hemisphere)
Argument XXXV (*)
Page 5
Data:
Undemocratic regimes deny individual human rights.
Backing;
a) Under dictatorship most citizens experience injustice and poverty.
b) A free man shouldn't expect equality, freedom of expression,
dialogue and transaction, and peace in a dictatorship, but democracy.
Warrant:
(Since), Individual rights are the basis of peace and justice.
Backing:
Individual is above government.
Claims:
(So), "Democracy is the only road to peace and justice [in Central
America]."
Reasoning by Generalization.

160
Arg. XXXVI
P. 5
D.

History shows that those who are afraid of freedom allowed
oppression of any sign to exist.

B:
a) Many individuals lived and still live under oppression from either
leftist or rightist regimes.
b) People who are value-less or afraid of freedom oppressed its own
people.
W:

(Since), Political oppression can only be exerted by people who are
afraid of freedom and without human values.

B:
Majority has a voice only within democracy.

c
(So), "The only defense against the enemies of freedom is to
strengthen freedom and democratic institutions."
Reasoning by Generalization.

161
Arg. XXXVII

P. 6
D.

New democracies do not receive the economical and political support
expected from international economic institutions and the
industrialized world.

B:
a) Dictatorships have received better economic treatment than most
new democracies.
b) New international crisis and enormous external debts may new
democracies' economies very fragile.
c) International creditors put the hardest conditions on new
democracies to pay their obligations.
W:

(Since), Economical and political support from the industrialized
world and international economic institutions are prerequisite of
democracy.

c
(So), "[It] is too early to talk about consolidation of democratic era m
Latin America."
Reasoning by Sign.

162
Arg. XXXVIII
P.6
D.
In Central America, people are affected by things not under their
own control.
B:

a) Urban lower class and countryside's population don't have an
active participation in political programs which affect their destiny.
b) Social and economical obstacles limit their involvement in public
affairs.
c) More migration from the countryside to the cities contributes to
increase political tensions and subsequent urban violence.
W:
(Since), People denied a voice will respond with violence.

B:
Democracy is based on the participation of majorities.

c
(So), "Migratory problems and violence will continue spreading."
Reasoning by Generalization.

163
Discourse 5
"La Paz no tiene fronteras" (Peace doesn't recognize borders)
Date: December 10, 1987
Argument XXXIX (*)

Oslo, Norway

Page 5
Data:
There are many viewpoints and interest in the Central American
conflict.
Backing:
a) This process involves numerous decisions based on consultation
with many people from different countries.
b) Peace is an attitude, way of life, and a way of conflict-solving
which is based on consensus.
c) Most successful peace negotiations are based on understanding
and mutual respect.
Warrant:
(Since), "[Peace] cannot be forced on the smallest nation nor can it be
imposed by the biggest nation."
Backing:
Consensus attains taking into account the voice of the majority
Claim:
(So), "The endless process [of peace] requires that we work
together."
Reasoning by Generalization.

164
Arg.

xxxx (*)

P. 7
D.

Defeatist statements about Costa Rican peace plan paralyze people
and jeopardize peace efforts in Central America

B:
It is more easy to forecast defeat than triumph, war than peace.
W:
(Since), Peace is to be sought as desirable

B:
Defeatism denies human will.

c
(So), "I can't accept defeatism."
Reasoning by Cause.

165
Arg.XXXXI
P. 7
D.
Latin American tyrannies are opressing their people
B:

Torture, exile, gigantic external debt, corruption and injustice are
the heritage of dictatorships in Latin America.
W:
(Since), The oppresion of the people should never be supported
B:
It is in the public interest to don't support tyrannies, but
democracies

c
(So), "We [democrats] should be neither political nor economic allies
of governments which oppress their peoples."
Reasoning by Generalization.

Arg. XXXXII (*)
P.11
D.
There are those in Central America who preach dogma and stifle
creativity
B:

Pascal said that "we know too much to be skeptics. We know too little
to be dogmatic."

W:
(Since), That which stifles human creativity is bad/evil

B:
Pascal is credible source

c
(So), "Dogmas are the enemies of human creativity [individual
freedom]."
Reasoning by Classification
Arg. XXXXIII

166
P. 11
D:
C.A. population's freedom clamor for centuries had not been
adequately addressed by politician and public officials.

B:
Most tyrannies oppressed, exiled, and tortured Central Americans to
quiet claims for freedom, peace and justice.
W:

(Since), People's call for freedom cannot long be supressed.

B:
The voice of the Majority should be respected

c
(So), "Ignoring the clamor for freedom may condemn Latin America
to another century of horror and death."
Reasoning by Analogy.

Arg.XXXXIV
P. 12
D:
Costa Rica has been strongly free and democratic without having
an army.

B:
a) Lowest index of unemployment in the Western Hemisphere
b) Strong policies to guarantee housing to all its citizens
c) Free and mandatory education for all.
d) Socialized health care for everybody.
W:
(Since), What free people believe in their souls and live can't be
taken away

c
(So), "[Democracy] is invulnerable before the totalitarian attacks."
Reasoning by Generalization.

167
Arg.XXXXV
P. 14
D.
Some people pursue war in Central America

B:
a) They accept the war as the normal course of events in the Central
America scenario.
b) They react with wrath and fury when peace efforts take place m
Central America.
c) For them history consists of military victories.
W:

(Since), The pursuit of war is antagonistic to the pursuit of peace.
B:

Civilized behavior is rooted in rationality

c
(So), "No matter how noble the crusade is [peace efforts], some wish
for and encourage its failure."
Reasoning by Classification.

168
Arg.XXXXVI
P. 14
D:
Nuclear and conventional war have their own horrors.

B:
78 million people have died during the conventional wars of this
century.
W:

(Since), Nuclear war and conventional war are equally harmful and
threatening to humankind.

B:
Life is sacred

c
(So), "[We must] equally fight together against the possibility of
another Hiroshima, or another Vietnam."
Reasoning by Parallel.

]
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Discourse 6
"La paz- suprema esperanza del mundo" (Peace - supreme hope of
the world)
Date: University of Peace, October 6, 1988
Argument XXXXVII (*)
Page 8
Data:
Conflicting parties in Central America are having a hard time
reconciling their differences to reach a peace accord with each other.
Backing:
a) Same parties who fight each other claim for peace.
b) More intransigent parties in peace talks are those who claims for
keeping the dialogue open.
Warrant:
(Since), Reconciliation is a prerequisite to peace
Claim:
(So), "[In Central America] there is no peace because there 1s no
reconciliation."
Reasoning by Cause.

170
Discourse 7
"Architects of the century of peace"
Date: Georgetown University, May 28, 1988
Argument XXXXVIII
Page 15-16
Data:
"The Central American Peace Plan is being crucified [as Christ was m
his time]."
W:
(Since), The force of peace could not be silence.
Claim:
(So), "History repeats itself [with the Arias Peace Plan]."
Reasoning by Parallel.

Arg. IL

P.19
D.
The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are negotiating peace and reducing nuclear
armaments through peaceful dialogue.
W:
(Since), Conflict between superpowers is not different than conflict
between Central American nations.

c
(So), "There is no reason to support the use of military force in the
solution of Central American conflict."
Reasoning by Parallel.

171

Arg L
P. 23
D.

Various events and people in Central America show desire for peace

B:
An indigenous woman in Guatemala thanks Oscar Arias for his efforts
for peace after the signature by Central American presidents of the
peace accord of Esquipulas I.
W:
(Since), The desire for peace is permeating Central America.

c
(So), "Central America is committed to peace."
Reasoning by Generalization

